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The purpose of this study was to conduct a conceptual design study for a lunar
transfer vehicle, thus considering the question of whether or not it is possible to conduct a
human lunar return given a restriction to exclusively use currently existing technology. A
variety of analytic, parametric, and heuristic techniques were used to develop a
comprehensive vehicle design. A modular design resulted, consisting of six component
spacecraft and an associated mission control environment. A cost analysis was
performed to determine an approximate funding level required to support such a vehicle.
Recommendations for integration of this lunar transfer vehicle design with a lunar surface
base are provided as well as recommendations for further research.
Preface
Since 1990, the author of this study has worked as a summer intern and co-op at
NASA — Johnson Space Center. During these work tours, he had the opportunity to work
on a variety of projects involving the space shuttle, space station and crew return vehicle.
He was exposed to Shuttle, Station, and Apollo-era astronauts, flight controllers, and
engineers. He also saw NASA engineers face the frustrations of hiring freezes, never-
ending space station budget cuts and redesigns, and a political “glass ceiling” that seemed
to sentence NASA to unambitious low Earth orbit efforts as far as human spaceflight is
concerned. In this context, he began to consider the question of why NASA’s space
goals are so often unrealized and whether or not some of these goals are even feasible,
given the current technological and political constraints. This led to the decision to
undertake the design of a lunar transfer vehicle. While this design is in the context of a
larger question of an overall lunar exploration program, the scope of this dissertation is
focused specifically on the human transportation element, namely the lunar transfer
vehicle. The investigation described in the pages that follow has allowed the author to
explore questions about these matters in a systematic fashion.
Chapter One provides an introduction to this study and a rationale for a return to
the moon. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (the legislation that
established NASA) is reviewed in the context of a lunar return, along with a brief
discussion of the merits of lunar return as opposed to immediate Mars expeditions.
Finally, specific objectives for a lunar mission that would utilize this lunar transfer
vehicle are developed.
vi
Chapter Two provides an extended review of previous scholarly studies which
have focused on spacecraft design in general as well as specific lunar exploration design
concepts. The majority of these concepts make generous assumptions about the
willingness of Congress to fund new super-heavy lift launch vehicles — assumptions that
seem dubious at best and demonstrate the need for an approach to lunar mission design
that focuses more on the nation’s current space launch capabilities.
Chapter Three provides an overview to the lunar transfer vehicle and illustrates
the flight sequence involved in human lunar transfer. Vehicle orbits and trajectories are
also calculated.
Chapters Four through Nine discuss the conceptual design of each spacecraft that
composes the modular lunar transfer vehicle. Parametric, analytic, and heuristic
algorithms are applied to size vehicle mass and power requirements.
Chapter Ten explains the Mission Control Center support infrastructure required
by the lunar transfer vehicle. Spacecraft functions and mission timelines are assessed to
determine flight controller responsibilities and staffing levels.
Chapter Eleven provides a cost estimation for the vehicle. Parametric cost
estimates are used to determine vehicle development and production costs. Published
launch vehicle rates are used to determine launch costs. Correlations with space shuttle
and space station mission control are used to determine mission operations costs.
Chapter Twelve summarizes the study, identifies its major theses, and offers an








DEDICATION..... - _ - - III
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS- - - - - - ----IV
ABSTRACT - --
v
PREFACE - - VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS -- - - - - VIII
LIST OF TABLES - - - XV
LIST OF FIGURES - - - -- -- XVII
CHAPTER ONE — INTRODUCTION - 1
1.1 BACKGROUND...................................................................................................... 1
1.2 WHY WE ARE IN SPACE ........................................................................................ 3
1.3 REASONS FOR SPACEFLIGHT TO THE MOON ......................................................... 6
1.4 IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION OR INACTION .............................................................. 9
Historical Lesson of the Chinese Treasure Fleet........................................................ 9
Military Implications ................................................................................................ 10
1.5 REASONS TO NOT JUST Do MARS ...................................................................... 13
1.6 REASONS SPACE EFFORTS HAVE DISAPPOINTED ............................................... 15
1.7 CONGRESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................ 17
1.8 ISSUES RELATING TO NASA BUDGET CYCLE...................................................... 22
1.9 HowWE SHOULD Go TO THE MOON ................................................................. 25
1.10 MISSION OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................... 26
1.1 l REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS ................................................................... 34
1.12 DISSERTATION OBJECTIVES ............................................................................... 39
CHAPTER TWO — REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE - ...... - 41
2.1 OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 41
2.2 SPACECRAFT DESIGN LITERATURE .................................................................... 41
2.3 SPACECRAFT DESIGN STANDARDS AND TOOLS .................................................. 50
2.4 LUNAR MISSION LITERATURE ............................................................................ 52
2.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR DISSERTATION ..................................................................... 58
CHAPTER THREE- CISLUNAR TRAJECTORIES AND VEHICLE
OVERVIEW - _ 61
3.1 TRAJECTORY LIMITING FACTORS ....................................................................... 61
Heavy Lift Capability .........................................'....................................................... 61
Cryogenic Boilofi'...................................................................................................... 62
Low Performance ofStorable Propellants ............................................................... 62
Non-Viability ofNuclear Propulsion ........................................................................ 63
Human Vulnerability in Cislunar Space ................................................................... 63
3.2 CISLUNAR TRAJECTORIES INVESTIGATED .......................................................... 64
viii
3.3 ALGORITHMS USED ........................................................................................... 65
 
3.4 TRAJECTORY DETERMINATIONS ........................................................................ 66
Outbound................................................................................................................... 66
Inbound ..................................................................................................................... 68
Abort Options — Deorbit and Direct Entry ............................................................... 69
3.5 POTENTIAL TRAJECTORY SOLUTIONS ................................................................ 69
3.6 TRAJECTORY SUMMARY .................................................................................... 71
3.7 IMPLICATIONS OF USING L1 ............................................................................... 71
Overview ................................................................................................................... 71
Analysis of Collinear Equilibrium Points ................................................................. 74
Application ofJSC Study to Trailblazer LTV Problem............................................. 75
Collinear Equilibrium Point Orbits .......................................................................... 76
JSC Controller and Application to LTVDesign ....................................................... 77
3.8 LTV OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 79
3.9 LTV SPACECRAPT DESCRIPTIONS ...................................................................... 81
Crew Module (CM). ............................................................................................... 81
Propulsion Module 1 (PMI). .................................................................................... 81
Aeroshell Module (AM)............................................................................................. 81
Ascent-Descent Vehicle (ADV). ................................................................................ 82
Propulsion Module 2 (PM2). .................................................................................... 82
Fuel Tanker (FT)....................................................................................................... 83
3.10 LTV COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE........................................................... 84
3.1 1 LTV FLIGHT OPERATIONS ................................................................................. 86
3.12 TRAILBLAZER MISSIONS .................................................................................... 87
Trailblazer 1 : Infrastructure Development Mission 1 ............................................. 87
Trailblazer 2: Infrastructure Development Mission 2 .............................................. 87
Trailblazer 3: Infrastructure Development Mission 3 .............................................. 88
Trailblazer 4: Fuel Prospecting Mission 1 ............................................................... 89
Trailblazer 5: Fuel Prospecting Mission 2 ............................................................... 89
Trailblazer 6: Fuel Prospecting Mission 3 ............................................................... 89
Trailblazer 7: Commercial Opportunities Mission 1 ................................................ 90
Trailblazer 8: Commercial Opportunities Mission 2................................................ 90
CHAPTER FOUR - LTV CREW MODULE - 91
4.1 OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 91
CM-ADV Rendezvous Location ................................................................................ 91
CM Vehicle Selection ................................................................................................ 92
4.2 LIFE SUPPORT .................................................................................................... 95
Atmosphere Management.......................................................................................... 95
Cabin Pressure.......................................................................................................... 98
Water Supply ........................................................................................................... 100
Radiation Protection ............................................................................................... 101
4.3 CREW ACCOMMODATIONS ............................................................................... 102
4.4 AVIONICS ......................................................................................................... 107
GPS ......................................................................................................................... 107
ix
Star Sensors ............................................................................................................ 107
 
 
Sun Sensors ............................................................................................................. 108
Horizon Sensors ...................................................................................................... 108
Laser Rangefinders ................................................................................................. 109
Air Data System ...................................................................................................... 109
Vehicle Autonomy ................................................................................................... 109
Flight Computer...................................................................................................... 112
4.5 DOCKING SYSTEMS .......................................................................................... 115
4.6 THERMAL CONTROL ........................................................................................ 117
4.7 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 120
4.8 PROPULSION..................................................................................................... 124
Engine Selection...................................................................................................... 125




4.9 POWER ............................................................................................................. 129
Batteries .................................................................................................................. 129
Solar Arrays ............................................................................................................ 131
4.10 MASS PROPERTIES ........................................................................................... 132
4.11 ELV DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................... 133
CHAPTER FIVE — PROPULSION MODULE 1 - - 134
5.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 134
5.2 RADIATION PROTECTION ................................................................................. 134
Polyethylene Shielding ............................................................................................ 136
PM] Radiation Shield ............................................................................................. 137
5.3 AVIONICS ......................................................................................................... 138
5.4 DOCKING SYSTEMS .......................................................................................... 139
5.5 THERMAL CONTROL ........................................................................................ 140
5.6 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 141
5.7 PROPULSION..................................................................................................... 142
MPS Configuration ................................................................................................. 142
MPS Performance ................................................................................................... 142
ACS Configuration.................................................................................................. I43
ACS Performance.................................................................................................... 143
PM] Refueling ........................................................................................................ 144
Tank Sizing .............................................................................................................. 145
5.8 POWER ............................................................................................................. 145
5.9 MASS PROPERTIES ........................................................................................... 147
5.10 ELV DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................... 147
5.11 PM] REDUNDANCY ......................................................................................... 147
CHAPTER SIX - ASCENT DESCENT VEHICLE - - 149
6.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 149
Implications ofSurface Base on ADVDesign and Operations .............................. 149
 
Differencesfrom other Lunar Lander Concepts ..................................................... 150
6.2 ADV CONFIGURATION .................................................................................... 151
ADV Cabin Wall Thickness..................................................................................... 152
6.3 LIFE SUPPORT .................................................................................................. 153
6.4 AVIONICS ......................................................................................................... 154
6.5 DOCKING SYSTEMS .......................................................................................... 155
6.6 THERMAL CONTROL ........................................................................................ 155
6.7 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 156
6.8 PROPULSION..................................................................................................... 156
SLS Configuration................................................................................................... 156
SLS Performance .................................................................................................... 157
ACS Configuration.................................................................................................. 157
ACS Performance.................................................................................................... 158
ADV Refueling ........................................................................................................ 158
Tank Sizing.............................................................................................................. 159
6.9 POWER ............................................................................................................. 160
6.10 MASS PROPERTIES ........................................................................................... 161
6.11 ELV DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................... 161
CHAPTER SEVEN — AEROSHELL MODULE -- - -- - 163
7.1 BACKGROUND.................................................................................................. 163
7.2 AEROCAPTURE MODULE DIMENSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ................................... 165
7.3 AEROCAPTURE MODULE FLIGHT PROFILE ....................................................... 167
7.4 ENTRY ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................... 168
Flight Trajectory ..................................................................................................... 168
Entry Heating .......................................................................................................... 169
7.5 THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS OVERVIEW .................................................. 174
7.6 TPS MATERIAL SELECTION ............................................................................. 177
7.7 TPS SIZING ...................................................................................................... 182
7.8 TPS STRUCTURE .............................................................................................. 184





Power ...................................................................................................................... 1 90
Thermal ................................................................................................................... 1 91
Ballast ..................................................................................................................... 192
Mass Properties ...................................................................................................... 192
7.10 AEROSHELL DEPLOYMENT............................................................................... 194
Earth Launch .......................................................................................................... 194
Trans L1 Injection ................................................................................................... 194
L1 Stationkeeping.................................................................................................... 195
Aeroshell Module Redundancy ............................................................................... 195
xi




CHAPTER EIGHT — FUEL TANKER -- 197
8.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 197
8.2 FUEL TANKER MISSIONS .................................................................................. 197
Low Lunar Orbit Refuel Mission 1 (FT-M1) .......................................................... 197
LEO Refuel Mission (FT-M2) ................................................................................. 198
Outbound L] Refuel Mission (FT-M3) ................................................................... 198
Low Lunar Orbit Refuel Mission 2 (FT-M4) .......................................................... 198
Inbound L] Refuel Mission (FT-M5) ...................................................................... 198
8.3 AVIONICS ......................................................................................................... 199
8.4 DOCKING ......................................................................................................... 199
8.5 THERMAL......................................................................................................... 200
8.6 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 200
8.7 PROPULSION..................................................................................................... 201
MPS Configuration ................................................................................................. 20]
MPS Performance ................................................................................................... 20]
ACS Configuration.................................................................................................. 20]
ACS Performance.................................................................................................... 203
Refueling Operations .............................................................................................. 203
Tank Sizing .............................................................................................................. 204
8.8 POWER ............................................................................................................. 205
8.9 MASS PROPERTIES ........................................................................................... 206
8.10 ELV DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................... 206
CHAPTER NINE - PROPULSION MODULE 2 207
9.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 207
9.2 CENTAUR SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 207
9.3 DELTA 4-2 SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 208
9.4 PM2 DOCKING SYSTEMS ................................................................................. 209
9.5 COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................... 210
9.6 POWER ............................................................................................................. 210





FT Missions............................................................................................................. 2] 1
9.8 PROPULSION..................................................................................................... 212
9.9 MASS PROPERTIES ........................................................................................... 212
9.10 ELV DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................... 213
CHAPTER TEN - LTV MISSION CONTROL ANALYSIS -- - 215
10.1 APOLLO, SHUTTLE, AND ISS MOCR/FCR POSITIONS ..................................... 218
Apollo MOCR Positions.......................................................................................... 218
xii
Shuttle FCR Positions with descriptions................................................................. 218
 
 
ISS FCR Positions with descriptions ...................................................................... 219
10.2 LTV MCC DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................. 220
LTVFCR Position Descriptions ............................................................................. 223
LTVMCC Communications .................................................................................... 226
LTVMCC Staffing................................................................................................... 227
LTVMCC Console Configuration .......................................................................... 230
LTVMCC Facility Location ................................................................................... 231
CHAPTER ELEVEN - COST ESTIMATION - - 232
11.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 232
11.2 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK COSTS .............................................................. 233
1 1.3 VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION COSTS ......................................... 234
11.4 LAUNCH COSTS ................................................................................................ 237
Space Shuttle ........................................................................................................... 237
Expendable Launch Vehicles .................................................................................. 239
ELV Payload Assignments ...................................................................................... 240
Trailblazer Launch Expenses.................................................................................. 24]
1 1.5 SPACECRAFT PROPELLANT COSTS ................................................................... 241
11.6 MISSION OPERATIONS COSTS .......................................................................... 242
Mission Control Center Facility and Software Development................................. 242
Flight Controller and other Personnel Expenses ................................................... 245
Mission Operations Cost Summary ........................................................................ 246
11.7 COST SUMMARY............................................................................................... 246
CHAPTER TWELVE - DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS - - ........ 250
12.1 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 250
12.2 DISCUSSION OF DESIGN DETAILS ..................................................................... 250
LTV Summary.......................................................................................................... 250
Program Cost.......................................................................................................... 25]
12.3 SATISFACTION OF TRAILBLAZER LTV REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS ..... 251
Assume no heavy launch vehicle development........................................................ 25]
Assume available launch vehicles will be limited to existing vehicles ................... 25]
Minimize the development ofnew space vehicles ................................................... 25]
Develop intelligent navigation systems with maximum possible versatility ........... 252
Have the ability to receive ISS and STS support but be capable ofoperating with
neither ..................................................................................................................... 252
No more than $3-6 billion increase in NASA annual budgetfor Trailblazer LTV
activities .................................................................................................................. 252
Five to ten year development timelinefrom concept tofirst crew landing............. 253
Ten year design lifetime .......................................................................................... 253
United States mission with limited or noforeign participation .............................. 253
Minimize ground operations support team (flight controllers, program ofi‘ices, etc. ).
................................................................................................................................. 253
12.4 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 253
xiii
12.5 FUTURE WORK ................................................................................................ 255
 
LIST OF REFERENCES -- - -- - 260




TABLE 3- 1. TRANSFERS FROM LEO TO LLO ................................................................... 271
TABLE 3-2. TRANSFERS FROM LEO TO L1 ...................................................................... 271
TABLE 3-3. TRANSFER FROM L1 TO LLO ........................................................................ 271
TABLE 3-4. TRANSFERS FROM LLO TO LEO................................................................... 271
TABLE 3-5. TRANSFERS FROM LLO TO L1 ...................................................................... 272
TABLE 36 TRANSFERS FROM L1 TO LEO ...................................................................... 272
TABLE 3-7. SIMULATED LISSAJOUS ORBITS (HOFFMAN, 1993) ....................................... 272
TABLE 4- 1. WATER MASS REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................... 272
TABLE 42 LTV CREW ACCOMMODATIONS COMPONENTS ............................................ 273
TABLE 43 SPACE RADIATOR HEAT REJECTION (LARSON AND PRANKE, 1999) ............. 273
TABLE 4-4. CM COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE....................................................... 274
TABLE 4-5. RS-72 ENGINE (RS-72, 2002) ...................................................................... 275
TABLE 46 R-4D ENGINE (R-4D - GENERAL DYNAMICS, 2002) .................................... 275
TABLE 4-7. SINGLE AXIS MANEUVERING THRUSTER SELECTION ................................... 276
TABLE 48 CREW MODULE POWER REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 277
TABLE 49 POWER REQUIREMENTS BY FLIGHT REGIME................................................. 277
TABLE 4- 10. ECLIPSE DURATION AND KWH BY FLIGHT PHASE ...................................... 278
TABLE 4-1 1. CREW MODULE MASS SUMMARY............................................................... 279
TABLE 5-1. PMl MPS BURN SUMMARY ......................................................................... 280
TABLE 5-2. PMl ACS THRUSTER ENGINE NUMBERING ................................................. 280
TABLE 5-3. PMl SINGLE AXIS MANEUVERING THRUSTER SELECTION ........................... 281
TABLE 5-4. PMl POWER BUDGET ................................................................................... 281
TABLE 5-5. PMl ECLIPSE KWH ...................................................................................... 281
TABLE 5-6. PMl DRY MASS SUMMARY ......................................................................... 282
TABLE 6-1. ADV SLS BURN SUMMARY ......................................................................... 282
TABLE 6-2. ADV ACS THRUSTER ENGINE NUMBERING................................................. 283
TABLE 6—3. ADV SINGLE AXIS MANEUVERING THRUSTER SELECTION .......................... 284
TABLE 6-4. ADV POWER REQUIREMENTS BY FLIGHT PHASE ......................................... 284
TABLE 6-5. ADV DRY MASS SUMMARY......................................................................... 285
TABLE 7- 1. AEROCAPTURE DATA FOR LUNAR RETURN (WILLIAMS, GIETZEL, ET AL AND
WILLIAMS, CURRY, ET AL) ....................................................................................... 286
TABLE 7-2. PREDICTED MAXIMUM CONVECTIVE HEATING ............................................ 286
TABLE 7-3. AM RCS THRUSTER ENGINE NUMBERING ................................................... 287
TABLE 7-4. AM SINGLE AXIS MANEUVERING THRUSTER SELECTION ............................ 287
TABLE 7-5. AEROSHELL MODULE SYSTEMS MASS SUMMARY........................................ 288
TABLE 8- 1. FT MPS BURN SUMMARY ............................................................................ 288
TABLE 82 FT ACS THRUSTER ENGINE NUMBERING..................................................... 289
TABLE 8-3. FT SINGLE AXIS MANEUVERING THRUSTER SELECTION .............................. 289
TABLE 8-4. FI‘ ACS PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS ......................................................... 289
TABLE 8-5. FT REFUELING OPERATIONS ........................................................................ 290
TABLE 8-6. FT POWER REQUIREMENTS BY FLIGHT PHASE ............................................. 290
TABLE 8-7. FUEL TANKER DRY MASS SUMMARY ........................................................... 291
XV
TABLE 9-1. MB-60 (MB-XX, 2002) ............................................................................... 292
TABLE 9-2. CENTAUR PM-2 CAPACITY .......................................................................... 293
TABLE 9-3. DELTA 4-2 RL- 10B-2 PM-2 CAPACITY........................................................ 293
TABLE 94. DELTA 4-2 MB-6O PM-2 CAPACITY............................................................. 293
TABLE 9-5. ELV LIFT CAPACITY FOR CENTAUR PM2 .................................................... 294
TABLE 9-6. ELV LIFT CAPACITY FOR DELTA 4-2 RL— 10B-2 PM2 ................................. 294
TABLE 9-7 . ELV LIFT CAPACITY FOR DELTA 4-2 MB-6O PM2 ...................................... 294
TABLE 1 1- 1. LTV SPACECRAFT COST ESTIMATES .......................................................... 295
TABLE 112 ATLAS FAMILY PAYLOAD AND COST DATA ............................................... 295
TABLE 11-3. DELTA FAMILY PAYLOAD AND COST DATA ...............................................'295
TABLE 1 1-4. ELV PERCENT CAPACITY OF TRAILBLAZER SPACECRAFT .......................... 296
TABLE 1 1-5. ELV PERCENT CAPACITY OF SELECTED COMBINED SPACECRAFT ............. 296
TABLE 1 1-6. LTV INIIIAL EXPEDITION LAUNCH COSTS ................................................. 297
TABLE 1 1-7. LTV SUBSEQUENT EVEN NUMBERED EXPEDITION LAUNCH COSTS ........... 297
TABLE 1 1-8. LTV SUBSEQUENT ODD NUMBERED EXPEDIIION LAUNCH COSTS ............ 298
TABLE 1 19 LTV FUEL MASS: INITIAL EXPEDITION ...................................................... 298
TABLE 1 1- 10. LTV FUEL MASS: SUBSEQUENT ODD NUMBERED EXPEDITIONS .............. 299
TABLE 1 1-1 1. LTV FUEL MASS: SUBSEQUENT ODD NUMBERED EXPEDIIIONS .............. 299
TABLE 1 1-12. TOTAL LTV FUEL COSTS ......................................................................... 300
TABLE 1 1-13. X-38 V201 GROUND CONTROL CENTER COST DATA (RADER, 2002) ...... 300
TABLE 1 1-14. TRAILBLAZER LTV MCC DEVELOPMENT COSTS ..................................... 301
TABLE 11-15. LTV MCC FLIGHT CONTROLLER SALARY COSTS .................................... 302
TABLE 1 1-16. TRAILBLAZER LTV PROGRAM TOTAL COSTS ........................................... 302




FIGURE 2- 1. HLR OPEN COCKPIT LANDER ..................................................................... 304
FIGURE 3- 1. LEO OUTBOUND DELTA-v OPTIONS ........................................................... 305
FIGURE 3-2. DELTA-v AND FLIGHT TIME FROM L1 TO LLO............................................ 306
FIGURE 3-3. LLO INBOUND DELTA-V OPTIONS .............................................................. 307
FIGURE 3-4. L1 INBOUND DELTA-V OPTIONS ................................................................. 308
FIGURE 3-5. EARTH-MOON SYSTEM EQUILIBRIUM POINTS ............................................. 309
FIGURE 36 THE HALO ORBIT (HOFFMAN, 1993). .......................................................... 309
FIGURE 3-7. THE LARGE LISSAJOUS ORBIT (HOFFMAN, 1993). ...................................... 310
FIGURE 4- 1. CREW MODULE ........................................................................................... 31 1
FIGURE 4-2. EVA SUIT PRESSURE, CABIN PRESSURE, AND R-FACTOR (NASA STD 3000,
1994). ...................................................................................................................... 312
FIGURE 4-3. CREW ACCOMMODATIONS LAYOUT ............................................................ 313
FIGURE 4—4. CT-63X STAR SENSOR (CT-63X, 2002). .................... ~................................ 313
FIGURE 4-5. MIDES HORIZON SENSOR (MIDES, 2002). ................................................ 314
FIGURE 4-6. MIDES OPERATION ILLUSTRATION (MIDES, 2002). .................................. 315
FIGURE 4-7. AUToNAV OPTICAL NAVIGATION (AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION, 2002). 316
FIGURE 48 APAS DOCKING MOUNT (SCHNEIDER, ET AL, 1996). ................................... 317
FIGURE 4-9. APAS DOCKING MECHANISM (SCHNEIDER, ET AL, 1996). ........................... 317
FIGURE 4- 10. APAS WITH MDAS EXTENDIBLE BOOM (SCHNEIDER, ET AL, 1996). ........ 318
FIGURE 4-11. MDAS STEEL PLATE ................................................................................ 318
FIGURE 4-12. MDAS IN DOCKING POSITION (SCHNEIDER, ET AL, 1996). ........................ 319
FIGURE 4-13. MGS STEEL PLATE ORIENTATION............................................................. 320
FIGURE 4-14. CM ACS THRUSTER LOCATIONS .............................................................. 321
FIGURE 5-1. PROPULSION MODULE 1 .............................................................................. 322
FIGURE 5-2. PMl ACS THRUSTER LOCATIONS ............................................................... 323
FIGURE 6- 1. ASCENT DESCENT VEHICLE ........................................................................ 324
FIGURE 62. ADV ACS THRUSTER LOCATIONS, SIDE AND TOP VIEWS .......................... 325
FIGURE 7-1. AEROSHELL MODULE: DOMED CYLINDER CONFIGURATION ....................... 326
FIGURE 7-2. AM RCS THRUSTER ENGINE NUMBERING .................................................. 327
FIGURE 7-3. LTV PREPARING TO ENTER AEROCAPTURE MODULE ................................. 328
FIGURE 7-4. LTV RETRACTION INTO AEROCAPTURE MODULE ........................ ............... 328
FIGURE 7-5. LTV POSITIONING AT DOCKING MOUNTS ................................................... 328
FIGURE 76 LTV DOCKED WITH AM ............................................................................. 329
FIGURE 8- 1. FUEL TANKER ............................................................................................. 329
FIGURE 8-2. FUEL TANKER ACS THRUSTER LOCATIONS ................................................ 330
FIGURE 9-1. CENTAUR UPPER STAGE (ATLAS LAUNCH SYSTEM MISSION PLANNER’S
GUIDE, 2001) ........................................................................................................... 331
FIGURE 9-2. DELTA 4-2 UPPER STAGE (DELTA IV PAYLOAD PLANNERS GUIDE, 2000).. 331
FIGURE 9-3. RL- 10B-2 (RL-lOB-2, 2002) ...................................................................... 332
FIGURE 11-1. ATLAS V FAMILY (ATLAS V ADDENDUM, 1999) ...................................... 333
FIGURE 1 1-2. DELTA IV FAMILY (DELTA IV PAYLOAD PLANNER’S GUIDE, 2000) ......... 334
FIGURE 1 1-3. TRAILBLAZER LTV PROGRAM COST DISTRIBUTION ................................. 335
xvii

Chapter One — Introduction
1.1 Background
The call for a return to the moon has been repeatedly given ever Since the final
lunar landing. During the period from 1969 to 1972, NASA landed six Apollo missions
on the moon, thus fulfilling President Kennedy’s pledge to land a man on the moon and
return him safely to Earth. These six missions are the only times human beings have left
the immediate vicinity of the Earth to travel to another heavenly body. In subsequent
years, however, calls to return to the moon have fallen largely on deaf ears. Many times
the response has been the question of why. This question is asked with more intensity
under the current climate. NASA is facing immense challenges. Costs for the
International Space Station are climbing into orbit; Mars is far too unknown for human
flight; robotic missions seem to fail nearly as often as they succeed; and the shuttle is
becoming increasingly obsolete. What is the focus NASA Should pursue in the 21St
century? Clearly NASA must maintain the shuttle and work towards a new launch
system. They must complete the International Space Station, especially now that
components are in orbit. Robotic exploration of the solar system must continue. But for
all practical purposes, this might as well be a path to nowhere. While there are definite
long-term payoffs — in the 20+ year timeframe — there is far too much room in the near
future for a loss of identity and purpose.
Much of the space program has been criticized for failing to communicate clear
rationales for space activity. Neither the scientific community nor the American public
will find much reward in a space program that Spends the next five years building a space
station, the next ten years Visiting it, and in the background launches occasional robotic
probes into Space, not to be heard from until years later. While these necessary tasks
Should by all means continue, NASA must place them in the context of a bold vision for
the future of spaceflight. This is not a vision consisting of timetables, hypothetical
programs and budget projections. Those have been so over-used that they carry no
meaning. Instead, this vision must go back to the 1958 Space Act and reiterate why
NASA exists; it must create an inspiring image of a future in Space where people beyond
the agency and its contractors are participants.
NASA has the congressionally mandated responsibility of opening up the Space
frontier. Simply investigating LEO does not constitute an opening of the space frontier;
this vision must include the moon as a near term destination. There are valid
opportunities for commercial enterprise on the moon. NASA must find them and bring
them into reality. There are operational procedures and engineering technologies
necessary to support lunar operations. We have no idea what they are. NASA must
develop and validate them. There are resources in the lunar environment that will
enhance our capabilities for missions in other areas of Space, both within the Earth-Moon
system and further into the solar system. NASA must identify these resources, learn how
to tap into them, create the conditions to make their use a reality, and pass this knowledge
on to American private industry.
In a sense, there are a series of three questions that must be resolved to address
the issue of rationale. Why Should we be in space? Even if we should be in Space, why
should we go to the moon? If we go to the moon, what should that mission accomplish?
With such a rationale established, it is then appropriate to proceed to the point of
developing actual mission architectures.
1.2 Why we are in Space
Why do we have a Space program? Whenever technical difficulties or budgetary
problems come to light, this is often the first question out of the mouths of critics. What
is there about Space that could possibly warrant the expenditures and risks incurred in our
endeavors? What are some reasons to enter Space? Why should we enter space at all?
There are several reasons that come to mind. It is human desire (or alternately, it is
human destiny/drive). There are commercial opportunities in space. Finally, there is a
national mandate to explore Space and develop its potential.
Throughout human history, mankind has exhibited a drive to reach beyond the
boundaries Of the time. Simple curiosity, desires to make new discoveries to improve the
quality of life, and a belief that it iS simply our purpose have all fueled this drive.
Ancient explorers set sail — at tremendous expense and risk — seeking to traverse vast,
unknown oceans and explore newly discovered continents. Even today, we Still explore
these oceans and continents, driven to discover and understand parts of this planet that
remain a mystery to us. In the days of American expansion, people believed it was
literally God’s will — or a Manifest Destiny — for the country to span the continent. This
is similar to the beliefs of emperors and kings throughout history who created vast
nations. In a sense, space is the perfect “Manifest Destiny.” Unlike the more brutal
expansions in the world’s past, there are no native inhabitants to be oppressed by
expansion. Space is vast. No matter how far outward we expand there is still new,
unexplored territory.
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 states in Title I, See. 102 (c),
“The Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as established by title H of this Act)
seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of
space” (National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958).
We have only barely begun to fathom commercial possibilities in space. Just fifty
years ago, only the Shrewdest of visionaries could have even imagined that Space could
be a potential source of profits. Yet today, the commercial communications industry is
dependent on orbiting satellites to provide a communications infrastructure. While
commercial profiteering is primarily limited at present to communications in Earth orbit,
an unwritten future contains an incalculable domain of business ventures.
A point of inspiration is the city of Las Vegas, and really most of the major cities
in the American southwest. Las Vegas is an island of financial profiteering in the middle
of the desert. When explorers first reached the area where Vegas now stands, there was
nothing but sand. Anyone would have laughed at the idea of creating a major tourist
attraction in that location. Yet someone found a way to develop a wildly successful
business plan. Hotel and casino Operators now have no problem Spending incredible
amounts of money to develop their facilities, for they know with confidence that they can
turn a profit. Space is Where Las Vegas was a hundred or so years ago. It is a
wilderness, seemingly with very little to offer. But to the proper visionary, it is the
source of the next financial empire. Whether through tourism, manufacturing, scientific
discovery, or some other source of income, multitudes of new industries await
development.
Finally, in Title 1, Sec. 102 (d), the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
(as amended) imposes the following rationale for American Space activity:
((1) The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute
materially to one or more of the following objectives:
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena in the atmosphere
and space;
(2) The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency of
aeronautical and space vehicles;
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments,
equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space;
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the
Opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space
activities for peaceful and scientific purposes;
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space
science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful
activities within and outside the atmosphere;
(6) The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of
discoveries that have military value or significance, and the furnishing by such
agencies, to the civilian agency established to direct and control nonmilitary
aeronautical and space activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or
significance to that agency;
(7) Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work
done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof;
(8) The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the United
States, with close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United States in
order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment; and
(9) The preservation of the United States preeminent position in aeronautics and space
through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing
processes.
Implicit in this statute are previously mentioned reasons to enter Space as well as
the directives to develop and maintain the technological capability to accomplish such
goals. Scientific knowledge, commercial utilization, and American leadership are all
directly cited as rationales in the Act. The human drive to explore is not directly
mentioned, but is perhaps an indirect motivation for several of the listed objectives.
SO now that we have a reason for Space activity, what is it that makes the moon an
important destination? Is orbiting the Earth truly insufficient? With all the recent interest
in Mars, why not forget about the moon and Simply concentrate on Earth-orbiting Space
stations and Mars exploration?
1.3 Reasons for Spaceflight to the Moon
Some critics of lunar exploration would ask Why go to the moon? They would
say that we’ve been there with Apollo, so there is nothing new to gain. Their logic,
however, is flawed. From Salyut to Skylab, to Mir, and now to ISS, we are establishing a
human presence in Earth orbit. With each program we are learning new things and
accomplishing more than its predecessors. Yes, we have been to the moon before, but
only in the most minimal fashion. Simply put, we have not accomplished much of
Significance on the moon. It is true that the Apollo program provided incredible
breakthroughs and discoveries, but only a tiny fraction of what can ultimately be gained
from the moon was accomplished through the Apollo program. To say, “why go to the
moon Since we’ve been there with Apollo,” is comparable to saying, “Why build the
International Space Station (ISS) since we’ve been in orbit with Mercury capsules.” Just
as Mercury was incapable Of performing the missions ISS Will accomplish, Apollo was
also incapable of conducting the missions a return to the moon would perform. The
moon has also been recommended as the next focus for space exploration by numerous
committees established to guide Space agencies (Schrunk, 2000).
The following elements of the National Aeronautics and Space Act Of 1958 are
perhaps the most directly applicable to the call for a return to the moon:
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment,
supplies, and living organisms through space;
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the
opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space
activities for peaceful and scientific purposes;
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and Space
science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities
within and outside the atmosphere;
(9) The preservation of the United States preeminent position in aeronautics and space through
research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes.
We currently have no vehicles capable of carrying people to the moon, or any
equipment and supplies beyond that of small robotic rovers and science landers.
However, only relatively modest developments are required to develop this capability
from a synthesis of currently existing Space systems. The moon is logically the next
developmental step in terms of space transportation capability and compliance with Title
1, Sec. 102 (d) 3 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act.
Numerous researchers have proposed benefits from lunar utilization, and
establishing Studies of those benefits is specifically part of the NASA mission. Another
directly relevant section of the National Aeronautics and Space Act that also Speaks
towards this issue is, “The Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States
requires that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as established by title H
of this Act) seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial
use of Space.” This provision does include the moon and is one of the reasons that NASA
must return to the moon as quickly as possible.
Just as an arbitrary example on a somewhat morbid level, the Space burial
company Celestis has recently begun selling lunar burials (in addition to their already
existing Earth orbital services). For a price Of $12,500, an interested person can have a
symbolic portion of their departed loved one’s ashes impacted on the lunar surface
(Celestis, Inc. 2002). The first participant in this service was Dr. Eugene Shoemaker —
co-discoverer of the famous Shoemaker-Levy comet — whose ashes were carried in a
Celestis flight capsule as a secondary payload aboard NASA’S Lunar Prospector. His
ashes impacted the lunar surface on July 31, 1999 (Celestis, Inc. 2002).
This is one of the first of many lunar business opportunities that could be realized
in the next few decades. Numerous other business schemes for lunar revenue are being
formulated left and right. Ideas run the gamut from Simple banking and commerce using
remote servers on the moon to Wild, grandiose schemes for mining and construction
colonies, lunar fueling stations, and even massive lunar hotels — the ultimate Las Vegas
of the future. There is, however, one thing all these concepts have in common. They
require the development of a capability to travel to the moon and return safely. “The key
to unlocking Space for business and individuals who will use it to make money, pay
taxes, create jobs, and improve the economy is to facilitate the access to space”
(Hammond, 1999). Celestis dealt with the Earth to moon transit problem by flying as a
secondary payload on a NASA mission, but was only able to do so because its payloads
are small — on the order of seven grams of cremated ash per customer. Many companies
Sit Sidelined, unable to participate in off-world economies until NASA develops
commercially viable Cislunar transportation architectures capable of transporting large
payloads.
There is a threshold that leads to entirely new worlds of business opportunities on
the moon. We have not yet crossed that threshold. One reason to return to the moon is to
take us a Step closer. It is NASA’S congressionally mandated responsibility to do all
Within its power to take us that step closer.
Finally, the United States cannot hope to maintain its leadership role if another
nation is the one to implement these studies and develop the associated spacecraft. Or, as
Oberg puts it, “Control of space is the linchpin upon which a nation’s space power
depends” (Oberg, 2002). Simply put, if the Untied States wishes to remain a superpower,
this is one of the missions it must conduct.
1.4 Implications of Action or Inaction
“Technological competence is required to become a Space power, and conversely,
technological benefits are derived from being a space power...A properly organized and
efficiently aimed space industry enhances national wealth” (Oberg, 2002). In other
words, pursuing a lunar program would invariably produce technological benefits and
enhanced global status. Conversely, abandoning a Space effort could produce opposite
results.
Historical Lesson ofthe Chinese Treasure Fleet
As a sobering historical observation, Oberg brings out the lesson of the Chinese
“Treasure Fleet.” In the early 14th Century, China fielded immense ocean-going vessels
that visited the East Indies, northern Australia, and the east coast of Africa (Oberg, 2002).
In the 14003, the Chinese sent out seven expeditions of these great ships, in fleets
numbering up to 300 (with a mix of the giant Ships and smaller support vessels) with
crews totaling up to 27,000 people. The mere arrival of such fleets caused nations to
declare allegiance and pay tribute (Bosworth, 1999).
Chinese naval technology was far superior to that of European technology of the
same era (with the exception of navigation instruments). In 1403, Emperor Zhu Di
commissioned a naval fleet with the largest Ships measuring more than 500 feet long.
These ships were multi-masted, with up to thirteen watertight compartments. The
Europeans did not develop compartmentation until learning of this Chinese technology in
the 19‘h century, some 400 years later (Bosworth, 1999).
However, the Chinese society never found anything “worth buying” from the
“barbarians” the Chinese visited in their expeditions and were more concerned with
internal issues, such as agriculture, the army, and national infrastructure projects
(Bosworth, 1999). Consequently, the Chinese government diverted funding from the
fleet to other national interests (Oberg, 2002). In 1500, it was made a capital offense to
go to sea in a ship with more than two masts without Special permission. III 1525,
officials were authorized to destroy the larger classes of Ships (Bosworth, 1999).
A mere century after the Chinese’s fateful decision, Portuguese sailors, clearly
inferior to the no longer existent Chinese navy, retraced the Chinese routes in the
Opposite direction to “discover” China. Thus began a centuries-long confrontation
between East and West that had unfortunate consequences for the East as the West
emerged as the technologically superior and dominant force. Imagine how history would
have played out differently had China retained its fleets, allowing it to be the dominant
sea power during the 15"‘-19th centuries, as opposed to the competing European powers
of Portugal, Spain, France, and Britain.
In a sense, rockets and spacecraft are the “Treasure Fleet” for the United States
and the lesson of the Chinese Should be obvious. It is a rare and priceless commodity for
a nation to acquire technological capabilities that place it head and shoulder above its
neighbors.
Military Implications
Despite President Bush’s push for missile defense with possible Space-based
elements, Oberg (2002) believes that, “In the near term, US policy will strive to keep
Space a weapons-free sanctuary.” However, he adds that, “when warfare [inevitably]
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moves to Space, many orbital locations will prove to be advantageous, including some
that use the Moon’s gravitational field” (Oberg, 2002).
The Moon has an unlimited supply of energy (solar power, fusion and fission
nuclear reactants [Geochemistry, 2001], cryogenic and non-cryogenic rocket propellant
sources), unlimited ammunition (lunar rocks and boulders, that may be accelerated
through any number of technologies, as well as the previously mentioned nuclear
reactants), and is potentially a near-impenetrable fortress (depending on how assets are
buried and Shielded). If and when such a time comes that warfare expands into the space
environment, the nation(s) with the greatest advantage will be those already capable of
reaching and operating from Strategic orbital locations, including the moon.
The United States enjoys military superiority on land, sea, and air, but the only
nation that has ever had military superiority in Space is the Soviet Union. The only true
manned combat Spaceship flown (though others were designed) was the Soviet Union’s
Salyut 3 space station, which was launched on June 25, 1974. The station visually hunted
Skylab, demonstrating use of its sensor array in space-to-Space warfare and
reconnaissance (Almaz Part 1, 2002).
The station was armed with a 23 mm Nudelmann NR-23 aircraft cannon, intended
for defending the station against interception by American spacecraft. The NR-23 had a
total mass of 39 kg. It fired a 23 mm, 200 g projectile at a muzzle velocity of 690 m/s and
a rate of 950 rounds per minute. When being fired, this would have produced a recoil
equivalent to 2185 N of thrust. The station was easily stabilized during firing by the two
main engines of 3900 N each and the attitude control engines of 390 N each (Almaz Part
2, 2002).
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The entire station was moved by manual or remote control in order to track the
target (Almaz Part 2, 2002). On January 24, 1975, trials of a “special” system aboard
Salyut-3 were carried out with positive results at ranges from 3000 m to 500 m.
Cosmonauts have confirmed that a target satellite was destroyed in the test, which was
presumably a test of the station’s gun (Almaz Part 1, 2002). Fortunately, the gun was
never used against American Spacecraft.
The closest the United States ever came to a manned combat Spaceship was a
design concept for an Apollo Covert Space Denial (CSD) Lunar Module, which would
operate in Earth orbit, armed with black spray paint. The idea behind the “weapon” was
that the paint would ruin optics, disable solar cells, and change the target spacecraft’s
thermal characteristics, causing it to overheat and fail (Apollo LM CSD, 2002). The
Apollo CSD was never built.
While the Russians are no longer potential adversaries, it is important to consider
that as the cost of spaceflight goes down, the potential increases for adversarial nations
and other hostile entities to gain access to Space. It Should be noted that according to the
2002 Forbes list of the world’s billionaires, the average billionaire’s net worth is $3.1
billion and twelve of the world’s billionaires come from the Middle East (The World’s
Billionaires, 2002), a region that currently is not a Space power but clearly has ongoing
tensions with the United States. Given that even a can of Spray paint has weapons
potential in space, it is important that the United States maintain sufficiently superior
access to space (and to strategic locations in Space). It is a known principle of military
strategy that achieving superiority requires control of the high ground. LEO is no longer
the highest ground — the moon now claims that title. It is not useful for the United States
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to actually deploy weapons in Space — such activity could trigger a space arms race — but
a robust Space infrastructure, including lunar access, would allow for a more capable
logistics link and would allow weapons to quickly be positioned if another entity were to
deploy weapons in a threatening manner.
1.5 Reasons to Not Just do Mars
To a large extent, the preceding information has provided rationale for a return to
the moon. But in the context of possible Mars exploration, the issue of Mars must be
addressed. Some argue that the rationales for returning to the moon are valid, but they
are outweighed by the rationales for Mars exploration. These people see Lunar and Mars
programs as competitors, such that we will either do the moon now, or we will do Mars
now. The mistake in this thinking is that Mars is seen as a valid option. Unfortunately,
we truly are not ready for Mars yet. Neither the political will nor the technological
expertise exists to send humans to Mars.
It is becoming recognized that the variable specific impulse
magnetohydrodynamic rocket (VASIMR) is a prime contender for a human Mars
mission. However, VASIMR technology is far from operational and the impression some
hold that Mars is “just around the comer” is inaccurate. Additionally, VASIMR and all
Mars surface plans require nuclear reactors, a requirement which may be unable to
overcome political barriers anytime in the near future, despite a rapidly growing interest
within the Space community. Even if VASIMR iS not used, all Mars plans do require the
development of a new (Saturn V/Energia class or superior) super-heavy lift booster.
There currently is virtually no Congressional support for development of this booster
within the next five to ten years.
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There are also unresolved concerns in the areas of radiation protection, food shelf
life, plant growth, equipment repair, physiological reconditioning, surface base assembly,
extraterrestrial planetary human factors, and many others. Many of solutions to these
problems Should be verified and utilized in a low gravity, remote environment prior to
entrusting them to a Mars mission. Such verification tests assume an already existing
lunar presence capable of facilitating such tests. A return to the moon could lay the
groundwork for an infrastructure capable of supporting such research.
Another key arena that must be proved before proceeding to Mars involves the
unexpected. It has been said that our ability to send missions to Mars and beyond
depends heavily on robust systems capable of dealing with the unexpected and multi-
functional tools for dealing with the unexpected (Larson, 1999). The unexpected is the
key issue. Unexpected events occur almost routinely in human Space missions. In Earth
orbit, a full mission support team is available to help the astronauts resolve the situation.
Proposed solutions are choreographed and tested on Earth before astronauts are allowed
to proceed. There is real time direct communications as the astronauts attempt a
resolution. In most situations if no solution can be found, the mission can be aborted and
the crew can return safely to Earth. The key things lost at Mars are communications and
the ability to abort the mission. The distance is so great that real time communications
will not be possible. Also due to the distance, there are no aborts — a Mars crew cannot
abandon the base and return early. Before we send crews to Mars we need to understand
what can go wrong on a surface base and prove our ability to resolve unexpected crises.
The moon is a location where such operations can be tested.
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1.6 Reasons Space Efforts Have Disappointed
If there are so many reasons and opportunities to be in Space, and even a federal
mandate to be in space, why have space efforts often disappointed? Many see the space
program as an endeavor that costs too much and accomplishes too little. Frequently,
there is a divergence in goals that can create problems. Fundamentally, there are often
two types of people involved in the space program. On one Side (typically the NASA or
contractor engineer) is the “Space Advocate.” On the other side (typically the members
of Congress and the President) is the “Governmental Administrator.” These two often
have different goals for American space activity, which leads to clashes in program
development and budget appropriations.
The Space Advocate is the type who wants to climb the mountain because it is
there. This person has an innate desire to explore Space and expand human presence into
space. He or She appreciates the benefits we gain from the utilization of space, but would
favor space exploration even if there were no gains. The thrill is in the journey, so to
speak.
The Governmental Administrator has no such love for the journey. He or She is
only concerned with protecting and advancing the interests of the United States of
America. And that is fitting, for that is the role of the government. This person
appreciates the benefits gained from the utilization of space (which is why they authored
the National Aeronautics and Space Act in the first place), but prioritizes those benefits
among other endeavors. The metric used is how do these benefits advance the interests
of the nation?
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Since the beginning of the space program, these two factions have engaged in an
intricate dance to try to find common ground. Unfortunately, that dance has often
included false or unrealistic promises to garner support. Advocates often promise
Spacecraft designs that can do anything, when in reality they can do only a few things.
Administrators promise and sometimes even legislate directives for Space utilization that
ultimately cost far more than the Administrators are willing to spend.
During the Apollo era, the two were largely united as the Advocate desire to
explore space was coincidentally matched with the Administrator desire to demonstrate
American technological superiority over the Soviet Union. The successful landings on
the moon ironically destroyed this alliance, however. The Administrators had achieved
their goal and had nothing further to gain from lunar landings. The Advocates, on the
other hand, had merely seen their first step accomplished. Its success spurned them on to
grandiose dreams of Space colonies, Mars exploration, and lunar cities. To this day,
Advocates are struggling to understand why the Administrators “turned their backs on
them,” not fully grasping why support existed for the Apollo program and thus not
understanding why that level of support does not exist today.
Another source of disappointment is the reality that political management of a
technological endeavor is a dubious prospect at best. American politics is grounded in
the arts of compromise, lobby, and coalition building. Technological enterprises are
based in the laws of physics, thorough analysis, and relatively inflexible design. The two
do not mix well, especially when these differences are not taken into consideration.
Even once the Advocates and Administrators have agreed on a Space initiative to
support and funding has been authorized, and even when all technological challenges
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have been resolved, program expenses can still grow out of control, causing
disappointment and resentment among the Administrators. Many times, Space programs
become bloated for the purpose of job security. The temptation is great (for both civil
service and contractors) to involve an entire office in a study, even if one person can do
the job, thus justifying (to the Administrator) the existence of the office. Many excuses
are given: that it is necessary to maintain the Skill level of all employees; that we should
never be dependent on the technical competence of any one person; that multiple sets of
eyes are needed to verify data; etc. These are all true, but the result is a semi-
uncontrolled growth of project Size (and indirectly complexity, sometimes even
increasing the potential for error). The project then costs more than it would otherwise
have cost.
The result of all of this is massive, underachieving projects whose destiny is
cancellation. Almost ALL human Space programs are eventually cancelled. The only
exception to date is the Space Shuttle (It Should be pointed out that while the Shuttle is
not yet cancelled, replacements are already on drawing boards and it is only a matter of
finding Congressional spending approval). Even ISS assumes cancellation and is
designed with termination in mind. A true ongoing station would assume orbital
replacement of all components, rather than an eventual deorbiting of the complex.
1.7 Congressional Implications
The rocket equation is more than physics. In other words, the design of a
spacecraft does not begin and end with its mass properties, propulsion systems, orbital
mechanics, and so forth. The purpose for the spacecraft must be effectively
communicated to its sponsors, in the case of a NASA project, the American public and
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Congress. The greatest challenge for the a lunar program lies not in systems engineering
or orbital mechanics, but in negotiating its way through the Congressional appropriations
process. This is not to diminish any of the technical issues involved in lunar travel, but to
emphasize the reality that other factors are equally important — and in these other areas
NASA has historically not displayed the same level of effectiveness as it has in systems
engineering functions. The result has been a consistent decrease in Congressional
support for NASA Since Apollo.
In a recent AIAA magazine interview, Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) described
NASA as an agency that carries with it the hopes and dreams and imaginations of
Americans (Sietzen, 2002). Representative Mel Watt (D—NC) agrees that NASA has
historically carried those hopes and dreams, but he adds that while NASA continues to
carry that same kind of interest with a number of his colleagues, many don’t have that
image of it (Watt, 2002).
Congressman Watt also recommends that as a first step in recapturing that image,
NASA needs to make sure they are hiring a diverse employment group so that everybody
[Congress as well as all sectors of the American public] feels like they have some
connection to the missions and responsibilities of NASA (Watt, 2002).
With respect to rationale for missions to return to the moon and appropriate levels
of funding, Congressman Watt places the burden squarely on the Shoulders of NASA and
does not feel that it Congress’ place to provide that rationale. “That has to originate and
the case needs to be made by NASA; that’s kind of like me telling NIH what they Should
research next, or how they should research it, or what methodologies they Should use.
We want these agencies to be on the cutting edge and they [NASA] need to be telling us
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what the case is for exploration of the Moon or stars or other planets. Politicians
shouldn’t be telling them that; they need to be telling us that and making the case for it
and telling us what the potential is for discoveries that will be beneficial for us in our
day-to-day lives. I don’t know that I have any views or expertise I can share with them
about whether it Should be the moon or some other parts of space, but I would be
receptive to them telling me what they see as the next frontier and what the benefits are
for us in trying to pursue the next frontier. I want them to be constantly suggesting what
the next frontier Should be and making the case that that frontier is important to
humankind. Without them making that case I think the level of support will diminish
over time” (Watt, 2002).
In other words, there will be no directives coming from Congress for NASA to
return to the moon, and if there is no sufficient rationale from NASA to Congress, then
there will be no significant funding coming from Congress for NASA either. This is
central to the mistake NASA has made with LUNOX, FLO, and other lunar return
effOIts. NASA Studies have primarily presented large engineering studies, with
correspondingly large budgets, but have not presented equally impressive rationales.
“I’ve been supportive of NASA’S appropriations request,” he adds, “but I think
they’ve got to continue to make the case that what they’re doing is beneficial, just like
everyone must do. We can’t assume that what we were doing the year before is going to
be beneficial the next year and the year to come. In some ways this is more of a
challenge for agencies like NASA than agencies where we can see tangible results that
directly benefit people. A lot of times the benefits from NASA are longer term and less
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understandable in their immediate impact. So NASA needs to continue to make that
case” (Watt, 2002).
In terms of NASA’s responsibility for ensuring that the United States maintains
global leadership in all Space-related industries, Congressman Watt treats NASA
Similarly to NSF and NIH. “In same way as NSF and NIH have been in the forefront of
encouraging research into new medicines, new science, and maintaining the US on the
cutting edge of those things, NASA has similar responsibilities. I View them similarly to
NIH and NSF as one of the agencies that Should be encouraging innovation and keeping
us on the cutting edge” (Watt, 2002).
Historically, NASA projects have been subjected to budget cuts during their
design and development phases, resulting in redesigns that left the finished product less
capable — and sometimes more expensive — than the original concept. To avoid this fate,
Congressman Watt declares that any future lunar program should, “be constantly
demonstrating [to Congress] that in the earlier R&D stages sufficient commitments must
to be made to that stage to ensure the results that are projected at later Stages” (Watt,
2002).
In other words, NASA must engage in a little “communications science” if it
wants funding to do rocket science. Like rocket science, there is more involved than
initially meets the eye. Dr. Sandra Howard (2002), retired professor of Business
Communication at North Carolina A&T State University states, “The act of
communication, a complex process in itself, is compounded Significantly when you are
trying to communicate with different audiences who have different degrees of
understanding about your topic. This job can be especially problematic when you are
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presenting a funding request that must be acted upon by individuals who hold a broad
Spectrum of positions, with varying degrees of support for, as well as opposition to, the
idea of granting your request.”
Congress is faced with the awesome responsibility of ensuring that the fiscal
allocations under its control are handled both wisely and responsibly. The myriad of
funding requests and pet projects that make their way to the Capitol building each day
makes NASA’S task of securing sufficient funding from appropriations committees a
particularly daunting challenge (Sandra Howard, 2002).
It is clear that despite past deeply rooted support from the American public in
general, as well as from Congress, NASA no longer commands widespread interest or
strong fiscal backing (Sandra Howard, 2002). In order to “make the case” as
Congressman Watt suggested, it is important for NASA to first answer several key
questions.
What is the best process to use in communicating the reasons the program should
be funded? Who are the various groups and audiences who will influence the outcome
regarding your request? What is the current position of each group that must be
considered? Which persons or groups have a vested interest in supporting your project or
withholding their support? Which spokespersons are most likely to address the concerns
of the various groups most credibly and most effectively? What kinds of strategies will
be most effective in making the case? Which strategies should be avoided because they
are more likely to fail than to succeed? How much explanation do the different groups
need in order to understand the project? What kind of timetable Should be used in
promoting the endeavor (Sandra Howard, 2002)?
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How will the project meet the needs of the individuals within the various groups?
What are the important advantages and disadvantages that should be considered? How
do the advantages outweigh the disadvantages? What are the issues — the hopes, the
dreams, the fears, and the needs — that would motivate the various groups to support the
lunar effort, despite possible inherent conflicts of interest? What are the benefits that will
make the venture worth the cost — from both a financial and a non-financial perspective
(Sandra Howard, 2002)?
In developing and communicating the raison d’etre for appropriating the fiscal
support needed for the project, NASA must determine carefully which factors Should be
considered and which points should be emphasized in making its funding appeal. NASA
must communicate effectively the rationale for, as well as the benefits from, the proposed
lunar venture if the agency is to be successful in securing the psychological and financial
support necessary to carry it out (Sandra Howard, 2002).
1.8 Issues relating to NASA budget cycle
If Congress is not convinced of the need for NASA’S agenda, then Congressional
fiscal support will not materialize and disappointments with NASA space activities will
continue to be exacerbated by the budget cycle used to get funding from Congress. The
NASA budget cycle is a three-year process of budget formulation, budget enactment, and
budget execution. Budget formulation begins in January of each year with economic
forecasts and general guidelines from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). A
final NASA budget is submitted to OMB in October to be incorporated into the
President’s proposed budget, which is generally submitted to Congress in the following
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January. Congressional review generally lasts until the end of the summer or October
(Hammond, 1999).
Some problems are induced by this structure that can affect the Space mission
design process. With annual funding, there is a funding control gate for all programs at
the beginning of every fiscal year. This, of course, places constraints and risks on the
design process. A change in political alliances or public opinion could easily cause
Congress to change the level of funding allocated to a Spacecraft project under
development. An engineering design is inherently inflexible to this sort of activity, as
evidenced by costly, sometimes annual redesigns to the International Space Station
throughout the previous decade. Another problem is that the NASA budget must
compete with other federal agencies under the OMB for funding, including highly
dissimilar agencies such as the Social Security Administration, the Veteran’s
Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Hammond,
1999).
This has caused serious problems for the International Space Station from the
beginning. The Space station has been subjected to budget-induced major redesigns at
least seven times (Hammond, 1999). For nearly a decade, Congressional opponents
attempted to kill it during each budget cycle. It has gone from an eight-person station
down to a four-person station, up to a six or seven-person station, and lately back down to
a three-person station. Even today, ISS designers at the Johnson Space Center cannot say
with true confidence what the final configuration of the station will be, primarily due to
the budgetary uncertainty. This inevitably results in a vehicle that is more expensive, less
capable, and less safe than the original design.
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President Bush’s 2002 budget considers the station “US Core Station Complete”
when Node 2 is delivered on flight 10A. The impression is that American station
components scheduled for delivery after Node 2 are no longer guaranteed. “U.S.
contributions to such capabilities will be dependent on the availability of funds within the
President’s five-year budget plan for Human Space Flight, technical risks, and the
Administration’s confidence in Agency cost estimates” (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Budget for Fiscal Year 2002). Threatened components include the US
Habitation Module, Crew Return Vehicle (thus limiting the Station to a three-person
crew), and Russian Program Assurance contingency modules — Interim Control Module
and US Propulsion Module (National Aeronautics and Space Administration Budget for
Fiscal Year 2002). This “Core Station” ISS will never be able to accomplish all of the
things the full station would have attempted. It will inevitably become a source of
disappointment for those who planned to utilize the full capability of the station.
This budget cycle must be considered in the development of future space projects.
A Space vehicle is an integrated system. When a budget change forces the elimination of
a component, adjustments must be made, which can sometimes mean a redesign of the
entire vehicle. Generally, such redesigns increase the cost, delay the mission, and
increase both the technical risk for mission success and the risk for further budget
reductions and perhaps even program cancellation. Rapidly paced projects are much
more likely to survive the budget process. The more times a project faces Presidential
and Congressional review, the more opportunities exist for vital funding to be removed.
Thus, there is a rationale for programs that can be implemented reasonably quickly.
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1.9 How We Should Go to the Moon
Having established that there are valid reasons to go to the moon, a Specific plan
Should next be discussed. Simply launching forward unconstrained with only a general
consensus to send humans to the moon would inevitably bloat into the most massive
undertaking in human history. A specific concept must be established with rigid mission
parameters. Once the design is begun, these parameters Should not be changed.
“Changes of mission parameters of almost any type have potentially large effects upon
the Specifications for the subsystems which compromise and support a spacecraft”
(Fortescue, 1995). Even details as small as orbital inclinations are significant. “The
specific orbit adopted for a mission will have a strong impact on the design of the
vehicle” (Fortescue, 1995).
SO how should we go? Big? Small? National? International? Many of the
issues discussed previously in this paper suggest that a lunar mission Should begin with a
small initial presence. From three perspectives — technological, political, and
commercial, it is counterproductive to begin with a large program. A small,
“trailblazing” program can prototype and field test issues to build confidence before
massive infrastructure resources are committed. From a political perspective, it is better
for this small mission to be American. Later expansion of this “Lunar Trailblazer”
program can and should be international, but by going first and laying the foundation,
America establishes itself as the leader and sets the ground rules for lunar use. It also
ensures that America develops and possesses the full range of technology required for
Cislunar travel and lunar surface operations.
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1.10 Mission Objectives
The first step in the development of any Space mission is to develop a mission
statement and mission objectives. These drive the entire design process, as they describe
what the mission is supposed to accomplish. The scope of this dissertation is limited to
the Cislunar human transportation element, but it cannot be developed until a broad
picture for the entire mission is developed. For the Lunar Trailblazer concept advocated
in this paper, the mission Statement is to establish a human operational presence on the
moon and provide a starting point for permanent occupation and utilization of the moon.










Land people on a lunar polar region, sustain each crew for a period of at least one month, return
them safely to Earth, and rotate new crews through the lunar facility on a periodic basis
Develop an expandable lunar surface infrastructure to support future lunar launch, landing and
construction endeavors, including survey and appraisal of existing terrain features, road surfacing,
trench excavation, and landing site preparation
Develop and evaluate surface base equipment and operational techniques
Study the effect of low gravity on human health and performance
Locate and survey potential lunar fuel resources
Mine and process lunar fuels to prototype possibilities for use in support of future space activities
Return raw and processed fuel samples to earth for detailed analysis
Provide an environment capable of supporting Mars related testbed activities
Demonstrate that human space missions can be conducted in a cost effective manner
. Develop and demonstrate American competence in human spaceflight beyond the gravitational
influence of Earth
Objectives 1, 9 and 10 are directly relevant to the lunar transfer vehicle design
(Objectives 2, 3, and 4 are also indirectly relevant. Objective 7 is considered beyond the
scope of the lunar transfer vehicle and would fall under the responsibility of a separate
cargo vehicle). Specific rationales for each mission objective will now be discussed.
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]. Land people on the lunar polar region, sustain each crewfor a period ofat least one
month, and return them safely to Earth, and rotate new crews through the lunar
facility on a periodic basis
There is a saying, “if we can put men on the moon, why can’t we put men on the
moon?” This somewhat humorous statement brings out the fact that we have lost
technological expertise we once had. This nation no longer has the ability to conduct
Cislunar travel. That capability must be restored.
The surface duration is also an important factor. During the Apollo missions,
crews stayed on the lunar surface for only a few days. Of course, very little could be
done in that time. A one-month stay is important in that it allows more useful time for
mission activity to be conducted. This is an increase over the Apollo mission durations,
but it does not begin to approach the long timeframes anticipated for most Mars mission
concepts. Such a stay begins human operational experience on another surface in a small
step. Future lunar programs could gradually increase the mission duration and set
endurance records as confidence grows.
The polar regions are of interest for several reasons. The thermal environment at
the poles is much less severe than at other locations across the moon. This will greatly
simplify surface base thermal systems. Additionally, there is possible water ice (or at
least hydrogen) at the poles, which is one of the most important extraterrestrial resources
in any space development long-range plan. Further, there is the possibility of permanent
sunlight. This is particularly true at the rim of the South Pole’s Shackleton crater. In
such an area, a Simple solar power system could be used, avoiding the energy Sforage
problems present elsewhere. Finally, other than the combination of an equatorial launch
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Site to an equatorial orbit, orbital rendezvous is simpler from a polar launch site to a polar
orbit than from any other location on the moon.
It Should also be noted that the time period of one month happens to match the
moon’s rotational period. At a polar site this is not of particular importance, though it
will be relevant for landings on other locations of the moon, which are subject to
tremendous temperature variations between day and night and Significant energy
storage/production considerations. Maintaining a human presence throughout the lunar
day/night cycle forces the development of a capability to inhabit the moon throughout its
temperature extremes and provide continuous power, which are necessary capabilities for
any permanent lunar development.
2. Develop an expandable lunar surface infrastructure to supportfuture lunar launch,
landing and construction endeavors, including road surfacing, trench excavation, and
landing site preparation
While the Apollo program produced a wide variety of scientific discoveries, it
was never a design goal of the Apollo missions to leave the lunar surface more accessible
to future human expeditions. AS a result, Apollo did little to increase our capability for
future human lunar activity. The same logistical issues present in each Apollo landing
remain present for any future lunar landings.
Many extensive lunar concepts (FLO, LUNOX, etc.) face the obstacle that they
require too elaborate a support infrastructure to be practical. Landing hazards due to
uncertain terrain and possible rock obstacles are a driving concern and risk factor of
every,lunar landing. Long duration missions must be buried underneath regolith for
radiation protection. Components for most modular bases must be transported from their
landing vehicle to the base location and assembled. The lack of smoothed roads or
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pathways for transport vehicles to move base components from a landing site to a base
location complicates any discussion of base assembly. Structures may need to be
outfitted after arrival with equipment transported on a separate landing vehicle.
Additionally, items to be tested in support of a Mars mission may require pre-existing
infrastructure support.
Of course, the Apollo program could not have addressed these issues because
each Apollo mission utilized a different landing Site and there was no reason to assume
any future lunar programs would revisit an Apollo Site. However, it is reasonable to
conclude that expanded human facilities will eventually be constructed at a Trailblazer
site. By utilizing the Trailblazer presence to prepare the lunar surface for future bases,
the design of those bases and their associated delivery systems can be simplified,
reducing both the cost and the technical risk of those follow—on missions.
3. Develop and evaluate surface base equipment and operational techniques
The only facility that has ever been used as a base of operations on the lunar
surface is the Apollo LM, which hardly qualifies as a base. Before large-scale
commercial activities or extensive lunar utilization can commence, it is important to
develop operational expertise in surface habitation. Inevitably, lessons will be learned
that perhaps would have been disastrous to discover in the course of a larger lunar
commitment. If nothing else, it is a virtual certainty that many lessons will be learned in
dealing with the problem of lunar dust. The short duration Apollo Stays had considerable
dust difficulties and a Trailblazer outpost will likely be faced with new issues that the
Apollo visits were too brief to encounter.
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4. Study the effect oflow gravity on human health and performance
Microgravity experience has demonstrated that the human body is affected by a
lack of gravity. It is important to determine if these same effects are experienced in low
gravity (as opposed to microgravity) and develop appropriate countermeasures before
committing personnel to a multi-year Mars expedition. Additionally, human factors
studies have identified work environmental issues present in microgravity that are not
present, or result in different actions, in normal gravity. It is important to determine how
low gravity will affect human performance prior to committing to work station hardware
for a Mars mission.
5. Locate and survey potential lunarfuel resources
It can be Shown that significant savings can be accomplished by fueling
interplanetary spacecraft with fuel mined on the moon as opposed to fuel mined on Earth
(Robert Howard, Jr., 1999). The lower the Isp of the rocket being fueled, the greater the
advantage. The chemical propellant (LH2,L02) version of the Mars reference mission in
particular can cut roughly Sixty-six percent of its required fuel if it utilizes hydrogen and
oxygen from lunar ice resources (Robert Howard, Jr., 1999). Achieving these savings in
the Mars reference mission or in any future interplanetary mission requires the presence
of a lunar mining Operation. However, prior to the establishment of such an operation it
is important to physically confirm the presence of fuels at suspected sites, survey these
Sites to determine appropriate mining and processing locations, and validate proposed
fuel processing techniques.
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6. Mine and process lunarfuels to prototype possibilitiesfor use in support offuture
space activities
By building the technology to turn lunar resources into usable fuel, Trailblazer
can bring Mars and other deep space human missions closer to an achievable reality.
Experimenting with fuel prototypes will allow astronauts to explore a wide variety of
processing technologies and select those with the greatest promise for future commercial
use.
7. Return raw and processedfuel samples to earthfor detailed analysis
Study of raw samples may reveal alternative methods of fuel extraction, which
may be simpler, more cost efficient, or require fewer resources than previously
anticipated methods (It Should be noted that at this point, the presence of hydrogen on the
moon is still speculative. While most agree that hydrogen is present at the poles in some
form, there iS considerable discussion as to whether it is in the form Of water ice or some
other compound). This insight should be gleaned before committing to specific
techniques in support of an operational fuel processing facility on the moon. Studies may
also yield insights about the moon that might not be obvious with the equipment available
on the surface. ISS and Earth can both provide more sophisticated laboratories for this
research, allowing samples to be studied in greater detail. Returning procssed samples to
Earth will also allow for the testing of various storage devices, which will be necessary
for any large-scale utilization of lunar fuel.
8. Provide an environment capable ofsupporting Mars related testbed activities
AS has been previously stated, the moon provides an ideal location for the
evaluation of some Mars components. There is, of course, no place other than Mars
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where the Martian surface, gravity, atmosphere, weather, and radiation environment can
be represented. It cannot be overstated that the moon cannot test all aspects of a Mars
outpost. However, in many aspects, the moon is a much closer approximation than any
location on Earth or in Earth orbit. Further, tests at Trailblazer can be aborted if
necessary, with no risk to crew and no possibility of stranding astronauts away from
Earth. The Trailblazer outpost should be expandable; such that Mars test articles can be
landed at the facility and tested by Trailblazer personnel.
9. Demonstrate that human space missions can be conducted in a cost efi‘ective manner
Human space flight has come to be perceived as impossibly expensive and it is
almost expected (with resentment) that any mission will inevitably go over budget and
fail to meet its design timelines. PresidentBuSh’S decision to suspend development of
the ISS Crew Return Vehicle and Habitation Module is seen by some within NASA as a
punishment for ISS cost overruns. There is also an inhibiting myth that human Space
travel beyond LEO (and in some cases even there) is too expensive for a Single nation. A
lunar program such as the one proposed here is not too expensive for one nation, and in
fact is less expensive than the American contribution to the International Space Station.
Of course, in order to prevent the traditional cost explosion, it is necessary to
control all aspects of the program, including staffing, from the project’s inception.
Success will provide lessons for larger space projects, such as the Mars expedition. It
will also inspire public and congressional confidence in NASA’s ability to implement
such projects. Success will further help empower private industry to expand into the
lunar arena for industrial, service, recreational and other enterprises.
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10. Develop and demonstrate American competence in human spaceflight beyond the
gravitational influence of the Earth
It is important to ensure American technical competency in all aspects of human
spaceflight. Only by actually designing, constructing and operating hardware does a
nation truly gain technical competency. For instance, while the theory of orbital
refueling of hypergolic propellants is well known, only the Russian space program is
currently capable of refueling spacecraft in orbit. If the Russians (whether by choice or
for reasons beyond their control) were to cease production of their Progress Spacecraft,
the International Space Station would fall out of orbit. It is important to the overall
Vitality of the American space program that we possess this capability as well, not for the
sake of competition in an Apollo-era contest Of “who is best,” but for the simple need to
be truly functional and not dependent on other nations for critical components of future
space operations. Implementing the technology to sustain humans on an extended lunar
presence will ensure American technological growth vital to future Space efforts.
Further, we cannot anticipate the status of foreign relations or the economic
Vitality of foreign nations over the next ten to twenty years. Political or economic
instabilities could render current allies and partners into enemies, competitors, or
otherwise non-participants. Serious launch disasters could also destroy the spaceflight
capabilities of partnered nations. The loss of relations or partnerships with such nations
must not compromise American space interests. The risk of dependence on foreign
nations for critical vehicle elements has already been seen in the space station program.
While this risk will be necessary for many future Space activities, it is an unnecessary risk
for a program of Trailblazer’s scale.
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Keep in mind, however, that a national Trailblazer effort does not preclude an
international lunar presence. It is absolutely reasonable to expect that an expansion of a
human lunar presence will become international in scope. An American Trailblazer
program could easily be the cornerstone of an international lunar presence by either
becoming core components of a future international surface base, or by serving as an
outpost to prepare a nearby surface location for such a future international endeavor.
Altemately, an international base could be developed independently of Trailblazer
physical resources, simply using lessons learned from Trailblazer. Regardless of the
manner in which international activity Spreads to the moon, Trailblazer can play a role in
building the international Space infrastructure while simultaneously ensuring the
development of American technological competence.
1.11 Requirements and Constraints
In addition to overall mission objectives, it is also necessary to specify
requirements and constraints that the Trailblazer LTV program must satisfy. These
requirements and constraints provide structures that keep the program from attempting to
“do everything” and provide guidance to design teams to ensure that Trailblazer is
capable of meeting its mission objectives. The following are Trailblazer LTV mission
requirements and constraints:
1 Assume no heavy launch vehicle development
2 Assume available launch vehicles will be limited to existing vehicles
3 Minimize the development of new space vehicles
4 Develop intelligent navigation systems with maximum possible versatility
5. Have the ability to receive ISS and STS support but be capable of operating with neither
6. No more than $3-6 billion increase in NASA annual budget for Trailblazer LTV activities
7 Five to ten year development timeline from concept to first crew landing
8 Ten year design lifetime
9. United States mission with limited or no foreign participation
10. Minimize ground operations support team (flight controllers, program offices, etc. ).
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Specific rationales for each requirement or constraint will now be discussed.
]. Assume no heavy launch vehicle development
Implicit in many human Space flight studies is the assumption that a new heavy
lift vehicle will be developed in support of the human exploration program. Human
spacecraft, stations, and planetary outposts are often sized beyond the capabilities of
current vehicles with the assumption that the development of boosters to launch them is a
logical given. In reality, however, new launch vehicles are unlikely without serious
governmental mandates to develop new launch capabilities or some economic driver for
new payload capacities. Such vehicles could become exceedingly large programs,
potentially larger than Trailblazer itself, and there is neither governmental interest nor
economic need for such vehicles. Trailblazer will therefore be sized such that no new
launch vehicles will be necessary to place a Trailblazer sized program on the moon.
2. Assume available launch vehicles will be limited to existing vehicles
Numerous commercial launch vehicles are in various stages of design, but
Trailblazer will not be designed to rely upon any of these vehicles, which may or may not
exist in reality when it is time to launch Trailblazer components. While these vehicles
are not so much dependent upon Congressional support, their limitation is that foreign
markets, technological issues, and other unpredictable factors could affect their readiness.
If such boosters are not ready on time, their delays must cause no schedule Slips to
Trailblazer. Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V recently performed a successful inaugural flight,
becoming operational on August 21, 2002 (ILS Press Release, 2002) and is one of the
primary launch vehicles Trailblazer will utilize. Boeing’s Delta IV is preparing for its
inaugural flight and for all practical purposes can be considered operational.
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Consequently, Trailblazer will assume full availability of the Atlas V and Delta IV and
will be designed to take advantage of their projected payload capacities.
3. Minimize the development ofnew space vehicles
Each new vehicle that must be deveIOped increases the cost (both political and
economic) and risk of Trailblazer. Using existing vehicles allows Trailblazer to sidestep
political discussions and development challenges that could prove damaging to the
mission. Existing engines, Spacecraft, and other subsystems will be used wherever
advantageous.
4. Develop intelligent navigation systems with maximum possible versatility
Such systems reduce the ground operations support required by Trailblazer, which
will Significantly reduce ongoing operations costs. Additionally, such intelligent systems
are necessary for future missions beyond the Earth-moon system and successful
validation of those technologies will help to reduce the risk of future space exploration.
In the early days of the Space program, massive computer complexes were required to
calculate the Spacecraft trajectories. These monstrous computer facilities had
significantly less computing power than a modern laptop, thus there is no reason why
these computations cannot be performed onboard the spacecraft.
5. Have the ability to receive ISS and STS support but be capable ofoperating with
neither
Trailblazer Should utilize existing space systems wherever possible for maximum
flexibility, but should not be tied to the availability of any particular Space infrastructure.
ISS may prove too limited to provide reliable support to the Trailblazer program. Despite
the fact that the station was originally pitched as an orbital construction complex (among
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other things), it was designed and built as an orbital research (primarily biological and
materials science) lab, which is an entirely different facility. Additionally, the shuttle
fleet could be grounded during a Trailblazer mission. Neither scenario should stop
Trailblazer from proceeding or disrupt a Trailblazer mission in progress.
6. No more than $3-6 billion increase in NASA annual budgetfor Trailblazer LTV
activities
A return to the moon is a major endeavor and no amount of cost cutting measures
will trivialize the budgetary resources necessary to conduct such a mission. Yet, given
the need for ongoing shuttle, station, aeronautics, and robotic missions, it would not be
prudent to expect Congress to devote more than a few billion of NASA’S annual budget
to initial lunar transportation (This requirement does not speak to the surface base as the
base lies beyond the scope of this dissertation).
7. Five to ten year development timelinefrom concept tofirst crew landing
This cannot be a program where civil servants and contractors devote their entire
career to seeing it launch - as has been done in both Shuttle and Station programs. A
primary cause of costs spiraling out of control is the extension of program development
well past the intended launch dates. This program is relatively small in size and scope
and if it cannot be launched in a reasonable period of time, then perhaps that is evidence
that technology has not reached an adequate point of maturity for the project.
8. Ten year design lifetime
This is a sufficient period of time to obtain sufficient science/engineering results
to determine future priorities. A life span, including scheduled major research initiatives,
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Should be planned out early in the design phases to ensure that the program is properly
designed for all issues generated by its operating timeline.
9. United States mission with limited or noforeign participation
It is often stated that space missions are so expensive that no one nation. can
conduct them alone. While that may be true for some nations, it has never been true for
America. A Simple glance at other major American initiatives (Panama Canal, Hoover
Dam, Strategic Defense Initiative, National Missile Defense etc.) reveal that America has
always been capable of, and committed to, greater expenditures than human space
projects such as Apollo, the Space Shuttle, and Trailblazer. Space missions are
expensive, and it is perhaps politically easier to share costs, but using the International
Space Station as an example, it is arguable that the original Space Station Freedom
concept would have ultimately been less expensive for America than the final US
contribution to the International Space Station Alpha. ISS proved that international
partnerships do not necessarily reduce cost, and can potentially increase cost
significantly. In truth, international missions merely allow the participating countries to
participate in space activities that require a greater level of political commitment than
what their respective governments are willing to provide by themselves.
International participation increases the number of organizations that will have the
ability to add cost, risk and complexity to mission requirements, while decreasing the
areas in which the Untied States can provide technological leadership and maintain its
current expertise. Where political considerations advise doing so, it may prove necessary
for Trailblazer to use some international participation, but in all other situations the
program should be strictly American. There is Significant room for international
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expansion beyond the initial capability and the National Aeronautics and Space Act does
provide for international participation. International outposts could be landed at the
Trailblazer site, incorporating crews and experiments from multiple nations. Trailblazer
should ideally be the vanguard of a potentially international “city” on the moon.
However, the basic Trailblazer mission should be American.
10. Minimize ground operations support team (flight controllers, program ofi‘ices, etc. ).
Operations are often the largest ongoing cost of a space program. The space
shuttle and space station programs both have large mission control teams, program
offices, configuration management teams, etc. Flight control teams should be limited to
front rooms (without support rooms) whenever feasible and where not feasible, the Size
of the support rooms should be carefully controlled. This implies a need for highly
sophisticated onboard software for mission management and systems monitoring.
Mission-specific software parameters should be calculated by the onboard software,
rather than by ground computers, wherever possible. If this can be accomplished,
staffing costs can be significantly reduced. Program offices should be kept small and be
given sufficient authority to enforce cost controlling measures.
1.12 Dissertation Objectives
In order to demonstrate that a Trailblazer lunar transfer vehicle can satisfy the
previously mentioned mission requirements and constraints, this dissertation must satisfy
the following basic objectives:
1. Complete a preliminary design of a lunar transfer vehicle utilizing primarily
existing technology that can be launched without the use of super-heavy lift
boosters.
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2. Complete a cost estimation of the entire lunar transfer vehicle program that
Shows Trailblazer costs to be within reasonable budget levels.
As a result of this research, an assessment can be made as to whether or not
human lunar travel is feasible in the immediate future without the development of a new
super-heavy lift booster.
(Except where specified otherwise, SI units will be used throughout this
dissertation).
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Chapter Two — Review of the Literature
2.1 Overview
This dissertation represents an attempt to develop a conceptual design of a lunar
transfer vehicle that is attainable within the constraints of present-day technology and
present-day launch infrastructures. While spacecraft design is a relatively modern field,
enough spacecraft have been designed that there is a growing collection of literature
relating to the process of designing spacecraft. The complexity of space vehicles is such
that Space agencies and space businesses devote considerable manpower and
organizational effort to ensure the groundwork is laid for a proper design before the first
piece of hardware is purchased. Additionally, there have been numerous designs of lunar
transfer vehicles that are worth considering, from both the perspective of taking note of
the technical aspects of their design as well as the perspective of considering why these
designs were never incorporated into lunar programs.
2.2 Spacecraft Design Literature
Fortescue and Stark’s Spacecraft Systems Engineering focuses, as the title
suggests, on spacecraft systems. There is little emphasis on how those systems are
integrated to form a complete spacecraft (1995). It does, however, briefly link the
systems together through a systems engineering chapter towards the end of the text. An
emphasis is placed on the spacecraft bus, rather than the payload.
In Spacecraft Mission Design, Brown attempts to concisely list the “most
practical tools” for early spacecraft design studies (1998). However, unlike Fortescue
and Stark, he focuses almost exclusively on orbit design, not spacecraft systems. While
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his orbital analysis is limited to two-body motion, it does provide a superior summary
than that of most of the other authors reviewed here.
Griffin and French go into greater detail with respect to systems engineering in
the text Space Vehicle Design (1991). They relate the following definition: “Space
systems engineering is the art and science of developing an operable system capable of
meeting mission requirements within imposed constraints including (but not limited to)
mass, cost, and schedule” (Griffin and French, 1991).
The process of systems engineering naturally produces conflicts as the optimal
solution for one aspect of a system will invariably come at a cost that degrades the
solution for another aspect of that same system. The goal of systems engineering is to
accomplish an effective resolution of these conflicts in an effective and productive
manner (Griffin and French, 1991).
Despite the extensive analytical tools available to engineers, there is no clear-cut
solution to many of these conflicts. Hence, space systems engineering is partially art, as
opposed to pure science. Both detailed analyses and educated human judgment are
required to produce a viable space system (Griffin and French, 1991).
They explain that this process is conducted through the use of requirements.
Griffin and French divide requirements into two sets: top-level requirements and
functional requirements. The top-level requirements are derived from the basic goals and
constraints of a given space mission. Generally, these goals are described in terms of the
target and activity - i.e. orbit Venus and map the planetary surface. Constraints may also
include operational dates, costs, international partnerships, etc. (Griffin and French,
1991).
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Functional requirements are in turn derived from the top-level requirements.
Functional requirements define what a space vehicle’s systems and subsystems must
accomplish in order to successfully complete the mission. They convert the top-level
requirements into specific engineering requirements such as communications bandwidth,
delta-V’s, orbital inclinations and altitudes, and other such mission elements (Griffin and
French, 1991).
At the stage of forming functional requirements it is important to apply critical
thinking skills in evaluating potential requirements. Unrealistic requirements may, for
instance, arbitrarily assume the availability of currently non-existent technology or may
fail to consider its impact on other systems. Failure to correct such requirements early in
the design process can lead to significant cost and schedule overruns. Additionally,
unnecessary requirements or excessively tight requirements can further increase the cost
and complexity of the design (Griffin and French, 1991).
Many details are difficult to establish early in a design program and as a result,
many of the numerical values of the functional requirements will not initially be
available. This changes as the design progresses. However, it is important to firmly
establish and freeze all elements of the functional requirements while the design is still in
the early stages. This is the only way to obtain a reasonable degree of cost control and
stability in the program. An absolute freezing of requirements is counterproductive, but a
specific coordination and review process should be in place to ensure that any changes
made are necessary and in the best interests of the program (Griffin and French, 1991).
Several tools are useful in developing the space systems defined by a set of
requirements. Among them are functional block diagrams and trade off analyses. The
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functional block diagram is used to demonstrate the relationships of vehicle or mission
elements. At the highest level it can demonstrate relationships between spacecraft,
ground systems, mission operations, facilities, or users. At a more detailed level it can
demonstrate relationships between a Spacecraft’s propulsion, guidance, electrical, and
thermal systems. However, the functional block diagram can complicate the design
process if it is carried too far. Any documentation produced in the form of functional
block diagrams must be maintained throughout the design process. If diagrams are used
all the way down to the subsystem component level, maintenance of the diagrams could
become an overwhelming task as spacecraft systems are changed (Griffin and French,
1991).
Trade-off analyses are used to help reach a compromise solution to the various
requirements and constraints. A combination of heuristic algorithms, analytical models,
and sound engineering judgment are required to trade various design options, such as
propulsion options, communication systems, and power systems (Griffin and French,
1991).
One particularly complex trade in spacecraft design involves the use of new or
existing technology. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Obviously, in
situations where existing technology cannot do the job, it is clear that new technology
must be developed. Altemately, in situations where well-known technology exists and is
already in use to do the exact job under question, there is little motivation to use new
technology. Most Situations, however, are less clear-cut and trades must be made
between adapting existing technology and developing new technology (Griffin and
French, 1991).
Existing technology is often less expensive and more readily available. There is
also often a lower risk associated with existing technology. However, many components
are not designed for space flight and can only be adapted for use in space vehicles with
increased cost or risk that may offset the economic value of using existing technology.
Further, older technology runs the risk of becoming obsolete, particularly in the area of
computers and other electronic systems (Griffin and French, 1991).
Incorporating new technology may produce advantages of higher efficiency,
lower mass, or lower volume. Such savings could have Significant impacts throughout
the vehicle. However, these changes are most beneficial in the early stages of design.
Once the design is well advanced, this new technology could actually increase cost and
complexity. The new technology may be incompatible with other existing components of
the vehicle or its support systems, forcing costly redesigns in other areas. Additionally,
there may be higher production costs associated with the delivery of components based
on new technology (Griffin and French, 1991).
One of the first texts to be entirely devoted to addressing the process of spacecraft
preliminary design was Larson and Wertz’s Space Mission Analysis and Design (1992).
The goal of their text is to
“begin with a ‘blank sheet of paper’ and design a space mission to meet a set of broad, often
poorly defined, objectives. You should be able to define the mission in sufficient detail to
identify principal drivers and make a preliminary assessment of overall performance, size, cost,
and risk.”
The text was written by a group of more than 50 senior space engineers and
emphasizes low Earth orbit unmanned spacecraft. The FireSat satellite is used as an
example of design principles throughout the text.
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Larson and Wertz advocate an iterative design process for space missions as
follows:
Define Objectives Define broad objectives and constraints
Estimate quantitative mission needs and requirements
Define alternative mission concepts
Define alternative mission architectures
Identify system drivers for each
Characterize mission concepts and architectures
Identify driving requirements
Evaluate mission utility
Define mission concept (baseline).
Define system requirements
Allocate requirements to system elements


















Successive iterations through this process will lead to a more detailed and better-
defined space mission concept.
A much earlier effort, Seifert’s Space Technology (1959), is not nearly as
extensive, but it does devote a chapter to spacecraft design, making efforts to point out
the importance of a systems engineering approach. Seifert points out that, “a missile or
Space vehicle is a complex conglomeration of as many as 300,000 items, each of which
must function correctly in the design environment. Failure of one of these items to
perform satisfactorily may cause newspaper headlines such as ‘Missile Fizzles’” (Seifert,
1959).
He points out that the design of each subsystem Should be made on the basis of its
place in the overall system and the interactions that exist between the subsystems. The
optimal complete system is not necessarily the sum of the optimum of each subsystem.
Most spacecraft exist in three to four of the following design environments: pre—launch,
ascent flight, space flight, and re-entry. While some do not re-enter, all pass through the
other three phases (whether as active vehicles or as cargo on another vehicle) and their
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designs must account for the demands of each flight phase. He advocates making a
parametric formulation of the major features and their interactions in the complete
vehicle system, so as to determine the characteristics of the design and the performance,
as well as to develop a list of trade-off costs between the various design considerations
(Seifert, 1959).
Wertz and Larson return to the spacecraft design process with Reducing Space
Mission Cost (1996). This text applies lessons from the Soviet space program and the
LightSat community in America and Europe. It also incorporates traditional cost
reduction methods such as Design-to-Cost and Concurrent Engineering, as well as radical
cost reduction methods involving fundamental changes to how satellites are built, bought,
and Operated. The book explains how to consider these approaches and make the proper
selection during the Spacecraft design process (Wertz, Larson, 1996).
In a similar vein, Boden and Larson offer Cost-Effective Space Mission
Operations (1996). This text focuses on the mission operations aspect and considers how
to trade the future cost of Operations against current development costs. Involvement of
the mission operations manager in the early stages of developing the mission is of
paramount importance, as is the importance of developing mission operations concepts
from the very beginning of the project (Boden and Larson, 1996).
Another systems engineering text related to spacecraft design is Hammond’s
Space Transportation: A Systems Approach to Analysis and Design (1999). He defines
systems engineering as “the discipline of developing and engineering complex systems.”
Disciplines such as structures, propulsion, aerodynamics, financial accounting, human
factors, etc. are integrated into a team effort. A systems engineer must follow a
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structured, multidisciplinary process to integrate various points of view while minimizing
risks and meeting the needs of the customer. The customer’s needs must be translated
into functional requirements, from which the system architecture is developed.
Requirements are then allocated to elements of the system design and the resulting
product must be verified to ensure that it meets the customer’s original needs (Hammond,
1999).
The design process involves a number of iterative steps to produce a final product.
Often, the process is divided into three phases or levels of design: Conceptual Design
(Phase A), Preliminary Design (Phase B), and Detail Design (Phases C and D)
(Hammond, 1999).
The Conceptual Design Phase is of particular importance in the design process
because life cycle costs are largely determined by the conceptual design and are very
difficult to change beyond this stage. It is the most important time in the life cycle of a
space transportation system because both good and bad features of the resulting design
are locked in during this phase. Conceptual design answers the basic questions of
configuration arrangement, payload, vehicle size, mass, and performance. Parametric
trade studies are conducted using preliminary estimates of vehicle performance.
Different engine pod layouts can be considered and various orbits are analyzed. In this
phase, the feasibility of the design to accomplish a given mission is established, but the
details of the configuration remain open to change. This phase is essentially a “paper
study” only. The purpose of this phase is to evaluate potential advances in technology
and investigate different Operational modes. These designs must be credible enough to
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inspire confidence in the results. The capability must also be present to evaluate
promising configurations in greater depth (Hammond, 1999).
The latest text in Larson’s series is Larson and Pranke’s Human Spaceflight
Mission Analysis and Design (1999). It attempts to provided a comprehensive overview
to the spacecraft design process, geared towards human missions for Earth, Moon, and
Mars. Larson and Pranke compiled extensive lists of sizing equations, illustrations,
tables, and cases studies. It is essentially the same concept as Larson and Wertz’s Space
Mission Analysis and Design, but applied to human space missions as opposed to robotic
spacecraft (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Campbell brings out the importance of integrating Human Engineering into the
spacecraft design process (2000). He defines Human Engineering as, “the application of
human factors knowledge in a systems engineering context. Human Engineering
processes are used to ensure that programs effectively integrate operators, maintainers,
and other critical personnel into missions and systems. Human Engineering is an
essential part of systems engineering and is performed as part of multi-discipline
concurrent engineering teams. Human Engineering processes are used to define concepts
and requirements for missions and systems, based on the characteristics of humans who
will participate in those missions and systems, and ensuring that the requirements are met
through design, fabrication, integration and operations” (Campbell, 2000).
Human Engineering is concerned with the integration of flight crews with
spacecraft, as well as the integration of ground personnel with systems such as flight
processing, mission control, and Earth-Space communications facilities. Human
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Engineering is required where any mission-critical human function is performed, from
mundane tasks such as eating and sleeping, to more complex operations such as in-flight
maintenance and orbital assembly of space structures.
2.3 Spacecraft Design Standards and Tools
Since the early days of the space program, NASA has developed Human
Engineering standards to regulate the design of human spacecraft. Developed in the mid-
seventies, MSFC-STD-512A replaced its 1966 predecessor, MSFC-STD-267A (MSFC-
STD-512A, 1976). The goal of this standard was to “provide specific descriptive design
information for use by the aerospace community to ensure proper integration of manned
requirements with those of other aerospace disciplines, and to assist in verifying proper
operation of zero gravity systems” (MSFC-STD-S 12A, 1976). It focuses on all aspects of
human interaction with a spacecraft and the space environment and is intended to be used
as a guide throughout the design process.
In 1995, NASA-STD-3000 replaced MSFC-STD-512A. Its stated goal is “to
provide a single, comprehensive document defining all generic requirements for space
facilities and related equipment which directly interface with crewmembers” (NASA-
STD-3000, 1995). Its requirements apply to launch, entry, on-orbit, and extraterrestrial
space environments. Its scope is concerned with space human factors, namely the
application of human factors knowledge to the spacecraft environment. Like its
predecessor, it specifies design requirements that spacecraft must incorporate if they are
to carry humans as passengers or crew.
Supplementing NASA-STD-3000 is NASA-STD-3000/T, the International Space
Station Flight Crew Integration Standard. This is the ISS program contractually binding
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man systems integration design requirements. The data in NASA-STD-3000/T are a
subset of the data found in NASA-STD-3000. It defines the firm requirements that are
applicable to the ISS program only and is concerned with flight crew interfaces with the
station. It replaces NASA-STD-3000 Volume IV, Space Station Freedom Man-Systems
Integration Standards.
NASA also adds an additional level to NASA-sponsored design processes. In
order to verify that a design satisfies program requirements, a design review process is
implemented at various milestones of the vehicle design (NASA SP-6502). Objectives-of


















To evaluate the capability of the design to meet the total system requirements
To determine the effects of procurement, assembly, test, shipping, storage, human factors, and
maintenance on the achievement of the design goals
To identify problems of process control, production, and parts and material procurement
To consider the effects on performance of proposed configuration changes
To evaluate the operational functions of the design with respect to the current known state-of-the-
art
To evaluate the adequacy of the specification to meet the intended operational use
To determine whether the design conforms with the specification requirements
To provide for optimization of design within the functional performance requirements
(NASA SP-6502)
Reviews are generally grouped into one of five milestone categories:
Preliminary design review (at system, subsystem, and component level).
Prepackaging review (for electrical and electromechanical components).
Prerelease review (for all components prior to manufacture, also at subsystem level by concurrent
reviews at component level).
Acceptance reviews (for all levels).
Special purpose reviews and buy-offs.
(NASA SP-6502)
Properly applied, the design review process effectively reduces the technical risk
of a space mission while also controlling cost (NASA SP-6502). In practice, the latter
remains a questionable conclusion, while the success rate of human spaceflight does
speak well for the former claim. The NASA document continues to describe the purpose
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of each design review, review team members and duties, necessary data inputs and
outputs, and recommended preparation and meeting time for review team members and
other participants (NASA SP-6502).
Focusing more on the cost impacts of spacecraft design, Reynerson developed a
tool to model lunar and Martian exploration missions with an emphasis on cost reduction
through variation of key mission requirements. The model uses parameters such as
power, weight, volume, crew size and endurance to characterize spacecraft payloads.
This model consists of both an engineering model and a cost model. The
previously mentioned parameters are inputs to the engineering model, which generates
outputs of spacecraft mass, power, and volume. The cost model then takes the spacecraft
mass as an input to generate cost data (Reynerson, 2000).
Reynerson described one of the principal contributions of this tool as its ability to
directly Show the impact of payload requirements on cost. Or, alternately, it can show the
amount of supportable payload given a limit on the initial investment amount
(Reynerson, 2000). While such a tradeoff ability is paramount for commercial space
ventures, it is also significant in government ventures, given tendencies of governments
to cap space activities at specific funding levels.
2.4 Lunar Mission Literature
There has been no shortage of designs for lunar missions since Apollo. A brief
survey of some of the key design studies will be reviewed in this section. This review
will consider only American lunar designs, though the Soviet Union nearly succeeded
with its lunar plan in the sixties and currently both Russian and Chinese Space advocates
have well-defined lunar plans (though neither group has governmental support).
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The possibility of post-Apollo lunar missions actually began before the lunar
landings. In 1964, Boeing prepared a report for NASA describing Lunar Exploration
Systems for Apollo (LESA) as a follow-on to the Apollo missions (Portree, 2001). LESA
assumed Saturn V rockets for the initial stages, but assumed heavier lift vehicles would
be developed as the program progressed. LESA used a modified Apollo LM for lunar
landing and ascent (Wade, 2002).
A flurry of post-Apollo lunar designs were proposed using a combination of
Apollo and Gemini technology, but in an all-encompassing storm of budget cuts, Apollo
itself was cut back and post-Apollo human Spaceflight activities were reduced to Skylab,
Apollo-Soyuz Test Program and the Space Shuttle. Official sanction would not be given
to lunar exploration ideas until the late eighties.
NASA provided a 90-Day Report to President Bush in November of 1989 to
respond to his call to return to the Moon. This report assumed development of a launch
vehicle with a 140-ton capacity and called for extensive additions to Space Station
Freedom (Portree, 2002).
In May of 1991, the Space Exploration Initiative (SE1) Synthesis Group released a
series of possible architectures for human exploration of space. The Synthesis Group’s
Mars Exploration Architecture included a series of precursor lunar missions to prepare
for a Mars expedition. Their proposed Lunar Transportation System (LTS) is composed
of two vehicles, a LTV and a Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV). It is capable of
transporting a crew of six from LEO to the lunar surface. The LTV is composed of two
stages: a Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) Stage and a Lunar Orbit Insertion/Trans-Earth
Injection (LOI/TEI) stage. The LEV is a single stage rocket. All stages use RL-10
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derived engines, using liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen propellant, with a thermal system
sized to provide boiloff management for up to 60 days in LEO. No mention is made of
how this boiloff management technology (which does not currently exist) is to be
developed. An ELV with a 150-ton payload capacity to a 160 nautical mile Earth orbit is
assumed (Cooke, Weary and Kaplan, 1991).
Recognizing that other lunar proposals were dead in the water due to their
mammoth budgets, Boeing proposed a Lunar Campsite concept in 1991. Somewhat
similar to its old LESA concept, Boeing’s approach used a 94.3-ton Crew Vehicle with a
crew of four astronauts. The vehicle consisted of a 8-ton crew capsule, 3.7 tons of
supplies, two rovers and scientific equipment totaling 3.2 tons, four engines and four
landing legs. It was attached to a 92.7-ton booster, which provided TLI propulsion. It
employed a direct trajectory from LEO to the lunar surface. The return flight was direct
from lunar surface to Earth surface, employing Apollo-style direct entry (Portree, 2002).
The year 1992 saw the development of the next major NASA lunar concept: First
Lunar Outpost (FLO). FLO was developed based on SEI and Boeing concepts. FLO
required four heavy lift boosters, each placing 120 tons into LEO. The fourth booster
contained the LTV. (The previous three were for the surface habitat). Notably, the
LTV’S Crew Lander did use storable propellants, rather than cryogenic propellants, thus
evading the technology hurdle of storing cryogenic fuel. The Reentry Capsule resembled
the Apollo Command Module, using direct entry and splashdown at sea (Portree, 2002).
In 1993, NASA-JSC engineer Kent Joosten proposed the LUNOX mission as a
revision to NASA’S lunar plans in an attempt to reduce the costs. The key elements of
this plan were: use of lunar oxygen as a pIOpellant, shipping most cargo separate from the
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crew, and involving Russia as a partner. Earlier studies had focused on mining the moon
for fuel, but they did not assume the use of that fuel to return the crew. Separating the
cargo from the crew further reduced the burden on the LTV. Finally, use of Russia
improved (but did not solve) the Earth launch problem by gaining access to the Russian
Energia booster for cargo flights. NASA would still need to develop shuttle-derived
heavy lift boosters for the piloted lander. The LTV is propelled from LEO by a TLI stage
and is placed on a course for a direct surface landing. On the surface, the LTV is refueled
with liquid oxygen manufactured on the moon. The LTV returns to Earth on a direct
trajectory, with an Apollo-style capsule used for entry (Portree, 2002).
Somewhat discouraged with the lack of support from Washington for NASA’S
annual lunar mission redesigns, private organizations began to develop their own
conceptual designs. The Artemis Society is a private organization established in the mid
19903 that seeks to conduct a lunar mission through commercially raised funds. Their
LTV uses a Spacehab derived crew compartment, mated to two serVice modules and a
propulsion module. During lunar transfer, the LTV is mated to a Lunar Exploration Base
and Descent Stage and an open-cockpit Ascent stage (which at least in concept strongly
rrrirrors the NASA HLR open-cockpit lander described later in this chapter). Propulsive
braking is used to capture into not only lunar orbit, but also Earth orbit at the end of the
mission (Artemis Project Website, 2002). All details of the Artemis LTV design are not
publicly available, but from the limited overviews provided, it appears that their design
does not properly consider the delta-v required for orbital maneuvers, particularly TLI,
LOI, TEI, and most significantly end-of—mission Earth orbital capture.
55
Meanwhile, NASA continued its push for a lunar program. In September of 1995,
NASA Administrator Goldin initiated the Human Lunar Return (HLR) study. For the
first time, a serious NASA lunar plan did not assume the development of a Saturn class
super-booster, nor did it assume the availability of the doomed Energia. This led to
impressive budget estimates of only $2.5 billion per lunar mission. Only shuttle and
Proton launches were baselined, though extensive ISS support was required. It did,
however, assume development of a Russian liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen fourth stage
for the Proton (that to this date has not successfully flown). The LTV utilized a space
station module derived Command Module, a 30-foot diameter aerobrake, and a
propulsion system. The LTV is propelled from LEO by two 20-ton TLI stages, each
burning hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide (Portree, 2002). One of its more controversial
aspects, which led to considerable resistance from the Astronaut Office, was the use of an
open-cockpit Lunar Landing Vehicle, shown in figure 2-1 (All tables and figures are
located in the Appendix). The open-cockpit lander was an attempt at an extremely low
cost lunar lander. Essentially, it was a platform on which two astronauts in spacesuits
could stand (exposed to space, hence the term “open-cockpit”), mounted on top of an
engine and fuel tank assembly. That and other cost—cutting measures gave some the
impression that safety was being compromised in the name of budget reduction. HLR
was also and perhaps more severely threatened by the announcement of possible signs of
life in a Martian meteorite. Between those two issues, HLR quickly and quietly faded
into the background as Mars research began to dominate NASA’S post-ISS planning. For
a period of several years, official lunar activities could only be addressed in the context Of
“necessary preparations to support a Mars mission.”
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All discussion, however, did not cease. Michael Duke of the Lunar and Planetary
Institute in Houston proposed a new lunar concept in 1997, this time focused on ice at the
lunar South Pole. The Earth-Moon L2 point is used as a staging area. Duke assumes
only the shuttle for Earth to LEO transport. He does assume development of a solar-
electric propulsion vehicle for transporting cargo. He uses a Crew Vehicle (CRV) based
on the X-38 and a liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen propelled Lunar-Based Vehicle (LBV)
that serves as a transport vehicle, both for cargo modules and for the CRV. Chemical
propellants are used to send the CRV to L2, where it is met by the LBV and carried to the
lunar surface. Following the lunar stay, the CRV/LBV combined spacecraft launch on a
direct entry trajectory to Earth. The CRV performs a direct entry and the LBV is
discarded. Like LUNOX, Duke’s concept assumes the use of in—Situ manufactured
propellants. Consequently, Duke assumes the problem of storage of liquid hydrogen will
be solved during the course of this program’s development. He also does not address the
alterations that must be made to the X-38 to serve in this role, particularly the life support
and thermal protection system impacts. He does, however, caution that many details of
the mass estimation remain to be worked out (Portree, 2002).
Non-NASA “paper studies” also emerge periodically. Schrunk, et al’s The Moon:
Resources, Future Development and Colonization (1999) focuses on future utilization of
the moon, primarily discussing resource utilization, but also devoting some attention to
explaining several leading reasons for selecting the South Pole as an ideal location for a
lunar base. Shrunk additionally describes surface base and rover concepts.
Peter Eckart’s Lunar Base Design text (1999) focuses primarily on the design of a
surface base, but he does address several key areas for lunar transfer vehicle design.
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Eckart devotes a chapter to a communications and navigation system infrastructure. He
also allocates a chapter to discuss Earth-Moon trajectory implications and in a chapter on
lunar base location, he addresses orbital mechanics implications of base location.
Paul Spudis, deputy director of the Lunar and Planetary Institute, refines Duke’s
proposal with a design of his own in 2000. Instead of the L2 point, he uses the Earth-
Moon L1 as his staging location. In a key cost-saving move, he also launches all cargo
units on Delta IV rockets instead of the shuttle, reserving the shuttle only for astronaut
transfers (Portree, 2002). His efforts also coincide with a shift in emphasis at NASA.
With the failures of the Deep Space Two microprobes, Mars Polar Lander, and the Mars
Climate Observer, political support within NASA for imminent Mars human expeditions
began to fade, allowing these lunar Studies to return to official study.
In the wake of the realization that human missions to Mars will not be
forthcoming, there is a renewed interest in lunar travel. A new lunar study has been
underway at Johnson Space Center for the past year or two, but very few details have
been publicly released. Similar to Spudis’ concept, it does involve L1 staging and places
a space station of some kind at the Earth-Moon L1 point. It also assumes servicing and
support from ISS (Fletcher, 2002).
2.5 Implications for Dissertation
A variety of spacecraft design texts provide the framework for a successful lunar
transfer vehicle conceptual design. Taken as a whole, the texts examined in the literature
provide a fairly complete process that can be utilized in the development of any crewed
spacecraft and can be effectively applied to the design problem of a lunar transfer
vehicle.
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Additionally, the standards and tools reviewed in the literature provide
information of paramount importance to ensure that the resulting design is compatible
with its human crew and has a realistic cost.
Any design must be cognizant of the threat of budget cuts and must be developed
in a-manner to reduce its risk of termination at the hands of Congress. The NASA-
sponsored lunar designs reviewed Show either a persistent pattern of assuming Congress
will somehow be won over to the idea of a sprawling, colossal extraterrestrial endeavor
or perform only partial studies, leaving significant mass estimation details out — details
that could potentially eliminate all of their cost savings measures. In some cases,
weaknesses of previous lunar designs are repeated. For instance, lunar plans placed
repeated reliance on the development of a new launch vehicle. Unfortunately, rocket
booster capabilities are driven primarily by economic factors relating to the commercial
satellite market, whose propulsion needs are considerably smaller than those of Saturn V
or Energia class launch vehicles — the minimum size booster assumed in many lunar
exploration strategies. Thus, the reliance on new super-boosters makes most lunar return
strategies unrealistic and literally ensures they will never get off the ground. Any lunar
travel conducted in this generation will require a system capable of being conducted at
least initially without the need for new heavy lift boosters.
In this dissertation, the basic processes outlined by Larson, Wertz, Pranke, and
Boden will be followed to develop the LTV conceptual design. As noted by Hammond,
this will result in a basic configuration arrangement, payload, vehicle Size, mass, and
performance. Careful attention will be paid to the use of requirements development, as
noted by Griffin and French, most importantly freezing the requirements and not
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expanding them as the design progresses. The trade of new versus existing technology
will be made carefully, as Griffin and French also recommend.
In the process of conducting the Human Engineering aspects of this conceptual
design referred to by Campbell, NASA-STD—3000 and other relevant spacecraft design
standards will be used to ensure that the design can properly accommodate a human
crew. Realistic cost levels will be maintained, with vehicle/mission requirements traded
as necessary to keep costs under control.
In learning from the mistakes made in previous designs, several absolutes will
apply to the design work of this dissertation. It will not call for a massive Apollo-like
budget increase; will not require a new launch vehicle; will not rely on unproven abilities
to use in-Situ resources; will fully consider delta-V requirements of orbital maneuvers;
will not use an open-cockpit lander; and will not leave out excessive mass estimation
details. L1 will be considered as a staging location, but no space station will be located
there and no assumptions will be made about the availability of ISS to support the LTV.
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Chapter Three - Cislunar Trajectories and Vehicle Overview
3.1 Trajectory Limiting Factors
Human Cislunar transfer is a greater challenge than many lunar advocates realize.
Despite the relative closeness of the moon as compared to other celestial bodies, the
moon is still a significant distance from Earth. Crossing this void was not a trivial
undertaking during the Apollo program and it remains a challenge to this day. Several
limiting factors drastically impact Spacecraft designs, making it difficult to deveIOp viable
lunar mission plans.
Heavy Lifi‘ Capability
The most critical limiting factor is a lack of heavy lift capability from the surface
of the Earth into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Any vehicle designed to transport people to
and from the moon — and all of its fuel — must first be transported from the Earth into
space. Arguably, the only boosters in world history that Should truly be termed heavy lift
boosters are the American Saturn V and the Soviet Energia, both of which are no longer
in production. Lesser boosters such as the space Shuttle, Titan IV,- and even the
upcoming Delta IV Heavy and Atlas V Heavy represent modern heavy lift capability, but
all are grossly inferior to the Saturn and Energia in terms of payload capability to LEO.
With respect to potential lunar spacecraft, these boosters can only carry spacecraft
components at best, requiring in-orbit assembly for virtually any lunar transfer vehicle
concept. The global political climate is such that it is extremely unlikely that
Satum/Energia class vehicles will be constructed in the near to distant future.




The highest performance rocket fuels currently available are chemical cryogenic
fuels (i.e. liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen). These fuels must be maintained at super-
cold levels to prevent the fuel from turning to gas and escaping. Even with the maximum
possible insulation, there is a leakage rate from all cryogenic tanks currently in service.
This is a problem for large spacecraft, which due to the lack of heavy lift capability
require in-orbit assembly. The International Space Station, for instance, is being
assembled in orbit over a period of several years. There are generally one to two months
between any particular assembly flights. This would be too long for a Cislunar craft.
Cryogenic tanks cannot remain in Earth orbit for significant periods of time while large
spacecraft are being assembled or they will lose much of their fuel to boiloff. In any
assembly process, they would need to be the last components launched; and even then
boiloff will still occur. It might not be possible to launch more than one tank to such a
spacecraft. This tank, of course, would be limited to the payload capacity of
Atlas/Delta/Titan class boosters. Multiple simultaneous launches could alleviate this
problem slightly, but there are not many launch sites around the world capable of
launching such boosters. Thus, the total fuel capacity for any lunar transfer vehicle is
significantly limited, therefore reducing the size and capacity of the vehicle.
Low Performance ofStorable Propellants
Storable propellants, on the other hand (typically hypergolic), can be maintained
in space indefinitely. However, their performance is significantly lower than that of
cryogenic fuels. Consequently, much more fuel is required for a given payload, driving
the mass of the vehicle up substantially (therefore increasing the amount of fuel required
to move the vehicle — a vicious cycle). This imposes a significant limiting factor on the
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size of human spacecraft intended for use beyond low earth orbit. Beyond a very low
vehicle mass - which may be too low for a useful LTV - the propellant and tank masses
rise to astronomical proportions.
Non-Viability ofNuclear Propulsion
Nuclear propulsion is often touted as a solution to propulsion difficulties because
of its high thrust and high performance, making it ideal from a propulsion standpoint for
human spaceflight to the moon or to Mars. However, many technical issues remain to be
solved for nuclear propulsion and the political climate renders nuclear propulsion a non-
option for the foreseeable future. Additionally, because most nuclear propulsion
concepts use hydrogen as a fuel, they are also affected by the same boiloff concerns as
chemical cryogenic fuels.
Human Vulnerability in Cislunar Space
Beyond the protective influence of the Earth’s magnetic field, astronauts are
subject to increased levels of radiation. In LEO, astronauts are protected to a degree by
the Earth’s magnetic field. Without that protection, Solar Particle Events and Galactic
Cosmic Radiation can be particularly dangerous. Additionally, whether the astronauts
are inside the magnetic field or beyond, they are subject to the physiological
deconditioning effects of microgravity. This is critical for the outbound trajectory leg,
because it is assumed that when a spacecraft crew reaches a lunar destination there will
be no time for reconditioning. The crew will need to immediately begin to conduct
operations of some sort. It is not even known with certainty that reconditioning can be
accomplished in a low gravity environment. Transfer time must be minimized,
eliminating efficient low thrust systems such as ion or plasma rockets or time-consuming
trajectories such as Weak Stability Boundary. Consequently, the safety of the flight crew
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dictates that travel times should be kept as short as possible (Longer flight times also
increase vehicle mass due to the need for additional food and other life support
consumables). It may be possible that low thrust systems can be used for LTV
components that do not carry crew. However, this option is not investigated in this
dissertation.
These factors combine to produce a problematic situation in Earth orbit. If the
crew module is too massive, the propulsion system will not be able to transport it to the
moon unless the tank volume is increased. But if the tank volume is increased too. far, the
mass of the propulsion system will exceed the capabilities of any current boosters.
Consequently, any lunar transfer vehicles must be relatively small. Additionally, due to
microgravity and radiation exposure concerns, crew travel time in Cislunar space must be
minimized.
3.2 Cislunar Trajectories Investigated
Overcoming these difficulties is a complex process. In addition to the spacecraft
design, the spacecraft’s trajectory must also be designed. This trajectory must be
attainable by an LTV that can be placed in LEO by present-day booster systems.
Two Earth orbital origin points will be considered — one consistent with the
International Space Station’s inclination, 51.6 degrees, and one consistent with a due east
launch from Kennedy Space Center, 28.5 degrees. Both will use the ISS orbital altitude,
407 km. Many advocate the use of the International Space Station to facilitate lunar
missions. Unfortunately, it is generally known that using the ISS inclination increases
the propellant cost of lunar travel. Because the moon’s orbit lies at a roughly 5.1 degree
inclination, the greater the LTV’S orbital inclination from this value, the more fuel will be
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required to reach lunar orbit. Very rarely do advocates of using the station take the time
to quantify this impact.
This study will investigate transfer to and from a lunar polar orbit. The polar orbit
does pose some problems in certain translunar trajectories. It is, however, necessary in
order to reach a polar landing site. Many lunar missions are designed around polar
outposts because surface thermal concerns are greatly reduced at the poles and because
there is general belief that the poles contain lunar ice.
A multi-conic trajectory will be used to analyze the flight time between these two
Earth origin points and lunar polar orbit. Both direct trajectories and trajectories using
the Lagrange (also called libration) point will be considered. Lagrange points are five
points in the Earth-Moon system where the gravities of the Earth and the moon create
balance points. This paper will use the L1 point, the Lagrange point located directly
between the Earth and the moon.
In order to conserve propellant, aerocapture is assumed for all Earth-inbound
trajectories. Capture at L1 and lunar orbit will require propulsive insertion.
3.3 Algorithms Used
All orbital parameters are calculated with the aid of numerical analysis programs
developed in the early nineties at NASA’S Johnson Space Center. NASA employee Sam
Wilson, who has Since moved to Elgin Software, wrote these programs.
“Procedure E2LP is a program to compute and print a description of an impulsive
tangential departure from a circular earth orbit for transfer to the L1 or the L2 libration
point in a specified flight time, using the multi-conic method to compute the 3—body
trajectory. The moon's geocentric orbit is modeled as a circle” (Wilson, 1991).
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Procedure LPLS did not contain a documentation file, but it is a program to
compute and print a description of an impulsive tangential departure from the L1 or the
L2 libration point for transfer to a circular lunar orbit in a specified flight time.
Similarly, procedure ESLC did not contain documentation. It, however,
calculates a range of delta-V’s for trans-lunar injection and lunar orbital insertion, and
flight times for multi-conic trajectories between Low Earth Orbit and Low Lunar Orbit.
“Procedure LOEO is a program for computing and displaying data relating to
optimum transfers between a circular selenocentric orbit and an earth orbit, achieved by
aerocapture” (Wilson, 1996).
Finally, procedure MOON2LP also did not contain documentation. It calculates
departure and arrival delta-V’s for transfers from a circular lunar orbit to the L1 or L2
libration point in a Specified flight time.
3.4 Trajectory Determinations
Outbound
The most obvious outbound trajectory is a direct transfer from LEO to LLO. If
the LTV departs from the space station, it will be leaving from a 51.6-degree inclination
orbit. If it is placed in orbit from a due east Kennedy Space Center launch and does not
dock with ISS, it will be leaving from a 28.5-degree inclination. Table 3-1 describes
computational results giving the delta-V’s and flight times associated with such transfers.
In addition to transfers to LLO, it is also possible to pursue trajectories to L1 and
from there continue to LEO. The advantage to doing so is that it allows a lower delta-v
from LEO. Because there is a limit to the amount of fuel that can be brought to LEO,
traveling to L1 can allow for larger payload masses. At L1 the LTV would drop its
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cryogenic propulsion unit and exchange it for a hypergolic one waiting at Ll, using this
new stage to continue the journey. This is Similar to traditional rocket staging, except
that the lower stage does not carry the mass of the upper stage. The upper stage is pre-
deployed by another rocket. The payload will rendezvous with this upper stage and then
dock with it. I am terrrring this scheme “rendezvous staging.” The question to be
answered is whether or not rendezvous staging will provide any advantages for human
lunar flight. Table 3-2 lists delta-v’s and flight times for travel from LEO to L1.
It is perhaps difficult to discern the advantages of rendezvous staging from these
tables. Graphing the data as shown in Figure 3-1 gives more insight.
The computer codes employed for these various trajectories did not compute over
the same flight time intervals, but viewing the trajectories on a graph allows the
researcher to gain insight into their relative delta-v (and thus fuel) costs. It is most
demanding on the LTV’S propulsion system to attempt a direct flight to LLO from the
space station inclination. A departure from 28.5 degrees going only to L1 saves a
considerable amount of delta-v. Additionally, it is clear that a 3 to 3.5-day flight time
offers the best compromise of mission duration and fuel savings.
Of course, this is only useful if a propulsion module waiting at Ll can transport
the LTV from there to LLO. Table 3-3 and Figure 3-2 numerically and graphically
illustrate the delta-v requirements to move from L1 to LLO under various flight times.
There is not much difference between a 1 and 2-day flight time, but a significant
savings exists between a 12-hour and 24-hour fight time. Thus using rendezvous staging,
a LTV could move from LEO to LLO in roughly 4 to 4.5 days.
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Inbound
Just as with the outbound trajectories, the most obvious paths are direct transfers
from LLO to LEO. Again, this trajectory may terminate either in a 28.5-degree
inclination or a 51.6-degree inclination, depending on whether the LTV is to enter an
orbit compatible with the space station or with a vehicle arriving from a KSC due east
launch. Table 3-4 indicates that it is more difficult to reach an ISS orbit from the moon.
In fact, in some cases it is not possible to reach an ISS inclination.
Because a propulsion system might not have the fuel to complete an entire
transfer, it is important to consider the option of using the L1 point as a rendezvous
staging location. Table 3-5 indicates delta-v and flight time parameters for travel from
lunar orbit to L1.
The data from the preceding two tables are combined on Figure 3-3 to Show the
relative performance requirements for LLO departure options.
The difference in delta-V’s from LLO to L1 versus LLO to LEO is not as
Significant as the differences noted during the outbound trajectories. The pattern does
still hold, however, that L1 is the easiest destination to reach, followed by LEO with a
28.5-degree inclination. The highest delta-v requirement is for transfer to the ISS
inclination of 51.6 degrees.
If rendezvous staging is used, a third propulsion stage is picked up at Ll. Table
3-6 and Figure 3-4 indicate the delta-v requirements for a transfer from L1 to LEO.
Again, 28.5 is shown to be the minimum delta-v trajectory, though in this case it
is only a small difference over the trajectory to a 51.6 inclination.
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Abort Options — Deorbit and Direct Entry
This research is conducted in the framework of a LTV preliminary design concept
that is intended for cyclic travel between LEO and LLO, in both locations rendezvousing
with other vehicles that shuttle between the respective surfaces and orbits. The space
shuttle (or other crewed ascent vehicle) would dock with the LTV in LEO to transfer a
crew to the LTV. Upon reaching LLO, the LTV would rendezvous with a lunar
ascent/descent vehicle, which would transport the crew between LLO and the lunar
surface. The process would be reduced for a return flight. Under nominal conditions, the
LTV would never enter Earth’s atmosphere to land on Earth.
However, in an abort or emergency scenario, rather than stop in LEO, the LTV
could conceivably perform a direct atmospheric entry from either LLO or L1. This was
the approach used by the Apollo program. The delta-V’s for these approaches can be
approximated from the aerocapture calculations. A direct entry from L1 is roughly the
same delta-v as that for a transfer from L1 to LEO utilizing aerocapture. Similarly, direct
entry from LLO is roughly equal to a transfer from LLO to LEO, also utilizing
aerocapture.
Should the transfer vehicle stop in orbit and then need to select a deorbit option,
the deorbit delta-v from a LEO altitude of 407 km is found from a simple Hohman
transfer to an altitude of 150 km (Larson and Wertz, 1992). Orbital inclination is
irrelevant, affecting only landing site options. This delta-v is found to be 743.3 m/s.
3.5 Potential Trajectory Solutions
A flight plan cannot be developed solely on the basis of delta-v requirements.
However, from the data computed above, several general trajectory schemes emerge: a
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minimum total mission delta-V trajectory, an outbound rendezvous staging trajectory,
and a double rendezvous staging trajectory.
The Minimum Total Mission Delta-V Trajectory is the most obvious trajectory
and it produces the minimum total fuel expenditure for the mission. It is formed from the
inbound and outbound direct transfers between LEO and LLO. Of these transfers, the
delta-v requirement is lowest when using a 28.5-degree inclination. The outbound delta-
v requirement for a 323-day transfer is 4110 m/s. Inbound, the requirement is 1158 m/s
for a 3-day transfer, thus yielding a total mission budget of 6.23 days and a total 5268 m/s
delta-v.
The Outbound Rendezvous Staging Trajectory is a compromise between
propellant tank sizing and minimized mission duration. Rendezvous staging is used
between LEO and LLO, with an intermediate stop at L1 to exchange propulsion modules.
The second propulsion module must be sized to complete the rest of the flight. The
inbound leg is a direct transfer from LLO to LEO. All Earth orbits are at a 28.5-degree
inclination. The first stage must achieve a 3878.3 m/s delta-V for a 3-day flight to L1.
The second stage must complete an 890.52 In/s delta-v for a 2-day flight from L1 to LLO.
It then must complete an 1158 m/s delta-v for a 3-day return flight from LLO to LEO.
Thus, the second stage is responsible for a total delta-v of 2048.52 m/s. Total flight time
is 8 days.
The Double Rendezvous Staging Trajectory allows for the minimum possible
propellant tanks, but at the expense of mission duration. Rendezvous staging is used on
both the inbound and outbound legs. The outbound leg is identical to that described for
Outbound Rendezvous Staging. The inbound leg involves a 2-day flight from LLO to L1
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with an 890.53 m/S delta-v. From there, a third stage is responsible for a 3-day flight
from L1 to a 28.5-degree inclination Earth orbit requiring a 810.4 m/S delta-v. Thus, the
first stage must achieve a 3878.3 m/s delta-v; the second stage must accommodate a total
delta-v of 1781.05 m/s; and the third stage must accommodate an 810.4 m/s delta-v. This
trajectory’s flight time is 10 days.
3.6 Trajectory Summary
Each of the potential trajectories imposes specific requirements, not only upon the
LTV propulsion system but also on the entire vehicle design. The interactions between
LTV crew accommodations requirements, propulsion systems limitations, and these
trajectories will drive the selection of a particular scheme. As will be shown in
subsequent chapters, a Double Rendezvous Staging Trajectory will be required in order
to satisfy all mission constraints.
3.7 Implications of Using L1
Overview
The Earth-Moon L1 point has never been used in actual Spaceflight, but it has
played pivotal roles in many lunar mission architectures. The Trailblazer LTV design is
no exception and it is imperative to properly size any impacts of using the L1 point.
Without the use of L1, the Trailblazer concept literally falls apart and cannot be salvaged.
Consequently, it is of Vital importance to demonstrate that a human space mission can
indeed use this point by determining an order of magnitude assessment for the delta-v
required to keep a spacecraft at or near the Earth-Moon Ll point.
Most orbital mechanics texts direct the majority of their attention towards what is
known as the two-body problem — the motion of a system of two masses that are subject
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to their mutual gravitational interactions. An example would be a Spacecraft orbiting the
Earth, or one orbiting the sun as it traverses interplanetary space between the orbits of
Earth and Mars. Kepler’s equations, Hohman transfer orbits, and the patched-conic
approximation are based in the two-body problem.
Unfortunately, the real solar system is not a two-body problem. Two-body
assumptions yield reasonable results unless a third body of significant mass is nearby.
This is the case in the Earth-Moon system. Both the Earth and the moon, making the
transfer a three-body problem, heavily affect a spacecraft on a trans-lunar trajectory.
Technically, even the sun has an impact and precise studies require the application of a
four-body system.
The complex array of forces and motions has puzzled mathematicians for
centuries and has presented equations that have never been solved in closed form.
However, these forces and motions have also produced a fortuitous network of contours
of equal potential energy in the space surrounding the Earth—Moon system. Within this
network are five points of gravitational equilibrium where the gravity of the Earth and
moon precisely balance each other (Griffin, 1991).
These points are interchangeably referred to in literature as Lagrange points,
libration points, or equilibrium points and are numbered L1 through L5. L1, L2, and L3
are referred to as collinear equilibrium points, all lying on the axis that passes through the
Earth and the moon. L4 and L5 are equilateral equilibrium points, each lying on the
vertex of an equilateral triangle formed by the particular point, Earth, and the moon.
They are on the radius of the moon’s orbit, with L4 60 degrees ahead of the moon and L5
60 degrees behind the moon. The numbering convention varies in different texts and the
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numbering scheme in Figure 3-5 will be used in this paper. (Thus, L1 is the equilibrium
point lying directly between Earth and the moon.)
Objects placed at these points would not experience any relative acceleration.
However, it is known that while L4 and L5 are stable, L1, L2, and L3 are not. At the
collinear equilibrium points, any displacement would result in a departure from the
neighborhood (Kaplan, 1976). Objects will remain at the collinear points only if they are
completely unperturbed. Of course, any Object positioned there would be perturbed and
propellant would be required to maintain its position and prevent it from drifting away.
Examples of naturally occurring perturbations are solar radiation pressure, the sun’s
gravity, and non-circularity in the moon’s orbit. Any outgassing and venting from the
spacecraft, or rrrisalignments in the attitude control thrusters will also produce
perturbations.
It Should be noted that there is a Lagrange system for every large object that orbits
another object. For instance, there is a set of Earth-Sun Lagrange points, which are an
entirely different set of points from the Earth-Moon Lagrange points. Goddard Space
Flight Center’s MAP probe is currently orbiting the Earth—Sun L2 point and that orbit
should not be confused with an orbit around the Earth-Moon L2 point (MAP, 2002). The
SOHO spacecraft is currently orbiting the Earth-Sun L1 point (SOHO, 2002). There is
also a Jupiter-Sun Lagrange system. The Trojan asteroids orbit in the Jupiter-Sun L4 and
L5 points. In one of the more interesting Lagrange systems, Satum’s moon Helene is
actually in the L4 position belonging to the moon Dione for the Satum-Dione Lagrange
system (Dione, 2002).
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The Trailblazer LTV assumes the use of the Earth-Moon L1 as a staging area.
Thus, it is important to first establish that L1 staging is necessary and then to determine if
it is feasible. The question of necessity can be answered fairly quickly by revisiting the
Av data compiled in this chapter.
A delta-V of 3.101 km/S is required to reach lunar orbit from LEO, while a delta-v
of 3.0679 ans is required to reach Ll from LEO. While this is a seemingly insignificant
difference, there are other factors that contribute to the need to stage at Ll. Capture into
lunar orbit from LEO requires a 1.009 km/s Av, while capture into L1 from LEO requires
a 0.8104 km/s Av. These two factors combined mean the following if a payload is
destined for lunar orbit: the payload (1) requires more performance during the TLI burn
— assuming the payload’s mass does not change; (2) suffers an increased mass because
the payload must perform a greater burn to capture into the target orbit; (3) requires even
more performance from the TLI booster because its mass did increase. Thus, heavier
payloads will require staging at L1 as available upper stages will be unable to reach lunar
orbit. This limitation will be immediately evident in the chapter addressing Propulsion
Module 2.
Analysis of Collinear Equilibrium Points
As previously indicated, Hohman transfers and other two-body approximations
cannot be used to analyze the perturbations experienced in the vicinity of an equilibrium
point. The only way to Simulate the motion of a spacecraft in the Earth-Moon system is
to integrate the equations of motion for the four-body problem. Since the mass of a
spacecraft is too small to alter the motions of the sun, moon, or Earth, this system of
equations can be simplified slightly by making the approximation mv=0, where mv is the
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mass of the spacecraft. This produces the following system of equations: (Hoffman,
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The subscripts s, e, m, and v denote the sun, Earth, moon, and spacecraft,
respectively. Ta represents the thrust acceleration. Clearly, there is no analytic solution
to these equations, but they can be numerically integrated via MATLAB, C code, or any
other mathematical program.
Application ofJSC Study to Trailblazer LTVProblem
Fortunately, it will not be necessary to perform such a complex mathematical
analysis. Johnson Space Center engineer David Hoffman undertook the task of analyzing
the stability at the Earth-Moon L2 and designing a controller to modulate Ta for purposes
of stationing a communications satellite near L2 (Hoffman, 1993). An L2 satellite would
enable mission planners to establish a continuous communications link between Earth
and the far side of the moon, without the expense of deploying an entire network of relay
satellites. If the satellite could orbit the L2 point with a large enough radius, it could
obtain a line of sight with both Earth and the lunar far Side.
While this application is not the intended use of an equilibrium point in the
Trailblazer LTV flight path design, it does share several commonalities that make its data
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applicable. First, the disturbances at L2 are the same as those at Ll. Thus, any stability
issues — and solutions — identified in the JSC study would directly apply to the LTV
study. Second, the JSC study is actually a worse case than the LTV scenario. The goal
in the JSC study is to maintain a satellite at a Specified distance away from the
equilibrium point. The LTV modules would prefer to be as close to the equilibrium point
as possible. As will be shown later, the Av requirement increases with radial distance, so
the JSC L2 communications satellite will have a more imposing Av requirement than the
Trailblazer LTV. Thus, an LTV sized to perform the Av identified by Hoffman will have
a surplus of propellant with which to accomplish the LTV mission.
Hoffman’s study developed a series of control algorithms to simulate the
performance of a Spacecraft in the vicinity of a collinear equilibrium point. The
controllers were tested at various levels of fidelity, ranging from three-body to four-body
approximations, thus including some or all perturbation sources. The algorithms were
used to determine an appropriate controller for use in a spacecraft navigation system and
to characterize the AV requirements in the vicinity of a collinear equilibrium point.
Collinear Equilibrium Point Orbits
Rather than remain exactly stationary at a collinear equilibrium point, it is
possible for a spacecraft to assume an orbit about the point. (It may be more technically
correct to describe this as a periodic trajectory around the point instead of as an orbit.
Orbit might imply a stability that does not exist, but it is much easier to say “orbit” than
“periodic trajectory”) Orbits around collinear equilibrium points are frequently referred
to as halo orbits. However, the halo orbit is only one of two possible orbit types. The
second is a Lissajous orbit (Hoffman, 1993).
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A halo orbit results when the period of in-plane motion has been set equal to the
period of out-of-plane motion. A satellite in such an orbit traces out a circle/halo in the
plane of the sky as seen by an observer on Earth. A Lissajous orbit, on the other hand, is
the natural motion of a satellite about a collinear equilibrium point. As seen from Earth,
the trace of this orbit fills out a square in the plane of the sky, with the disk of the moon
occulting the central part of the square, with the size of the orbit determining the size
ratio between the moon’s disk and the trace of the orbit (Hoffman, 1993).
This is why Hoffman sought to maximize the size of the Lissajous orbit. The less
time the moon occults the satellite’s orbit, the more communications coverage the
satellite can maintain with Earth. (Of course, for a halo orbit with a sufficiently large
orbit, there will be no occultation at all). However, for the LTV, this issue is irrelevant.
Because the LTV is at Ll instead of L2, there is no lunar occultation. Additionally, as no
attempt is being made in the LTV design to eliminate loss of signal periods, it would not
matter if there were.
[5C Controller and Application to LTVDesign
The data Obtained by Hoffman’s Simulations confirms the usability of L1 for the
Trailblazer LTV’S mission design. Table 3-7 shows the relationship Hoffman observed
between Lissajous orbit radius, communications coverage, and total accumulated Av over
an annual basis.
Figures 3-6 and 3-7 graphically Show the trace of a spacecraft in the x-y and y-z
planes as it pursues a halo or Lissajous orbit respectively.
A simple glance at the diagrams of both halo and Lissajous orbits makes it clear
that for logistical reasons, the LTV absolutely cannot tolerate a large orbital radius. A
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large radius would create nightmarish rendezvous problems, particularly in the case of
the Lissajous orbit. Such problems would destroy much of the advantage of staging at
Ll. So it will be important for the LTV to station-keep, not simply orbit at arbitrary
distances.
The Av case for station keeping is particularly attractive. Several of the perturbing
forces present in the Earth-Moon system vanish as a spacecraft approaches the
equilibrium point (Hoffman, 1993). The only perturbing influence a station-keeping
controller must counteract is the solar gravitational force. The solar gravitational force
will pull a spacecraft away from the equilibrium point and the controller will issue thrust
commands to counter this pull. Using a four-body model, Hoffman found a cumulative
Av at the end of a 365-day run to be 0.3081 m/s (Hoffman, 1993). For LTV purposes,
this suggests a trivial, almost nonexistent, amount of propellant will be required.
However, it would be unwise to assume that the LTV module in question will be
deposited precisely at Ll. There may be position and/or velocity errors. Hoffman
performed two series of simulations, one with a position error of (1500,500,1500) km in
(x,y,z) coordinates and one with a velocity error of (0.01,0.005,0.005) m/s, again in
(x,y,z) coordinates. The required Av in these cases increased to 33.6246 m/s and 17.7583
m/s, respectively (Hoffman, 1993).
These Av requirements compare approximately with the Lissajous orbit Case 2. It
would be a reasonably conservative approach to use the Case 2 Av as the performance
requirement for any Spacecraft intended for L1 station keeping.
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Currently, no spacecraft are stationed at the Earth-Moon L1 point, but the use of
the Earth—Sun L1 and L2 points along with the detailed studies of the Earth-Moon L2
point clearly demonstrate the feasibility of using the unstable collinear equilibrium points
for long duration space missions with reasonably small fuel expenditures. The NASA-
JSC studies of the Earth-Moon L2 point additionally reveal that the LTV can operate at
the Earth-Moon L1 point without requiring a large propellant budget. Thus, the
Trailblazer LTV can transport the Crew Module to lunar orbit, using L1 as a staging
location.
3.8 LTV Overview
Because of the previously discussed limiting factors and L1 implications, a
modular approach was required to develop a viable design concept. The LTV is
composed of six different spacecraft, which act alone and in concert at various locations
between LEO and the lunar surface. LTV Spacecraft (to be described in more detail
momentarily) are as follows:
> Crew Module (CM).







Propulsion Module 2 (PM2).
> Fuel Tanker (PT).
The LTV is not responsible for travel between the Earth’s surface and LEO — that
job remains with the Shuttle. However, the LTV does provide all transportation from an
orbiting shuttle to the surface of the moon and back.
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In order to reduce docking loads and Simplify the process of docking, a magnetic
docking system is used for all LTV Spacecraft dockings. This system allows spacecraft
to capture each other with zero relative velocity and no RCS thrustings. It can also
correct for greater rrrisalignments than a non-magnetic docking system. All dockings are
nominally autonomous, but the crew can perform a manual docking any time they are in
one of the two vehicles being docked.
Commonality is employed across the LTV Spacecraft. With the exception of the
cryogenic Propulsion Module 2, all main engines are the hypergolic Boeing Rocketdyne
RS-72. Also with the exception of Propulsion Module 2, all RCS engines are General
Dynamics R-4Ds. (Both the RS-72 and the R-4D are commonly used on commercial
satellites today.) All solar arrays are Triple Junction arrays with the same wing-mounted
configuration and all vehicles use lithium polymer electrolyte batteries for secondary
power. All vehicles use the same thermal loops. All vehicles carry the same navigation
sensors (primarily optical sensors and INS/GPS) and software (using a derivative of Deep
Space One’s AutoNav) with only the CM possibly adding an Air Data system and the
ADV possibly adding a laser or radar altimeter system. The same communications
equipment and data formats are used across all vehicles and all vehicles have the same
flight software loads (though all do not have the same number of computers). All
vehicles have identical rendezvous and docking software with nearly identical hardware.
It Should be noted that while it is not part of their design mission, PMl and the Fuel
Tankers are capable of performing ISS reboost missions. Additionally, given a properly
designed US Propulsion module, the FT would be equally capable of refueling ISS.
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3.9 LTV Spacecraft Descriptions
Crew Module (CM).
The Crew Module is a heavily modified X-38. It differs substantially from the X-
38 CRV variant studied by the NASA-JSC Exploration Office. Unlike the CRV, it only
carries a crew of two and is sized for 14.5 days of crewed operation. The CRV
propulsion stage is also replaced with a jettisonable RS-72 engine module that also has
retractable solar array and radiator wing mountings. Nominally, the CM does not land.
However, in the event that the Shuttle fleet is grounded while a lunar mission is in
progress or some other factor prevents a shuttle rendezvous, it is capable of performing a
deorbit burn and Parafoil assisted landing just as a CRV X-38 would do.
Propulsion Module ] (PMI).
Propulsion Module 1 is a reusable hypergolic stage capable of orbital refueling. It
provides propulsion for the Crew Module, beginning at Ll for the outbound (Earth to
moon) flight and for the entire inbound flight. It refuels multiple times. It is first
partially fueled in LEO, before it is transported to L1 by PM2. It uses this fuel to capture
into L1. It is refueled there, prior to its docking with the CM. It uses that fuel to take the
CM to lunar orbit and capture into orbit there. It is fueled once again in lunar orbit, using
that fuel (after the lunar surface mission) to return to L1 with the CM. It is fueled at Ll
one final time and uses that fuel to propel itself, CM, and AM on a trajectory to Earth.
After aerocapture, it will use the last of its fuel to circularize itself and CM into a low
Earth orbit. One spare PMI is stationed at Ll.
Aeroshell Module (AM).
The Aeroshell Module protects the CM and PMl from the intense heating loads
generated during aerocapture. It meets the CM and PMl at Ll during the crew’s return
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flight from the moon. The AM does not have a RS-72 main engine, only R-4D RCS
engines. The module is a large domed cylinder with an open aft end (roughly 19 meters
in length and 8.5 meters in diameter). A magnetic guide system captures the docked
CM/PMl spacecraft and draws it into the vehicle. The system then properly aligns the
CM/PMl, correcting any angular or position errors. A magnetic docking system then
takes over, securing the CM/PMl to two APAS mounts inside the AM, holding the craft
securely against the floor of the AM. The AM is propelled by PMl’s engine from L1 to
an Earth atmospheric entry corridor. Following aerocapture, CM/PMl separate from the
AM to perform a circularization burn and the AM is discarded. The heat shield uses
existing TPS materials. Part of its heat shield is ablative (SIRCA) and the AM
consequently cannot be reused. One spare is stationed at Ll.
Ascent-Descent Vehicle (ADV).
The Ascent-Descent Vehicle is the LTV’S version of the Apollo LM. It is a single
stage, reusable spacecraft. It awaits the CM in polar lunar orbit and flies the crew to the
lunar surface for their mission. After the surface mission, it flies the crew back up to
orbit where it docks with the CM to return the crew to the CM. Once the LTV departs, it
refuels from a FI‘ and awaits its next mission. It remains in orbit instead of at a lunar
base because it is more cost effective to deliver its fuel to lunar orbit instead of the lunar
surface.
Propulsion Module 2 (PM2).
Propulsion Module 2 is a slightly modified Centaur upper stage, replacing the
payload adapter with an APAS docking mount and two steel plates for use by the
magnetic docking system. It uses the Centaur’s existing RL-10 main engine and
hydrazine attitude control thrusters, with no modifications to either. It is the workhorse
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for getting LTV components away from Earth orbit. Everything leaving LEO is
pTOpelled by a PM2. PMZS are discarded after their burns and are not reused. It is
important to note that the Centaur-PM2 must be human rated, but it should be noted that
it is not being human rated to ride in the shuttle. PM2s will be delivered to orbit
exclusively by Delta IV and Atlas V. However, PM2S will be used to propel the Crew
Module (with the crew onboard) from LEO to L1, hence the need for a human rating.
Another difficulty will involve accomplishing a rendezvous and docking to PM2 before
its cryogenic propellants can boil off. The Delta IV and Atlas V are pushing their
payload lirrritations to place a fully fueled PM2 in LEO, so any payload — the other LTV
Spacecraft to be pushed by PM2 — must be launched on a separate vehicle, forcing an in-
space docking prior to the departure burn to head for L1. This means that these payload
spacecraft must be launched prior to the PM2’s launch and the PM2’S launch vehicle
must launch PM2 on course for a flight day one, preferably orbit one, rendezvous.
Fuel Tanker (FT).
The Fuel Tanker is the LTV’S equivalent of the Russian Progress. It is
responsible for refueling the CM, PMl, and ADV. Thus, depending on its particular
target vehicle, its missions may carry it to LEO, L1, or lunar orbit. FTS sent to LEO can
be recovered by the shuttle and reused if deemed cost effective. Those sent to L1 and
lunar orbit are discarded following use.
PM2s will be used to deliver FI‘S to L1 and lunar orbit. An unfortunate
consequence of this is that two FTS will be required to refuel the ADV prior to each lunar
mission. However, it is possible that solar-electric propulsion might replace PM2 at
some point for this purpose, or use of Weak Stability Boundary trajectories might allow
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for use of lower performance propulsion from LEO. If so, it could significantly lower
overall program launch costs and eliminate one FT and one to two PM2s from each
mission. In an emergency situation, any FT is capable of docking to the CM and acting
as a surrogate PMl.
3.10 LTV Communications Architecture
It may be desirable to avoid reliance on the Deep Space Network for
communications as the network is already heavily taxed with requirements in support of
NASA’S numerous space probes. Consequently, a network of geostationary
communications satellites should be deployed to support lunar communications, much
like the existing Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) supports
communications between the ground and the shuttle and ISS.
In fact, the existing two-satellite TDRSS can be oriented to provide visibility to
the lunar near side. (More than two satellites are in orbit, but the others serve as spares
and are not part of the active system.) Oriented in such a manner, the system can provide
near-continuous coverage, with daily outages of four to eight hours. Outages are due to
gimbal limits on the single-access antennas and Earth occultation. However, by
extending the gimbal limits, the problem could be reduced to only Earth occultation,
which occurs roughly ten times per month with an outage of less than or equal to 70
minutes (Eckart, 1999). Of course, the existing TDRSS cannot be used, as it is
continuously required to support ISS. A new network must be deployed.
The Boeing 601 and 702 spacecraft families (formerly Hughes) are easily capable
of meeting this communications requirement. The Boeing 601 is already used as the
NASA’S TDRS and would have sufficient power to communicate with any of the LTV
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spacecraft at any point in their mission trajectories. Given that the existing TDRSS will
need replacement before Trailblazer is expected to begin, the replacement TDRSS could
consider the needs of both LEO and lunar space programs. A future TDRSS (FTDRSS)
could consist of two active Boeing 702 satellites in geostationary orbit with fully
steerable antennas for lunar and translunar coverage, and additional steerable antennas for
LEO coverage. The additional power supplied by the Boeing 702 makes it a better
choice than the 601 due to the need to maintain a communications link with all deployed
LTV spacecraft. Further, without the 601’s gimbal limits, two satellites can provide full
coverage. (Altemately, three satellites with gimbal limits could provide full coverage,
but some negotiation may be required to obtain an additional geostationary orbit slot,
phased between TDRS East and TDRS West.) These satellites would enable human
spaceflight coverage throughout the near Earth environment. Two additional 702
satellites in halo or Lissajous orbits around the Earth-Moon L2 would enable coverage to
the lunar far side, including the surface base. Two satellites are required, phased 180
degrees apart, because a Single satellite cannot maintain continuous coverage of the poles
(Eckart, 1999). One Spare each would be required at GEO and L2. A total of six 702
satellites will be assumed for the FI‘DRSS constellation: two GEO active satellites with
one spare, and two L2 active satellites with one spare.
As an aside, it should also be noted that because the mission architecture will
always have one or more LTV spacecraft at Ll, a lunar base would only need to have a
communications system capable of reaching L1 or L2. LTV modules at Ll could serve
as relay stations, transmitting communications from a surface base to Earth. Thus, an
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indirect benefit of the LTV program is that the communications requirement for the
surface base is greatly reduced.
3.11 LTV Flight Operations
The LTV is designed assuming a four-year lunar program consisting of two lunar
missions per year. Each mission involves a 30-day stay in the vicinity of the lunar South
Pole. Travel times for the crewmembers are approximately 14.5 days: 6.5 days outbound
and 8 days inbound (including an assumed half-day loiter in LEO prior to lunar departure
and a 2-day loiter in LEO following aerocapture). However, despite the fact that there
are only 29 days per year with humans in the LTV, the LTV Mission Control will be
operational 365 days a year.
Because LTV spacecraft are permanently in space (LEO, Cislunar space, L1, and
lunar orbit), Mission Control must provide continuous flight control to monitor their
systems. Additionally, the logistical supply chain of pre-positioning LTV spacecraft is
conducted primarily while astronauts are still on Earth, requiring significant planning and
monitoring activities. Dynamic flight activities occur throughout the year, taking place
while astronauts are onboard, while they are on the lunar surface, and before they leave
Earth. More detail will be given to Mission Control operations in a later chapter.
The first lunar mission (including all launches of reusable LTV vehicles) is
estimated to take 163 days for Earth launches, assuming a 20-day turnaround for Atlas V
and Delta IV pads and exclusive access to Delta IV and Atlas V launch services during
the mission. The lunar outbound flight begins on day 163, by which time some console
positions are already making preparations for the launches associated with the second
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lunar mission. Subsequent even numbered missions take 102 days for ELV launches and
odd numbered missions take 83 days, with the same assumptions.
3.12 Trailblazer Missions
The previous section mentioned that the LTV is designed assuming a total of
eight missions spread over four years. While the surface base and operations lie beyond
the scope of this dissertation, it is worth making brief mention of the primary objectives
of each mission to indicate how the eight missions fit in to the Trailblazer mission
statement and objectives described in Chapter One.
Trailblazer 1: Infrastructure Development Mission 1
An ongoing objective will be to assess the impact of lunar gravity on human
health and performance. Studies will be conducted both inside pressurized structures and
on surface EVAS. In addition to determining biological impacts of low gravity, human
factors considerations for locomotion, posture, balance, and other anticipated activities
will be researched. This mission will also survey and appraise existing surface terrain
features in the immediate area for lunar surface base development and expansion. This
will include surveys both for future Trailblazer missions as well as for follow-on
commercial, government, or private lunar activities. Astronauts will begin to construct
landing sites for use by cargo and personnel transfer vehicles. AS another ongoing
program, they will continuously evaluate the effectiveness of lunar base equipment and
operational techniques. Mission success and responses to failures will increase
competence in planetary surface operations.
Trailblazer 2: Infi'astructure Development Mission 2
The second 30-day mission will continue to assess the impact of lunar gravity on
human health and performance. They will also continue to survey and appraise existing
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surface terrain features for lunar surface base development and expansion. As a new
activity, they will construct surface roads for use in lunar base construction and
operations. Astronauts will excavate trenches as necessary for the expansion of lunar
base facilities and continue to construct landing sites for use by cargo and personnel
transfer vehicles. As an important step to future expansion in space, they will begin to
establish a surface infrastructure capable of supporting Mars related testbed activities
(landing Sites, available power, monitoring facilities, etc). It should be noted that even if
a decision to pursue human expeditions to Mars does not materialize, this infrastructure
can still be used for any of a number of commercial, private, or governmental lunar
activities. Like the first mission, they will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of lunar
base equipment and operational techniques and increase US competence in planetary
surface operations
Trailblazer 3: Infrastructure Development Mission 3
As with all Trailblazer missions, the crew of Trailblazer 3 will assess the impact
of lunar gravity on human health and performance. They will continue to excavate
trenches as necessary for the expansion of lunar base facilities. Trailblazer 3 astronauts
will complete the construction of landing sites for use by cargo and personnel transfer
vehicles. This mission will complete the formal program to evaluate the effectiveness of
lunar base equipment and operational techniques. In preparation for Trailblazer 4, the
astronauts will begin to locate and survey potential lunar fuel resources. They will also
complete development of surface infrastructure for support of Mars related testbed
activities. The process of accomplishing Trailblazer 3 objectives will continue to
increase competence in planetary surface operations
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Trailblazer 4: Fuel Prospecting Mission ]
Trailblazer 4 marks the first mission to actually utilize lunar resources. A new
slate of activities will expand their ability to assess the impact of lunar gravity on human
health and performance, this time in a mining environment. They will complete the
surveying and appraisal of existing surface terrain features for lunar fuel mining and
processing operations. Based on their results, they will then locate and survey potential
lunar fuel resources. This will include both polar ice/hydrogen resources and lunar soil
resources (In recent years, lunar ice has dominated most discussion of lunar fuel, but a
variety of fuels and oxidizers can be extracted from lunar soil). They will then construct
surface roads for use in lunar mining operations. The crew will subsequently begin to
mine and process lunar fuels to prototype possibilities for use in support of future Space
activities. With the first mining of extraterrestrial fuel, Trailblazer 4 will begin to
develop a critically important competency in planetary surface operations
Trailblazer 5: Fuel Prospecting Mission 2
Trailblazer 5 will be entirely dominated by fuel mining and processing activities.
The assessment of impacts of lunar gravity on human health and performance will be
related almost entirely to mining Operations. Trailblazer 5 astronauts will continue to
mine and process lunar fuels and will return raw and processed fuel samples to earth for
detailed analysis. Results of Trailblazer 5 will be critical in establishing competence in
planetary surface mining operations and will be vital for future in-situ resource
development of the moon, Mars, and all other extraterrestrial bodies.
Trailblazer 6: Fuel Prospecting Mission 3
The final mission with a fuel-specific focus, Trailblazer 6 will wrap up the mining
and production of lunar fuels to prototype possibilities for use in support of future space
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activities. Like Trailblazer 5, samples of these fuels will be returned to Earth for detailed
analysis. In preparation for Trailblazer 7, the crew will survey the lunar surface for
future government and commercial applications. This will include the gamut of potential
future lunar activities. AS with all missions, Trailblazer 6 will continue to assess the
impact of lunar gravity on human health and performance and increase competence in
planetary surface operations.
Trailblazer 7: Commercial Opportunities Mission 1
The last two lunar missions focus specifically on identifying ways for American
industries to profitably exploit opportunities and resources on the moon. Trailblazer 7
will continue to assess the impact of lunar gravity on human health and performance.
The mission will also begin to develop safety guidelines for commercial and private
human operations on moon. Astronauts will continue to survey the nearby lunar surface
for future government and commercial applications. This mission will not only increase
competence in engineering and scheduling aspects of planetary surface Operations, but
will also begin to develop competence and confidence with lunar business models.
Trailblazer 8: Commercial Opportunities Mission 2
Trailblazer 8 completes the task of assessing the impact of lunar gravity on human
health and performance. This mission will also complete the development of safety
guidelines for commercial and private human operations on moon and will conduct a
final survey of the lunar surface for future government and commercial applications. The
conclusion Of the Trailblazer program will leave the United States with demonstrated
competence in planetary surface operations and will present a roadmap to the American
government and US business for future opportunities for lunar exploration in line with
national interests.
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Chapter Four — LTV Crew Module
4.1 Overview
CM-ADVRendezvous Location
The decision to carry the CM all the way to lunar orbit was the result of a trade.
Only two vehicles in the LTV are capable of carrying crew: the CM and the ADV.
Regardless of other considerations, the CM must travel at least as far as L1. If the ADV
is called upon to travel to L1 to take on crew (instead of in LLO), then it incurs a nominal
two-day life support requirement with a contingency five-day requirement (two days
from L1 to LLO, plus one day in orbit, plus two days returning from LLO to L1 (In the
event of any landing site problem, the ADV would need to be able to abort back to L1
without landing to take on new provisions). However, if the ADV is limited to ascent
and descent, it only incurs a nominal three to four-hour life support requirement with a
thirty-two-hour contingency requirement. This results in a tremendous difference in crew
accommodations and life support equipment required onboard the ADV, translating into
significant weight savings for the lunar lander. As will be seen in chapter six, it also
allows for significant structural weight savings on the ADV. Altemately, if the CM were
to stop at Ll, then it would only need to accommodate an eight-day life support
requirement, as opposed to a fourteen and a half-day requirement. Orbital mechanics
dictate that savings to the vehicle destined for the lunar surface are more important than
savings to a vehicle destined only for lunar orbit. It is also significant that this LTV is
intended to service a polar landing site. For a Site near the equator or poles, orbital
rendezvous is not a significant concern. However, for sites at middle latitudes, orbital
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rendezvous becomes a serious problem that would drive rendezvous locations away from
lunar orbit and to an Earth-Moon Lagrange point.
CM Vehicle Selection
An important step is the design of a crew module to carry the crew during the
lunar transfer. A variety of options are possible: a space station derived module, a
Spacelab module, a Spacehab module, a TransHab-style inflatable, an X-38, an Apollo
capsule, a Gemini capsule, and a uniquely designed module with no design heritage.
Clearly, the last choice violates the constraint to use existing vehicles as much as possible
and is not considered as a Trailblazer option.
The other choices can be divided into two categories: those capable of Earth entry
and those that are not. Those not capable of Earth entry have an inherent risk. The
shuttle or ISS must be capable of receiving their astronauts following a lunar mission or
the crew will be lost.
Currently, the station is not capable of receiving lunar astronauts who arrive in
spaceships incapable of Earth entry. Flight rules require that the station be able to
evacuate all personnel onboard in the event of a failure that renders the station
uninhabitable. The Soyuz capsule docked to the Russian segment currently provides this
function. However, the Soyuz can only carry a crew of three, which is the size of the
station crew. Unless the station adds additional lifeboats, which is highly unlikely, it
cannot be used. Therefore, only the shuttle can currently receive an inbound lunar crew
if the LTV itself cannot reenter and land (if the LTV can land, then a lunar crew could
currently visit the station, because the LTV is in essence an escape vehicle).
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The risk of shuttle unavailability is obvious. The shuttle fleet has been grounded
several times in its history while various problems with the shuttles were resolved. If the
fleet were to be grounded while a crew was on the moon, the crew could potentially die if
shuttle flights did not resume in time. Even if the shuttles are not grounded, launch
delays could cause a shuttle to miss its rendezvous with a LTV. Kennedy Space Center is
particularly vulnerable to weather-related delays during the winter and during hurricane
season. The hurricane threat is also present for Johnson Space Center and the year 2002
marks the first time in which a hurricane forced a Shuttle launch delay because it
threatened Mission Control at Johnson Space Center. Additionally, numerous in-flight
shuttle emergencies are possible that could cause the shuttle crew to deorbit and land
before receiving an incoming lunar crew. The risk of such an emergency is greater
during a long duration shuttle mission, which is the type of mission that would be
required for LTV end of mission support. The shuttle is far too complex and uncertain a
system to place crew survival on the assumption of a Shuttle being available “on
demand.” Regardless of whether the intent is to place a shuttle in orbit before the crew
departs at the beginning of a lunar mission (and keep it there until the LTV returns to
LEO at the end of a lunar expedition) or to time a shuttle launch to have the shuttle in
orbit by the time the crew returns, a variety of factors can cause the shuttle to not be
available precisely when the lunar crew’s survival depends on it being there.
Consequently, the crew module must be capable of entering the atmosphere and
landing its crew safely on Earth. This leaves Gemini, Apollo, and X-38 as options.
Gemini is an extremely small cabin and does not leave much room for astronauts to move
around. Gemini’s docking port is also incompatible with modern docking hardware and
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any possible modifications still would not allow astronauts to transfer from the CM to the
ADV without conducting an EVA. Because the Gemini cabin is too small for crew to put
on or take off a spacesuit, this would mean that the astronauts would have to remain in
spacesuits for the entire trip. From a human factors perspective, this is an unacceptable
living environment. Gemini is not an option.
While Apollo is larger and could be modified to support modern docking systems,
it is not a preferred solution because it is restricted to a water landing. This requires
deployment of ground personnel to a landing site and introduces additional risks and
failure modes associated with the ocean (e.g. the sinking of the Mercury capsule Liberty
Bell 7). The industrial and engineering infrastructure necessary to support Apollo
production also no longer exists, making it essentially a new vehicle and arguably
violating the constraint to use existing vehicles when possible.
Altemately, the X-38 lands on dry land and is capable of precision landings
anywhere in the world. It does not need ground personnel dispatched to some remote
location — it can land at existing facilities at Kennedy Space Center, Edwards Air Force
Base, or virtually any government controlled airfield. Based on casual claims made by
X-38 engineers about its precision-landing abilities, it could possibly land in a large
parking lot or Open field at Johnson Space Center. A greater advantage to the X-38 (over
Apollo and Gemini) is that its atmospheric flight software is modern and compatible with
existing avionics systems. It also has an existing engineering support base, unlike Apollo
and Gemini. Engineers would not have to spend a Significant period of time discovering
or relearning vehicle capabilities, systems and attributes. It could further allow for a
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more efficient use of budgetary resources, employing commonality between both station
CRV efforts and Trailblazer LTV efforts.
Consequently, the X—38, shown in figure 4-1, will serve as the LTV Crew
Module, with the necessary modifications to transform the X—38 from an ISS Crew
Return Vehicle into a fully reusable lunar transfer spacecraft. While the X-38 was
designed with the intent that it be easily applied to other Space applications beyond its
crew return mission, it will require significant modifications to convert it to a Spacecraft
capable of transporting two astronauts from LEO to LLO and back. Some systems, such
as the thermal protection system (TPS), landing gear, Parafoil, vehicle structure, and
pressure shell will remain unchanged. Most other systems will require some alteration
and will be presented in the remainder of this chapter. The X-38 has dimensions of 9.14
min length, 4.42 min width, and 3.20 min height.
4.2 Life Support
Atmosphere Management
Several options are available to provide oxygen to the crew: stored oxygen,
Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA), or Sabatier processes. These options can be
examined to determine the most appropriate solution.
The simplest and most widely used process for oxygen supply is simple oxygen
storage. This provides an Open loop system that is best for short missions. Oxygen can
be stored in high pressure or cryogenic tanks (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Larson and Pranke (1999) suggest a mass parametric of 1 kg per person per day
multiplied by a packaging factor of 1.9 and a volume parametric of 0.0033 m3/kg to size a
stored oxygen system. There are no power requirements. It operates at ambient
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temperature and does not generate waste heat. It is, however, a high-pressure system,
operating at 25.3 MPa.
The Russian Mir space station uses an Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) to
perform electrolysis on excess water produced by fuel cells. The International Space
Station (ISS) will later gain this capability (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Larson and Pranke (1999) suggest 35 kg per person as a mass parametric for
OGA, a volume parametric of 0.03 m3 per person, a power requirement of 0.35 kW per
person, and a heat generation of 0.1 kW per person. It operates at ambient temperature
and pressure.
The Sabatier process recovers carbon dioxide and uses a two-step process to first
react the carbon dioxide with hydrogen, producing methane and water. Water
electrolysis is then used to produce oxygen. The methane can either be decomposed to
reclaim hydrogen, or it can be used by the propulsion system (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Larson and Pranke (1999) suggest parametrics of 38 kg per person, 0.07 m3 per
person, 0.02 kW per person for power, and 0.16 kW per person heat generation. It
Operates at 473-673 K and is not restricted to any particular operating pressure.
For this mission, stored oxygen is more efficient than Sabatier or OGA. The key
driver is mission duration. For the short duration mission of the LTV (14.5 days), the
mass, volume and power requirements Of the Sabatier and OGA equipment outweigh the
benefit of recycling oxygen. Roughly 2 kg of oxygen and 5 kg of nitrogen are assumed
to be lost due to a habitat atmosphere leakage rate of 0.5 kg per day (Larson and Pranke,
1999). Taking this loss into account, 59 kg are required for the stored oxygen system,
3
occupying a volume of 0.195 m . Power requirements are negligible. By comparison,
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the OGA system requires 70 kg, 0.06 m3, 0.7 kW and generates 0.2 kW in heat. The
Sabatier system requires 76 kg, 0.14 m3, 0.04 kW and generates 0.32 kW in heat.
An additional 10 kg and 0.03 m3 are required for stored nitrogen. Another 64 kg
of life support consumables are required to support four EVAS per crewmember, based
on Larson and Pranke’s (1999) recommendation of 8 kg per crewmember per EVA. This
frequency of EVAS assumes one emergency EVA for crew transfer in the event of
docking system failure and three contingency in-flight-maintenance (IFM) EVAS.
In addition to providing oxygen, the life support system must also remove carbon
dioxide from the air. Virtually all crewed spacecraft have used Lithium hydroxide
(LiOH) canisters to absorb carbon dioxide (C02). The technology is mature and LiOH
canisters are highly reliable, small, and use low power. Because it is a non-regenerative
process, the mass can become prohibitive for long duration missions (Larson and Pranke,
1999).
Larson and Pranke (1999) indicate that a standard LiOH cartridge has a mass of 7
kg and can provide C02 management for four persons for one day. Simple scaling yields
a mass parametric of 7 kg per 4-persons per day. Larson and Pranke (1999) suggest a
volume parametric of 0.005 m3 per cartridge. A miniscule power requirement of 12 W is
needed to drive a fan to circulate air across the cartridge. Heat generation is negligible
and it Operates at ambient temperature and pressure.
As an alternative system to LiOH, Four Bed Molecular Sieves (4BMS) are used
on Skylab and ISS. 4BMS uses synthetic zeolites or aluminO-silicate metal ions to
collect C02 (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
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Again using Larson and Pranke’s (1999) parametrics, 30 kg per person is required
for 4BMS, with a volume requirement of 0.15 m3 per person, a 0.3 kW per person power
requirement, and a 0.3 kW per person heat generation. It operates at ambient temperature
at a pressure of 680 kPa.
Just as with the oxygen supply, mission duration is the critical driver for CO2
removal. Mass, volume and power requirements are significantly lower for Li0H than
for 4BMS at the LTV’S mission duration. The LiOH system has a mass of 51 kg,
occupies 0.036 m3 and draws 0.012 kW power. This compares to 4MBS requirements of
60 kg, 0.3 m3, 0.6 kW power, and 0.6 kW heat generated. Consequently, LiOH will be
used.
Cabin Pressure
Cabin pressure is driven primarily by EVA considerations. Unfortunately, the
optimization of cabin pressure is contradictory to the Optimization of spacesuit pressure
(Eckart, 1996). It is preferred for the cabin pressure to be at least one atmosphere (101.3
kPa) because at lower pressures, the oxygen concentration must be increased, therefore
increasing the flammability potential (Eckart, 1996). It was a pure oxygen environment
that played a significant role in the fatal Apollo 1 fire. However, the space suit pressure
should be as low as possible in order to provide the astronaut with increased mobility and
to maximize dexterity and tactility of the glove (Eckart, 1996). Generally, this means the
cabin and spacesuit will operate at different pressures.
Due to the pressure differential, astronauts must prebreathe oxygen before an
EVA. The oxygen prebreathe, or denitrogenation, reduces the nitrogen content in the
body and prevents occurrences of incapacitating decompression sickness and bends
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(Eckart, 1996). From an operational perspective, it is desirable to keep the prebreathing
time to a minimum as this affects the response time to an emergency situation and it
limits crew activities during prebreathe
The spacecraft atmospheric composition and initial and final pressure levels
govern the duration of prebreathing. An important safety measure is the R-factor, which
is a ratio of tissue nitrogen pressure (i.e. cabin atmosphere N2 partial pressure) prior to
decompression and the final suit pressure. The lower the R-factor, the lower the risk for
the crew to experience decompression problems. The United States, Russia, and Europe
use or plan different approaches and R-factors, with the United States using an R-factor
of 1.4, Russia using 1.7, and Europe planning to use 1.2 (Eckart, 1996). R-factor can be
calculated by the equation R=PN2i/Pss, where PN2i is the initial cabin atmosphere N2 partial
pressure and P85 is the spacesuit pressure (Eckart, 1996). Dependent on cabin pressure
and suit pressure selected, prebreathe times of zero can be achieved with R-factors of
1.22 and 1.4.
Several other constraints play important roles in determining the cabin
atmosphere. Current standards suggest that the oxygen partial pressure should not fall
below 16 kPa to reduce the risk of hypoxia (Larson and Pranke, 1999). However, the
concern of hyperoxia and 02 toxicity suggests that the oxygen partial pressure should not
exceed 21-22 kPa for long periods (Larson and Pranke, 1999). Additionally, to reduce
fire dangers, the oxygen partial pressure should not exceed 24% of the total pressure, or
up to 30% under controlled conditions (Larson and Pranke, 1999). Figure 4-2 shows the
relationship between suit pressure, cabin pressure, and R-factor.
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The LTV will maintain a cabin atmosphere of 68-kPa with 28% oxygen, 72%
nitrogen content. Assuming an EVA suit pressure of 35 kPa using pure oxygen, this will
result in an R-factor of 1.4 and will not require any prebreathe time. (Other than the
specification of suit pressure, details of the EVA suit design are beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Where mass and volume data is required, shuttle extravehicular mobility
unit [EMU] suits will be used as representative data).
Water Supply
The water supply will use a partially closed system. Multifiltration (Larson and
Pranke, 1999; Eckart, 1996) is a relatively simple and mature technology that will be
used to recycle hand wash, dishwashing, and urine flush water. Drinking and food
preparation water will not be recycled. Additionally, due to purity concerns, the urine
flush water will be recycled in a separate loop from hand wash and dishwashing water.
The recycled water will use a source stock that is sized equivalent to 2.1-day
supply. This quantity of water is selected to allow a sufficient amount of water to be
onboard the vehicle to serve as a radiation shield. Details of the Shield will be discussed
later in this chapter. A recovery rate of 85% is assumed. A total of 148 kg will be
carried onboard the crew module in three tanks: a potable water tank, multifiltration tank
1 (hand wash and dish wash), and multifiltration tank 2 (urine flush). Multifiltration tank
1 will hold 76 kg, multifiltration tank 2 will hold 4 kg, and the potable water tank will
hold 68 kg (EVA water will not be stored in this stock, but will be located with EMU
storage). Because multifiltration tank 1 is used for washing, it will be a hot water source.
The ideal maximum, safe temperature for hot tap water is 50°C (Medialaunch, 1999) so
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the tank will be maintained at this temperature. Table 4-1 indicates the quantities of
water required for various crew services.
The entire mass of the system, including all tanks and filters, is 265 kg. This
includes mass parametrics of 10 kg per person for each multifiltration unit’s mass
(Larson and Pranke, 1999). Tank masses are Sized by the mass parametric of (Water
mass)*(1/0.89-1) (Larson and Pranke, 1999). A total of 0.16 kW are required to operate
the two multifiltration units, based on the sizing parametric of 0.04 kW per person per
unit (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Radiation Protection
Despite the short mission duration for LTV crew, the LTV must provide some
degree of radiation protection due to the unpredictability of solar particle events. Due to
mass considerations, the primary radiation shielding is located on PMl and consequently,
radiation protection will be covered in greater detail in chapter five. However, because
CM operates for approximately three to four days prior to docking, an emergency level of
protection must be provided onboard the CM.
An emergency water protection shield exists on the CM, using the crew’s water
supply as a shield. The water tanks have a square cross section, measuring 0.62 meters
on each side. These dimensions represent the necessary size to protect two 95‘h percentile
adult males, with the two males back to back and the shield directly “overhead” or
“underneath,” depending on the orientation of the astronauts with respect to the shield,
which is positioned between the astronauts and the incoming radiation (NASA-STD-
3000/T, 1995). The amount of water carried onboard is sized to allow the tanks to
provide a combined depth of 0.39 meters, given the previously mentioned dimensions.
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This results in a shield that is essentially as capable as the PMI shield, though it covers a
much smaller area. It is, of course, only capable of providing protection in one direction.
For a short duration mission such as lunar transfer, this is acceptable. In such a mission,
the total Galactic Cosmic Radiation exposure (the primary omni directional source) is
within acceptable limits and the primary threat is solar particle events, which comes only
from the sun.
In order to be protected by this shield, the crew must position themselves, back to
back, directly in front of the water tanks. To accomplish this, the sleep restraints will be
mounted perpendicular to the water tank and spacecraft floor, such that each astronaut is
lying on their side (relative to the Spacecraft floor) with their backs to each other, one
facing the starboard wall and the other the port wall, their heads pointed towards the
spacecraft nose and their feet resting against the water tanks. (Altemately, they could
reverse direction such that their heads are against the water tanks.) The CM will be
oriented such that its aft is facing the radiation.
The crew will use the same radiation protocols whether the CM is attached to
PMl or not. The only difference is that when CM and PMl are joined, the crew will
have roughly twice the level of radiation protection as when CM is alone.
4.3 Crew Accommodations
Crew accommodations are a necessary, though often inadequately considered,
element of all crewed spacecraft. Failure to properly consider all aspects of crew
accommodations early in the design process can result in costly redesigns, performance
limitations, and reduced safety for the flight crew. Proper human factors principles must
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be reflected in the cabin layout and systems, operational procedures, and crew, vehicle,
and MCC interfaces.
For purposes of this dissertation, crew accommodations are considered to be the
elements of mission hardware and procedures that most directly serve human needs. This
includes the food system, sleep provisions and/or crew quarters, personal hygiene and
toilet, clothing system, crew health care, emergency provisions, recreation hardware,
maintenance, housekeeping and trash, photographic equipment, and restraints and
mobility aids (Larson and Pranke, 1999). These accommodations serve to both house the
crew and ensure crew health and safety.
The LTV must provide all necessary accommodations and systems to support a
human crew of two for 14.5 days while they are in transit between Earth and lunar orbits.
This assumes a half day in LEO before trans-L1 burn, three days en route to L1, a half
day at Ll, two days in transit to LLO, a half day in LLO before crew transfer to the lunar
surface, a half day in LLO following crew transfer from the lunar surface, two days en
route to L1, a half day at Ll, three days in transit to Earth, and two days in LEO
following aerocapture.
The Spacecraft Cabin Design Expert System (SCDEX), a software expert system
developed as part of the author’s master’s thesis, was used to perform a function and task
analysis and develop resource requirements for the LTV crew accommodations. SCDEX
applies heuristic rules to analyze user specified crew functions and determine specific
crew workstations to include in the Spacecraft (Robert Howard, Jr., 1997). The SCDEX
analysis indicates the following seven workstations or provisions will be required in the
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Crew Module: Vehicle systems, Housekeeping, Galley, Science, Exercise, Hygiene, and
Crew sleep.
With the workstations determined, SCDEX then determines spacecraft cabin
components based on a user supplied mission description. It utilizes a database
containing spacecraft crew components used in the Shuttle, station and X-38 programs to
generate a list of appropriate items (Robert Howard, Jr., 1997). SCDEX does not indicate
component power requirements or masses, but does list dimensions. It applies heuristic
rules to user queries concerning mission duration, crew size, and operating environment.
Human factors principles are applied to match potential equipment items to mission
parameters. SCDEX selected components are modeled volumetrically as blocks. The
exact dimensions and masses may vary to some extent in actual flight hardware, but
SCDEX estimates should be adequate for preliminary design work.
As part of the process of generating equipment dimensions, SCDEX applies
anthropometrics data, assuming crew will vary in Size within extremes of 5th percentile
Japanese female to 95th percentile American male. For certain items, such as sleep
restraints, it will add the appropriate human dimensions to the item to define the total
space required in the vehicle for the item and its human operator (Robert Howard, Jr.,
1997). Table 4-2 lists crew accommodations by major category.
Additionally, the LTV will need to transport some items that are not used during
the transfer but will be required on the moon, so some cargo space is also required. This
will include the astronauts’ space suits for use on the lunar surface. In a contingency
situation, the crew can conduct EVAS from the Crew Module, but a nominal mission will
not involve any EVA activity. The astronauts will don their space suits prior to transfer
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to the ADV and consequently will need to bring two EMUS with them. (Technically, this
is not an EVA because they do not enter the vacuum of space until they touch down on
the lunar surface and egress from the ADV.) A small allocation will also be made for
lunar samples, but Trailblazer does not assume that extensive samples will be returned to
Earth with the crew. Any large—scale sample return would utilize a dedicated cargo
vehicle flying a low thrust or other low energy transfer.
The X-38 is a relatively small spacecraft, which presents challenges in providing
sufficient internal volume for two astronauts and their associated systems. This forces
some compromises to the solutions identified by SCDEX. The LTV will use wall
mounted sleep restraints (essentially a stretcher with a sleeping bag attached) similar to
those used on the shuttle instead of larger sleep bunks recommended by SCDEX. The
restraints will be mounted between the oven and water dispenser, arranged along the
vehicle’s yz plane. Altemately, with the rower, seating, and flight controls folded out of
the way, the sleep restraints could be located in the area occupied by those items. This
area can also be used for donning and doffing EMUS in preparation for transit to the
ADV. Additionally, there is no room for the EMUS as described in the table, which
assumed the EMUS would be stored in a fully uncompressed fashion. The forward
section of the cabin will be allocated to the suits, but they will have to be compressed
significantly to fit within the available volume. Figure 4—3 shows an approximate
configuration of the CM pressurized volume, indicating a plan View layout of crew
accommodations equipment. Components are not modeled to scale.
Medical items must also be included in the CM cabin. Tamara Howard, M.D.,
Ph.D., physician and professor at Mt. Sinai University Hospital, notes (2002) that “the
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environment away from earth may cause a human to experience a variety of physical
stresses, resulting in disease or organ dysfunction...crashes, explosions, and other
accidents may occur during the course of space flight. The care provided during the first
hour after a severe traumatic injury occurs greatly influences whether the victim lives or
dies. Numerous non-life threatening injuries may also occur.”
It is consequently desirable to anticipate potential medical needs and equip the
CM with appropriate medical provisions so those needs may be addressed (Tamara
Howard, 2002). Dr. Howard (2002) suggests that specific emergencies that may arise
and which the astronauts can be trained to respond to include: hypoglycemia (level of
blood glucose drops low enough to put the person at risk for brain damage), seizures,
respiratory distress, cardiac arrest, traumatic injury (anything from minor to life
threatening), anaphylaxis (life threatening allergic reaction), and dehydration.
In order to provide appropriate medical care, Dr. Howard (2002) recommends
there should be a medical kit onboard the CM containing:
0 Automatic external defibrillator (device to Shock the heart to help it re-start a normal
rhythm in persons who develop an arrhythmia called ventricular fibrillation)
0 Drugs used in basic cardiac resuscitation (to help stabilize the person if the heart is
beating too fast, too slow, or not at all)
0 Ambu bag, oxygen, and intubation equipment (used to help protect the airway and
deliver oxygen to the lungs of a patient who has stopped breathing)
Splints and ace wrap (for use in case of sprains or fractures)
Medications for treatment to anaphylaxis (it is well known that persons can develop
an allergy to a given substance at any age during their lifetime, and sometimes the
allergic reaction can be life threatening)
0 Normal saline bags (fluid given intravenously to persons who are dehydrated, who are
bleeding heavily, or [in some cases] who are in shock)
0 Ativan (used to treat seizures [which can develop in many situations, including after a
serious head injury, and also in persons who develop certain blood chemistry
abnormalities]; also used to sedate a person who develops a psychiatric emergency
while aboard the CM)
0 Glucagon (is injected into a person whose blood sugar has dropped dangerously low,
raising the blood sugar level)
0 Tubes to collect blood and urine specimens, and machines to analyze the specimens
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The medical supplies will be located in storage lockers onboard the CM.
4.4 Avionics
GPS
The CM will use two GPS units (a prime and a backup unit) for position, attitude
and velocity information while in LEO. The space integrated GPS/INS (SIGI) has been
developed for use on the shuttle, station and CRV programs and will also be used on the
CM. The SIGI contains a GPS receiver, ring laser gyros, and force rebalance
accelerometers. It is capable of pure inertial, GPS-only, and blended GPS/INS
navigation solutions. The SIGI masses 9.53 kg and draws 45 W (SIGI, 2000).
The SIGI is capable of operating at altitudes up to 1111 km. It can process the
following maximums: angular rate i 57 deg/s, linear velocity i 12 km/s, angular
acceleration i 171 deg/s2, linear acceleration i 98 m/sz, and jerk i 200 III/S3. Under GPS
or GPS/INS blended performance it can achieve a position accuracy of better than 50 m
and a velocity accuracy of better than 0.3 m/s (SIGI, 2000).
This indicates that the SIGI will be useful for navigation purposes while in LEO,
and while it is 50 meters or greater from other spacecraft. Beyond LEO, the INS portion
of the SIGI will still be useful, though it will require periodic updating from the Star
Sensors or other navigation sensors.
Star-Sensors
The CM is equipped with two star sensors to provide fully autonomous attitude
determination. The flight-proven Ball Aerospace CT-633 has attitude accuracy better
than 6 arc-sec and will be used on the CM (CT-63X Star Sensor, 2002). The CT-63X
series of star sensors has been used on NEAR, ACE, SOAR, Coriolis, GALEX, TRIANA
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and Deep Impact. Each has a mass of 2.4 kg and draws only 9 watts power. Figure 4-4
shows a typical CT-63X sensor.
Sun Sensors
Sun sensors are embedded in the solar array masts and are used to track the
position of the sun, enabling the arrays to position themselves to face the sun. Six
additional sun sensors will be located on the CM surface. These CM sun sensors will be
SSTL 2-axis sun sensors or equivalent units (Surrey, 2002). Each sensor has a i 50-
degree field of view and a 0.5-degree accuracy. The mass is only 0.3 kg and the sensor
requires only 100 mW (Surrey, 2002). It is important for the CM to also have sun
sensors (not just on the arrays) because the vehicle can use this data to help establish its
position when it is not in LEO. By determining the direction of the sun, Earth, and moon,
the CM can determine where it is along a cislunar trajectory. Sensors on the solar arrays
cannot be used effectively for this purpose because of errors introduced due to flexing in
the array mast.
Horizon Sensors
Two Mini-Dual Earth Sensors (MiDES) horizon sensors (primary and backup) are
mounted on the CM (Mini-Dual Earth Sensor, 2002). The MiDES has two arrays,
configured 90 degrees apart, that locate the horizon of the planet or moon it is orbiting.
When the CM is in lunar or Earth orbit, these horizon sensors can help the CM
determine its attitude with respect to the surface and can correct any errors that have
developed in the SIGI’S INS. When star sensor data is available in orbit, horizon sensors
can serve as a backup to the star sensors. Additionally, while in cislunar transit, the
horizon sensors may be able to assist the star sensors and sun sensors in locating Earth
and the moon.
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The MiDES masses 1.4 kg and requires 800 mW (Mini-Dual Earth Sensor, 2002).
Figure 4-5 shows a sample MiDES and Figure 4-6 illustrates MiDES in operation.
Laser Rangefinders
To assist in the docking process, each of the two docking ports is equipped with
three laser rangefinders. Each laser has a range of 150 meters, weighs 4.5 kg and draws
17.5 W power (Laser Mapping, 2002). Their data is processed by the CM’S onboard
computers, enabling the spacecraft to develop a three-dimensional image of any surface
in proximity to its docking port.
Air Data System
The air data system is used during entry at speeds below Mach 3 to provide
information on the movement of the spacecraft through the atmosphere. Their data is
computed to provide the navigation system with angle of attack, mach number,
equivalent airspeed, true airspeed, dynamic pressure, barometric altitude, and altitude rate
(Air Data System, 2002).
A flush air data system (FADS) is currently being developed at NASA’S Dryden
Flight Research Center in support of the X-33, X-34, X-38 and HYPER-X projects. Over
78 test flights have been conducted with FADS. Advantages of FADS over deployed
probes are that it eliminates the need for intrusive probes, improves air data measurement
robustness, and eliminates probe vibration and alignment errors (FADS, 2001). The
Crew Module will assume the use of FADS for air data.
Vehicle Autonomy
Crew Module avionics will benefit extensively from New Millennium Program
missions such as Deep Space One. These missions were intended to demonstrate new
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technologies in space so that they assume the risk of first use, allowing future Space
missions to benefit from their breakthroughs (Remote Agent FAQ, 2002).
A key technology that will be applied to the Crew Module is AutoNav, which was
successfully pioneered aboard JPL’s Deep Space One mission. Once a week during Deep
Space One’s primary mission, AutoNav was invoked by the operating sequence to allow
it to acquire optical navigation images. It turned the spacecraft and the integrated camera
and imaging spectrometer to take pictures of asteroids and stars, analyzing them to
determine its location. AutoNav used the position of an asteroid relative to the stars to
calculate where it was in the solar system. It then issued appropriate commands to the
power and propulsion systems to activate its ion engine for the trajectory it determined
should be pursued (Autonomous Navigation, 2002).
Figure 4-7 illustrates the application of Autonomous Navigation to Deep Space
One’s mission. Of particular interest to this dissertation is the Optical Departure
segment, where AutoNav uses images of Earth and the moon to determine its position.
The Crew Module and other LTV spacecraft will require an enhanced variation of the
AutoNav used during Deep Space One’s Optical Departure. The CM AutoNav will use a
combination of optical navigation, TDRSS data links, laser rangefinder data, ring laser
IMU data, GPS, differential GPS, and relative GPS to determine the vehicle’s position,
attitude, velocity, acceleration, and attitude rates and accelerations.
Of equal importance is the Remote Agent fielded aboard Deep Space One. It is
an artificial intelligence computer software system that introduced significant autonomy
to the vehicle, enabling the Spacecraft to make a wider variety of decision for itself than
previous spacecraft were able to do. Rather than giving detailed instructions to a
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spacecraft, ground controllers were able to give only general direction, assigning general
tasks (Remote Agent, 2002).
The Remote Agent incorporates modern computer reasoning capabilities,
including model-based reasoning algorithms, constraint-based, goal-directed planning
and execution algorithms, and a fail-operational fault-protection approach (Remote
Agent, 2002).
A "planner/scheduler" generates a set of time-based and event-based activities,
known as "tokens." These tokens are delivered to an "executive," which is also part of the
software system. The executive makes decisions by taking into account knowledge of the
spacecraft’s state or health, constraints on Spacecraft operations, and the plan provided by
the planner/scheduler. The executive expands the tokens into a sequence of commands
that are issued directly to the appropriate subsystems on the spacecraft. The executive
then monitors responses to these commands, and reissues or modifies them if the
response is not what is intended (Remote Agent, 2002).
This response is implemented in part with Mode Identification and Recovery
(MIR), another Deep Space One artificial intelligence system. MIR uses a series of
vehicle models to detect failures, analyze to determine their cause, and recover from their
effects (MIR, 2001).
Not only does this improve the efficiency of spacecraft operations, but it also
allows a spacecraft to respond to unexpected situations/problems. Remote Agent and
MIR-derived programs will allow the CM to function with significantly less direct
oversight from Mission Control.
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Flight Computer
Prior to the 19905, most spacecraft avionics — including flight computers — were
driven by the “function-at-any-cost, melt-before-fail” design philosophy (Stakem, 2001).
As a result, Spacecraft computers tended to be archaic by any terrestrial comparison. In
1990, the space shuttle General Purpose Computer (GPC) was roughly equivalent to a
Commodore 64 in computing power. Even with upgrades since that time, it still has not
joined the ranks of pre-Windows 80286 class machines (Modern laptops are routinely
carried aboard the shuttle, but they do not perform flight control functions).
In the 19905, a drive towards the use of commercial (COTS) products became the
mantra of the day. While this has not enabled an upgrade of the shuttle (due to the
expense of rewriting flight software and the risk of potentially introducing catastrophic
errors) it has featured in the design of new spacecraft, including the International Space
Station and Crew Return Vehicle. Unmanned Spacecraft have utilized a variety of semi-
modem processors, such as the RAD6000, RH32, and the MIPS-derived Mongoose V
(Stakem, 2001).
Unfortunately, it is not wise to simply take a computer from a local dealer and fly
it in space. Like humans, computers are particularly vulnerable to radiation. This
vulnerability falls into two categories: damage caused by cumulative dose and damage
caused by transient energetic particles (i.e. during solar flare activity). Absorbed
radiation can cause temporary or permanent changes in the material. Leakage current can
increase, bit states can change, devices can exhibit unforeseen operation, and device
latchup or burnout can occur (Stakem, 2001). Consequently, radiation hardening of
processors, or at least implementation of error-checking software, is important to ensure
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resistance to radiation damage. Because of the small market for space-qualified
processors, companies have had a difficult time justifying the expense of developing
radiation-hardened processors. Consequently, available spacecraft-qualified computers
have lagged far behind modern computing capabilities.
For the past several years, Sandia National Laboratories, NASA-JPL, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and the Air Force Research Laboratory have been working to
develop a radiation-hardened version of Intel’s Pentium chip in an effort to improve the
performance of available space processors. These chips are expected to be on the market
in the 2003—2004 timeframe and are thus viable Options for the Trailblazer flight
computers (AFRL Public Affairs, 1998).
While radiation-hardened Pentiums are still a few years off, NASA has
experimented with Pentium laptops augmented with error correction and detection
software. The Advanced Portable Workstation (APW) features a 90 MHz Pentium with a
512K secondary cache memory. It has 32 MB high-reliability DRAM with Error
Correction and Detection. It has a 3.5” floppy drive and a removable rugged 260 MB
cartridge drive. The display is 11”, 1024x768 SVGA, 256-color AM-LCD. It also
features NTSC video conversion, capture and display. The laptop is 11.34 kg in mass
(APW II, 1995). When this computer was flown, in 1996, it was roughly equal to
standard terrestrial laptops. It was not, however, certified for shuttle flight control — that
function remains with the archaic GPCs.
NASA successfully conducted a wireless network experiment (WNE) aboard
Atlantis and Mir in 1996. This experiment marked the first use of a wireless client—server
network in the space environment. It studied and evaluated electromagnetic
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compatibility, computer device performance, wireless network performance, and human
factors design issues (Mir Wireless Network Experiment, 1997).
A data transfer rate of over 1.2 MB per nrinute was demonstrated, with over 7.6
MB of data transferred onboard Atlantis. The data transfer was also successful onboard
Mir. The experiment verified the viability of wireless networks in spacecraft. Networks
operating in the 2.4 GHz band at 50 mW output power can be used successfully aboard
spacecraft. The networks did not cause electromagnetic interference to spacecraft or
payload systems (Mir Wireless Network Experiment, 1999).
Trailblazer will assume developments in line with current space computer
research, though it will not extrapolate far beyond existing capabilities. It will assume a
radiation-hardened Pentium-class processor, with essentially no memory limitations on
RAM or storage Space. It will also assume all flight computers on the CM are connected
through a wireless network. The CM network can communicate with counterpart
networks on other LTV Spacecraft. Whenever two or more LTV spacecraft are docked or
in close proximity, the computers on the docked vehicles will be linked in a Single
wireless network.
Trailblazer will not assume the mass and power requirements of the APW
computer, as that would be unnecessarily conservative. The APW is clearly no longer
being produced — regardless of what model laptop it was — and could not be used under
any circumstances. As a conservative baseline, the laptop on which this dissertation is
being written — an HP Pavilion N5210 — will be used as a mass and power estimate for
the CM. Consequently, the CM flight computers will each be assumed to mass 3 kg and
require 65 W. (Given the trend in laptops, the computer ultimately used will be lighter
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and will require less power. Even though this laptop was produced in 2000, it is already
off the market and the 2002 notebook computers are indeed lighter and require less
power.)
The CM will be equipped with five flight computers, ensuring both redundancy
and adequate computational power. Like the shuttle GPCs, the computers will contain
identical flight software. In fact, all flight software for all LTV spacecraft will be stored
on each computer. In effect, any flight computer — not just on the CM but also on any
LTV spacecraft with the exception of PM2 — will be capable of driving any LTV system.
4.5 Docking Systems
The Crew Module will at various points along its trajectory dock with all five of
the other LTV spacecraft during the course of a lunar transfer. To accomplish these
dockings, the CM is equipped with two docking ports — one on the dorsal surface, and
one behind the aft propulsion unit. The aft docking port is used to dock with PMl, PM2,
and the FT. The dorsal docking port is used to dock with the ADV and AM. It is also
used for shuttle and station dockings. The dorsal port is the only one through which crew
will traverse and the aft port is the only one through which refueling, power, and heat
transport lines must pass.
The standard docking port for the LTV is the Magnetic Docking Aid System
(MDAS) (Schneider, Nagy, Schliesing, 1996). Magnetic docking was proposed in a
NASA-Johnson Space Center study to reduce the loads associated with traditional
Spacecraft docking and the associated risks. In traditional docking, two vehicles
essentially “ram” each other at a low speed in order to trigger the mechanical systems in a
docking mount. With magnetic docking, the vehicles actually come to a total stop with
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respect to each other. Electromagnets then pull the vehicles together in a significantly
milder manner.
MDAS configurations can be active, passive, or active-passive. All three
configurations include an Androgynous Peripheral Assembling System (APAS) docking
mount. Figures 4-8 and 4-9 Show the APAS docking mount. The active configuration
also includes two extendible booms, shown in figure 4-10, each of which has a 2025 N
electromagnet (Dura Magnetics, 2002) at the end. The passive configuration includes
two steel plates mounted 180 degrees apart along the APAS circumference. A
representative configuration is shown in figure 4-11. The active-passive configuration
has a steel plate surrounding each boom, such that the plate is flush with the
electromagnet when the boom is fully retracted. The CM includes two active MDAS.
Figure 4-12 shows an illustration of an active MDAS on the shuttle external airlock,
positioned beneath a Russian spacecraft’s passive MDAS (presumably the Mir) with the
two spacecraft in position for docking.
The CM is also equipped with six steel plates for use by the AM’S Magnetic
Guide System (described in chapter seven). These plates are grouped in two sets of three
on the vehicle surface. The plates in each set are mounted at sixty-degree intervals as
shown in figure 4-13.
Each APAS requires 116 W during the docking phase (Patrick, 2002), each boom
requires 13.5 W (assumed to be the same as the APAS “extend/retract” power
requirement [Patrick, 2002]) and each electromagnet requires 26 W (Dura Magnetics,
2002) for a total of 195 W per MDAS. This is, of course, a transient power requirement
as power is only required while the system is capturing or releasing a spacecraft.
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4.6 Thermal Control
Active thermal control will be utilized to maintain the crew module’s temperature.
The typical path for a thermal control system (TCS) is for heat to be acquired from
various heat sources in the spacecraft, transported via some heat transport system to
radiators, and rejected by the radiators into space. The first step in sizing the TCS is to
determine the maximum thermal load. This is the sum of the electrical power plus the
crew heat output. Crew heat output is estimated at 0.1 kW per crewmember (Larson and
Pranke, 1999). The TCS must be sized based on the maximum power level. As will be
seen later in this chapter, that power level occurs in lunar orbit and is 5.18 kW, resulting
in a thermal load of 5.38 kW.
With this information, heat exchangers can be Sized. Two types of heat
exchangers are used. Cabin air heat exchangers remove heat from the ambient air.
Coldplates are attached to avionics equipment and transfer heat directly from the
avionics.
Cabin air heat exchangers will be sized first. The mass (in kilograms) is
estimated from the parametric 17 + 0.25 x heat capacity (in kW) (Larson and Pranke,
1999). The capacity is the 5 .38 kW previously identified minus the avionics heat source
(0.365 kW), resulting in a mass of 18. 25 kg. Coldplate masses are estimated from the
parametric 12 x avionics heat capacity (in kW) (Larson and Pranke, 1999). This results
in a mass of 4.38 kg.
Heat pumps are sized next, using the mass parametric 4.8 x loop capacity in kW
and the power parametric in watts of 23 x loop capacity (in kW) (Larson and Pranke,
1999). This results in a mass of 25 kg and drawing 124 W.
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To complete the sizing of the internal TCS loop, it is necessary to size the
plumbing and valves, instruments and controls, and fluids. The parametric for these
masses requires first sizing the radiator, so the TCS loop will be completed after radiator
sizing.
Radiator sizing is dependent on the location of the radiator, as the average radiator
temperature and approximate heat rejection varies. Table 4-3 Shows typical values for
heat rejection by space radiators. It is important to note that the heat rejection is per
radiating area — often both sides of a radiator are used for heat rejection so the radiating
area is double the radiator length times width in the case of a rectangular radiator.
As seen in Table 4-3, the most demanding flight phase in terms of radiator Size is
LEO, where the heat rejection is 104 W/m2 and the radiator temperature is 270 K. The
power load in LEO is 5.38 kW, as will be shown in the power section of this chapter.
Radiator surface area is determined by dividing vehicle power (W) by heat rejection. For
a two-sided radiator, the result is divided by two. For the CM, this results in a radiator
size of 26 m2. The mass is estimated by the parametric 8.5 x surface area (Larson and
Pranke, 1999) and is 218 kg. The CM will use two retractable two-sided radiator wings,
each measuring 2.29 m in length and 2.8 m in width. They will be mounted on the
underside of the solar array wings, perpendicular to the array surface, such that they will
be in the shadow whenever the arrays are tracking the sun.
Now that the radiator has been sized, the rest of the TCS loop can be determined.
The mass for plumbing and valves is estimated at 15% the mass of the active TCS
(radiator, pumps, coldplates, and heat exchangers). Instruments and controls are
estimated at 5% the mass of the active TCS and fluids are also estimated at 5% of the
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active TCS mass (Larson and Pranke, 1999). This results in a plumbing and valve mass
of 40 kg, an instruments and controls mass of 13 kg, and a fluid mass of 13 kg. This
yields a TCS loop mass of 115 kg. For a fully redundant TCS system, there should be
two loops, which means it will be necessary to double the mass of the heat exchangers,
coldplates, pumps, plumbing and valves, instruments and controls, and fluids, resulting in
a TCS system mass of 218 kg for the radiator and 230 kg for the redundant loops.
It should be noted that the TCS will not always direct heat flow to the CM
radiators. The radiators cannot be used during entry or when the CM is docked to the
AM. At these times, other solutions must be implemented.
Heat transport plumbing lines also pass through the aft docking port and heat can
be routed in this direction. When docked to a FT or PMl, the TCS can be integrated if
needed, allowing vehicles to pass TCS fluid from one vehicle to another. When CM and
PMl are docked to the AM, the AM TCS provides heat rejection for the entire vehicle
(because the CM and PMl radiators are not exposed to space and cannot radiate heat
away from the vehicle). During this time TCS fluid is circulated through all three
vehicles to radiators on the AM.
The crew module will keep the current thermal protection system (tiles) under
development for the X-38. However, if there is a need to conduct an entry, no support
vehicles are available to provide thermal control and heat radiation is not an option.
Consequently, a heat sink is used. Water will be utilized as a heat sink, using water from
multifiltration tank 1. The necessary mass for a heat Sink is sized by Larson and Pranke
(1999) and is the heat rejection rate (in kW) times the mission duration (in seconds)
divided by the latent heat of vaporization (in kJ/kg). The latent heat of vaporization for
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water is 2500 kJ/kg. The mission duration for entry is estimated at 6300 seconds, which
is the time from deorbit burn through instrument shutdown after landing. The heat
rejection rate is the sum of the electrical power during entry plus the crew heat output.
As will be shown in the power section, the electrical power load is 1.78 kW, resulting in a
heat rejection rate of 1.98 kW (adding the heat output from the two crewmembers). This
results in a required water mass of roughly 5 kg. Given that multifiltration tank 1 holds
76.03 kg, it is more than adequate to serve as a heat sink. The temperature rise
experienced by the water can be predicted by dividing the energy transferred to the water
by the water mass and specific heat. The specific heat of water is 4186 J/kg°C. The
energy transferred to the water is obtained by multiplying the heat rejection rate (in W)
by the mission duration. This yields a water temperature rise of 39.17°C. The water is
nominally at 50°C, so it will heat only to 89.17°C - it will not become hot enough to boil.
4.7 Communications
The CM will include a communications system capable of supporting voice,
video and data transmissions between the CM and the lunar surface base, other
Spacecraft, astronauts on EVAS, rovers, and mission control. A data rate of 10 Mbps will
be required for video transmission (Larson and Pranke, 1999). This is significantly larger
than what would be required for voice only, which would be roughly 2.4 to 8 kbps
(Larson and Pranke, 1999; Larson and Wertz, 1992). Data communications have an
extremely wide range of data rates, from on the order of kbps or fewer to the order of
Mbps (Larson and Pranke, 1999). Consequently, the video transmission data rate will be
the primary driver for the communications system design. The CM will accommodate a
data rate of 12 Mbps to allow for 10 Mbps video and 2 Mbps for telemetry and other
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data. Table 4-4 indicates a preliminary link budget for the CM communications system.
The system is sized to accommodate a communications range from Earth to L1. It should
never need to transmit further than the Earth to L1 distance because when it is beyond L1
it can utilize the PM] or FT transmitter, both of which are sized to reach Earth from the
moon. The distance from Earth to L1 is 346,069 km.
The CM — and all LTV spacecraft — will utilize a 46 GHz U-band
communications frequency to communicate among themselves and the FI‘DRSS network
(A number of short-range RF antennas will also be mounted on the vehicle exterior to
allow for space-to—space communications with nearby spacecraft). This frequency is
currently allocated for future US government mobile, MSS, and radionavigation satellite
systems, so provisions will need to be made to reallocate spectrum for the LTV
(Neuhaus, 2001). The wavelength is simply the speed of light divided by the frequency,
or 0.0065 m.
Sizing the antenna and power necessary for this system requires a link budget
analysis. In its most general form, this analysis is summarized by the following equation
(Larson and Pranke, 1999):
SNRavajl = EIRP + G/T — Lfs — Lother — k — Rd, where
SNRaw,“ = available signal-to-noise ratio on the link
EIRP = effective isotropic radiated power of the transmit terminal
G = receive antenna gain
T = system noise temperature of the receive terminal
L2, = free space'signal loss
Lathe, = other link loss (antenna pointing, rain, atmospheric absorption,
and implementation).
k = Boltzmann’s constant (2286 dBW/K-Hz).
Rd = data rate
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The receive antenna’s gain is given by G = 20.4 + 10 log (n) + 20 log (t) + 20 log
(D), where n is the antenna’s efficiency (typically 0.55 for parabolic-dish antennas), f is
the frequency in GHz, and D is the receive antenna diameter. G is expressed in dB
(Larson and Pranke, 1999).
The system noise temperature consists of three components: antenna noise
temperature, line-loss noise temperature and receiver noise temperature. Typical
temperatures vary from 450K to 700K. Larson and Pranke (1999) use a sample value of
500K, which will be used in this analysis. T in dB is calculated by multiplying 10 by the
log(T) (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
The free space loss in units of dB is given by Lfs = 92.45 + 20 log (t) + 20 log (5)
where s is the distance, in this case the distance from Earth to L1. Other loss sources
typically considered in satellite communications are rain loss, atmospheric loss, and
pointing loss. Rain and atmospheric loss are zero in this case, because the LTV
communications architecture is an entirely space-to-space link. The space-to—ground
segment is handled by FTDRSS. An average value of 0.5 dB is used for the pointing
loss, as suggested by Larson and Pranke (1999). The data rate was discussed previously
and is the 12 Mbps necessary to support voice, video and data.
The signal-to-noise ratio available at the receiver is given by the SNR required
plus the margin. For BPSK modulation (recommended by Larson and Pranke [1999] as a
simpler design than other modulations) at a BER of 1x10'5 (also recommended by Larson
and Pranke [1999]), the SNR is 9.6 dB and the margin is 2 dB, resulting in a SNRavan of
11.6 dB (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
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The final parameters that must be determined are the transmit gain and transmit
antenna diameter. The transmit gain in dB is given by GT = EIRP - 10 log (P), where P is




Following through with these calculations and iterating to ensure that transmit and
receive antennas have the same diameter and supplying 100W for transmit power, the
CM antenna is sized with a diameter of 0.779 m.
Mass estimation is accomplished assuming a linear scaling from the FireSat
communications antenna and transmitter in Larson and Wertz (1992). This yields an
antenna mass of 9.34 kg and a transmitter mass of 23.25 kg. The CM carries two
antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the propulsion frame, to ensure coverage at all
vehicle attitudes and two transmitters for redundancy. Each antenna is used for both
transmission and reception. Like the current TDRSS, code-division multiple access
(CMDA) is employed to allow multiple simultaneous uplinks and downlinks.
The CM also carries two satellite phones to enable low volume data transfer from
entry through post landing. As an example of a representative system, this conceptual
design uses the Iridium Airsat 1, which masses 6.59 kg for a complete system and can be
used below 55,000 feet (Using Iridium, 2002). Presumably, it should not be difficult for
a satellite phone provider to modify a phone to operate at higher altitudes, possibly even
in low Earth orbit. Use of Iridium allows for all practical purposes the same coverage as
Inmarsat and significantly greater coverage than Globalstar. (Iridium does operate at
higher latitudes than Inmarsat, but the CM will not fly in those regions. Globalstar has
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virtually no ocean coverage and depending on the landing site selected, the CM might fly
over oceans at low altitudes.)
4.8 Propulsion
The Crew Module will contain an Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) and an
Attitude Control System (ACS). Because the CM is intended for extended periods in
Space between engine firings, it is impractical to use cryogenic propellants.
Consequently, storable propellants will be used. Both APS and ACS will use
monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204). These propellants are
hypergolic, eliminating the need for an igniter and increasing engine reliability. They are
also storable, eliminating boiloff concerns present in cryogenic propellants. Nitrogen
tetroxide is storable in liquid form between a range of —11°C and 21°C, while
monomethylhydrazine is liquid between -52°C and 87°C (N204/MMH, 2002). Despite
the high toxicity of these propellants, they remain the fuel of choice for space missions
due to their ease of storage and the increased engine reliability from using hypergolic
fuels. This propellant combination has been used since the late 1950’s and is one of the
most commonly used spacecraft propellants.
The APS will be responsible for providing delta-v for L1 capture and deorbit
from LEO. The ACS will be responsible for vehicle pointing whenever the CM is flying
separate from PMl or a FT. When docked to one of the two vehicles it serves as a
backup or supplemental ACS.
The APS is mounted on a propulsion frame behind the CM. This frame contains
structural supports for the aft docking mount, APS fuel tanks and engine, radiator and
solar array assemblies, and power, thermal, and fuel lines to a docked vehicle. The entire
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propulsion frame assembly is jettisoned and discarded following deorbit burn if the CM
executes an atmospheric entry. Unlike the APS, the ACS is fully integrated into the CM
spaceframe and is not jettisoned.
Engine Selection
In order to comply with design requirements, the CM must use existing rocket
engines or engines in development. To this end, the CM will use the Boeing RS-72 (RS-
72, 2002) as its APS engine. Parameters for the RS-72 are given in Table 4—5. This
engine has the highest Isp of any hypergolic upper stage currently in service, making it
particularly attractive for the LTV. The CM will use a single RS-72.
The X-38 CRV uses a compressed nitrogen system for attitude control (Dempsey,
2000). However, this system is inherently limited in performance and endurance.
Consequently, it will not be used for the CM ACS. Instead, the General Dynamics R-4D
engine will be used. Ironically, this is the successor to the attitude control thruster used
in the Apollo program. The current version of the R-4D is flying on the US. Navy's
Leasat, Insat 1, Arabasat 1, HS-393, HS-601, Milstar, Intelsat 6, Italsat, Olympus and
Eurostar (R-4D - Astronautix, 2002) Table 4-6 gives parameters for the R-4D. The CM
will use Sixteen R-4D thrusters.
APS Performance
As shown in chapter three, capture into L1 requires a delta-v of 0.8104 ans.
Deorbit requires a delta-v of 0.7433 km/s. The fuel requirements for these transfers can
be calculated by the formula mfue| = mvehicle - (exp(Av - 1000/9.81/Isp)-1), where Av is in
units of km/s and all masses are in units of kg. The vehicle mass will be determined in
the mass properties section to be 13,882 kg. This results in a fuel mass of 3843 kg for L1
capture and 3488 kg for deorbit. Given the RS-72’s oxidizer to fuel ratio of 2.05, this
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results in 1260 kg MMH and 2583 kg N204 for L1 capture, and 1144 kg MMH and 2344
kg N204 for deorbit. Burn time (in seconds) is determined by mfucl - 9.81 - Isp / Thrust
and is 230 seconds for L1 arrival and 209 seconds for deorbit.
ACS Configuration
ACS thrusters will be mounted primarily in four clusters of engines near the
center of mass, on each side, the top, and bottom. Engine configuration is Shown in
figure 4-14 (Arrows indicate the direction of propellant exhaust). Engines 1, 2, 3 and 15
are located on the top cluster. Engines 4, 5, and 6 are located on the starboard cluster.
Engines 10, 11 and 12 are located on the port cluster. Engines 7, 8, 9 and 14 are located
on the bottom cluster. Engines 13 and 16 are located on the vehicle aft.
This configuration will allow the CM to perform any X, Y, or Z-axis translation,
or any roll, pitch, or yaw rotation with a two-engine burn (Axis conventions are +X =
forward, +Y = port, +Z = up, +roll = port Wing up, +pitch = nose up, +yaw = nose right).
Roll and X translation are redundant for any single engine and certain two-engine failures
with no loss in performance and no increase in fuel expenditure. Maneuvers can still be
completed for other engine failures with a combination of maneuvers in other axes (i.e. in
the case of a loss of yaw capability, a roll-pitch-roll sequence can still accomplish a yaw
maneuver). Additionally, while connected with PMl or a FT, all rotations and
translations are redundant for all single engine failures and most are redundant for any
two-engine failure with zero performance loss or propellant use increase. Generally,
when the CM is docked to PMl or a FT, the aft firing thrusters (engines 13-16) will be
deselected and the aft firing thrusters on the docked vehicle will be used in their place.
Attitude Control thruster selection for each Single axis maneuver is shown in Table 4-7.
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ACS Performance
Preliminary estimations for the CM ACS required approximating the CM
moments of inertia. Using a simple rectangular block estimation (Iii = [a2+b2] M/12 for
each axis, where a and b are vehicle dimensions on the other two axes) and taking the
average CM fully fueled mass, moments of inertia were determined as follows: Ixx =
43721, Iyy = 137739, Izz = 151337.
The torque is next determined for each thruster. The torque is simply the thrust
times the moment arm. Side mounted thrusters all have moment arms of 3.09 m and
top/bottom mounted thrusters have moment arms of 1.602 m.
The ACS is sized to maintain a deadband of 10 degrees in roll, pitch, and yaw (A
deadband is an “envelope” of allowable degrees through which a spacecraft can rotate
when the spacecraft is configured to hold a particular attitude or rotational rate). The
maximum allowed angular velocities (above or below its commanded state) are 0.034
degrees per second in roll, 0.01 deg/sec in pitch, and 0.02 degrees per second in yaw.
These limits are designed to most efficiently utilize the R-4D’s minimum impulse bit.
With this information, fuel requirements can be determined for each axis. The
pulse length (duration the thruster fires) is determined by the formula: (0 - Iii/T, where 0)
is the angular velocity (in radians), In is the moment of inertia for the axis in question,
and T is the sum of the torques of the thrusters firing.
Assuming the maximum allowed angular velocity to be the actual Spacecraft
angular velocity, the interval between each thruster firing is determined by dividing the
deadband by the angular velocity.
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The number of thruster firings per day is then determined by dividing the number
of seconds in a day by the sum of the pulse length and the interval between thruster
firings. The total thrust time per day is then found by multiplying the number of thrust
firings per day by the pulse length. The total impulse per day is found by multiplying the
total thrust time per day by the total thrust per firing (sum of the thrust of each engine
involved). Finally, the fuel requirement per day is found by dividing the total impulse by
Earth gravitational acceleration (9.81 m/sz) and engine Isp. This process is conducted for
each axis to determine the total fuel requirement per day. The CM will assume a
requirement to carry 6.5 days worth of ACS propellant. This assumes a scenario where
the CM must provide attitude control for the entire flight from LEO to LLO.
Additional propellant is also sized for proximity operations - dockings and
separations. The CM will dock with PM2 in LEO and PMl at Ll. Each docking is
assumed to require 30 seconds of dual thruster firings. Fuel mass is found by dividing
the total impulse by Earth gravitational acceleration and engine Isp, just as in the
previous sizing. Separations are assumed to require only a 2 second dual thruster firing
and are Sized in the same manner. The CM will separate from PM2 en route to L1 and
from PMl in LEO prior to the beginning of the next lunar mission.
Total ACS and proximity operations fuel is found to be 58 kg, of which 22 kg is
MMH and 36 kg is N204.
Tank Sizing
Fuel tank Sizing is fairly straightforward, using mass parametrics provided by
Larson and Wertz (1992). For an unpressurized tank, the following formula is applied as
a mass parametric: m = mfuel - (1/0.89 — 1). This parametric yields a mass estimate for the
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propulsion system, excluding the engine and fuel (i.e. tanks and plumbing). The CM
contains four fuel tanks: the APS MMH and N204 tanks and the ACS MMH and N204
tanks. The APS MMH tank is found to be 156 kg and the N204 tank is found to be 319
kg. The mass of the ACS MMH tank is 3 kg and the N204 tank is 4 kg.
4.9 Power
CM power is supplied through a combination of solar arrays and batteries. The
CM flight profile dictates this solution over alternative power systems, such as fuel cells
or flywheels. Fuel cells are advantageous for short duration missions. Even though a
human crew only occupies the CM for short periods of time, it remains in Space for years
and there would be a disadvantageous impact of having to continually restock its fuel
cells. Flywheels are by nature massive, and are more appropriate for space stations than
for mobile spacecraft. Nuclear power (whether fission reactors, RTGS, or other nuclear
power sources) is politically nonviable and carries a set of technological obstacles
making it also an undesirable solution.
Table 4-8 details the CM power requirements. The total power required for all
CM systems is 6.435 kW. However, in practice this power level is never required. All of
the equipment is not used in all flight phases, and several items are only powered for
short periods of time. Table 4-9 gives an approximate power requirement by flight phase.
With these requirements established, the power system can be Sized.
Batteries
It is simpler to size the batteries first, as the batteries will directly impact solar
array size. The CM will use lithium metal dry polymer electrolyte batteries. This battery
has an energy density in the range of 250-350 Wh/kg, a cycle life of greater than 1000
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cycles, and self-discharges at a rate of much less than 1% per month (Lithium Power,
2002). The batteries can be molded into any shape and can thus be formed to make
maximum usage of CM internal volume.
A round trip efficiency of 92% and a depth of discharge of 80% is assumed in this
analysis. An energy density of 300 Wh/kg will be assumed. Table 4-10 Shows the
duration of eclipse periods for each flight phase. Eclipse kWh is the driving factor in
battery sizing and it is the Earth entry flight phase that has the greatest requirement, with
3.115 kWh. The battery mass is obtained by converting the eclipse kWh to Wh and then
dividing it by energy density and depth of discharge. This yields a battery mass of 13 kg
for the CM.
With the battery mass sized, the next step is to determine the charging
requirements that will be placed upon the solar arrays. Thus, for each flight phase, a
power requirement must be determined.
The first step in this process is to determine the kWh that must be accumulated in
preparation for each eclipse period. This is found by dividing the eclipse kWh by the
battery round-trip-efficiency. The one exception to this is the kWh in preparation for
Earth entry, which is found by dividing the vehicle power (during TEI) by round trip
efficiency and multiplying the result by the total time of entry. Once this kWh has been
found, the required array power is found by dividing the kWh by the available charging
time (the time the spacecraft is between eclipse periods). This result is the array charge
power in Table 4-10.
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Solar Arrays
Stretched Lens Array (SLA) triple-junction solar arrays developed by Entech, Inc
(O’Neil et al, 2001) will be used on the CM, taking advantage of recent improvements in
solar power technology. The SLA uses stretched membrane, silicone Fresnel lenses to
concentrate sunlight onto triple junction GaInP/GaAS/Ge photovoltaic cells. The array
has a standard efficiency of 27.4%. The SLA wing — including lenses, photovoltaic cell
flex circuits, composite panels, hinges, yoke, wiring harness, and deployment
mechanisms — has a mass density of 1.67 kg/m2 and a power density of 300 W/m2
(O’Neil et al, 2001). The SLA is developed from the SCARLET solar array flown on
Deep Space One and most SLA components were successfully proven on that Spacecraft
(O’Neil et al, 2001).
The power-conversion efficiency can be solved for the area to identify the size
solar array required: P = 65“,, T] Fp A cos(0), where P is the power in watts; (pm, is
[1368/d2] W/mz, where d is the distance to the Sun in astronomical units; 1] is the
conversion efficiency, which is found by T] = no (1 + Tc [T-To]), where no is the standard
efficiency, Tc is the normalized temperature coefficient (x10'3 per °C) and is —2.3 for a
triple junction array, T is the operating temperature (80 °C) and To is the standard (lab)
temperature (25 °C); Fp is a packing fraction, typically 85 to 90%; and 0 is the angle of
the array normal to the Sun (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
To solve this equation for the area, the power must first be determined. The
power is the combination of the system power listed in Table 4-9 and the battery charging
power listed in Table 4- 10. The solar arrays must be solved for the flight regime with the
greatest combined power requirement. This requirement is 5.180 kW, occurring in lunar
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orbit. Using a packing fraction of 85%, assuming 0 = 0, and applying a 58% loss factor
2. This in turnsuggested by Larson and Pranke (1999) yields an array size of 32.08 m
suggests an array wing mass of 54 kg.
This array will be a tracking array and the drive mechanism’s mass can be
estimated as a parametric function of the array mass: mdfive = (-0.014 marray + 20.6)
mamy/100 (Larson and Pranke, 1999). Because the thermal radiators are mounted on the
solar arrays, their mass is included in the array mass for this analysis. The CM array
drive is accordingly 46 kg. The CM will divide these parameters over two array wings,
each of which is 16.04 m2, 27 kg, and measures 5.6 m by 2.87 m.
One sun sensor will be located on each array wing to track the sun’s position.
Inputs from these sensors and measurements of generated power will be used to adjust
the arrays for optimum energy generation. The array wing provides for 360-degree
rotation along its axis and 180 degree rotation perpendicular to its axis, thus enabling it to
track the sun regardless of vehicle orientation.
4.10 Mass Properties
Table 4-11 gives the final mass summary for the CM. A 15% growth margin is
included to account for any unforeseen growth in vehicle systems. Vehicle masses vary
slightly depending on whether the CM has reached L1. This difference is only the
variation in fuel used for L1 capture or deorbit. In most other aspects, the CM has the
same mass properties throughout the lunar mission. The exception is entry. During
entry, the CM will jettison the dorsal docking port and the propulsion frame after deorbit
burn but prior to atmospheric interface. This removes the APS engine and tanks, solar
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arrays, U-band antennas, both docking ports, and the radiator. The resulting entry mass is
12,127 kg.
4.11 ELV Deployment
An Atlas V Heavy booster launches the CM into orbit. The booster is responsible
for lifting it into a 407 km altitude orbit at a 28.5—degree inclination. Five STS grapple
fixtures (two nose, three aft) will be used to hold the CM in place in the booster payload
shroud. The booster is not responsible for supplying any power or thermal conditioning
to the CM after launch (though the launch pad does need to supply both). If necessary,
the CM can supply inertial and GPS guidance data to the booster. PMl, described in the
next chapter, will ride into space on the same booster, already docked to the CM.
In theory, the CM could be launched by a Space Shuttle, but there is limited value
in doing SO. In order to allow sufficient time to fully check out the vehicle, it must be in
space several weeks to a few months before departing for a lunar mission. Consequently,
it should not be launched on the same Shuttle flight that is intended to transport a lunar
crew into space (as the shuttle cannot remain in orbit long enough to conduct such a
checkout). It is most cost effective to launch the CM on an unmanned rocket and send
crew up to the CM only after Mission Control is satisfied with the performance of CM.
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Chapter Five — Propulsion Module 1
5.1 Overview
PMl, shown in figure 5-1, plays a role in the LTV architecture similar to that
played by the Apollo Service Module. Because the CM cannot carry the necessary
propellant for orbital transfers, PMl and PM2 are used to transport the CM between
Earth and lunar orbits, with PMl taking up the responsibility from L1 forward. Unlike
the Apollo Service Module, PMl does not provide cabin air to the crew; PMI is only
responsible for propulsion, with backup capabilities in the areas of power and thermal
control. Excluding solar array and radiator dimensions, PMl measures 5.64 meters in
length and 2.4 meters in width and height.
5.2 Radiation Protection
AS mentioned in chapter four, the crew’s primary radiation protection is provided
by PMl. Space radiation is not constant, with radiation coming from multiple sources
including: Galactic Cosmic Rays, Solar Particle Events, and the Van Allen Belt. Unlike
cosmic and solar radiation, the Van Allen Belt is confined to a localized zone. Unless a
spacecraft’s orbit Spends a significant period of time in the Van Allen Belt, it generally is
not considered a significant source of radiation concern. Other sources, however, are
more serious. “Life threatening solar flares from Anomalously Large events occurring
during a solar maximum are readily detected, but not reliably predicted” (Ward, 1991).
Solar flares can be detected from the burst of electromagnetic radiation that
originates in the flare event. This radiation burst reaches Earth in about eight minutes.
The more damaging solar energetic particles (SPES) can arrive as soon as eighteen
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minutes after the flare (Radiation Hazards, 2002). Consequently, any astronauts in space
at the time of a flare may have as little as ten minutes warning. However, there is a blind
spot in this technique as some coronal ejections can produce SPEs without producing a
telltale flare (Radiation Hazards, 2002).
It is interesting to note the differences in radiation exposure limits among
different career fields. The national limits for radiation exposure for non-radiation
workers are 500 millirem per year or 300 millirem per quarter. The radiation exposure
limit for radiation workers is 5000 millirem per year. The radiation exposure limit for
shuttle astronauts is 50,000 nrillirem per year (Navy, 1991). This is extremely curious
given that a typical astronaut will have at most one shuttle flight in a given year.
Between 1956 and 1989, Anomalously Large events have occurred at rem levels
ranging from 30 rem to 498 rem. These occurrences are random and space missions
cannot be planned in advance to avoid them. Unprotected astronauts can be injured or
killed by the more severe events.
The 498 rem event, which occurred August 4-7, 1972, is particularly serious. A
498 rem dose would cause an exposed human hematologic derangement, nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, prostration, bleeding, infection, and a 50% mortality rate (Ward,
1991). According to Ward, a 50 rem dose would cause the same effect if the 50 rem level
was maintained for a ten hour period of exposure.
This radiation can be countered if astronauts have some form of shielding
available to them for use during times of maximum dose rate. During other periods, the
dose rate is acceptable without significant shielding (Ward, 1991). It is fortuitous to note
that the highest levels of radiation are due to solar activity (Ward, 1991). This suggests
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that a spacecraft radiation shield may only need to protect from a single source direction,
namely the sun.
Polyethylene Shielding
Jarrett (1992) recommends the use of polyethylene shielding to protect human
Spacecraft from this radiation. The high hydrogen content of polyethylene makes it
attractive for use as a shield. Low atomic mass elements are more effective shields than
high atomic mass elements. The shield proposed by Jarrett is formed from polyethylene,
sandwiched between aluminum foil. Borated polyethylene (containing boron 10) is
layered on the inside of the shield.
Jarret (1992) extensively describes the protective capabilities afforded by this
shield. A shield of this type with a 0.304-meter thickness will provide an order of
magnitude decrease in neutron dose and will reduce the gamma dose by a factor of three.
The combination of aluminum, polyethylene, and boron gives the shield its protective
abilities. Aluminum is not a good shield for proton or neutron radiation, but it is a good
shield for Beta and Gamma radiation, and will thus attenuate the heavy particles of
Cosmic sources. Polyethylene, on the other hand, provides a- good shield against proton
and neutron radiation, comparable in performance to water. Because the outer layer of
the shield is aluminum, it can attenuate particles from Cosmic rays before they enter the
polyethylene, generating neutron flux outside the shield. The borated polyethylene layer
reduces this further. The boron 10 absorbs thermal neutrons and forms boron 11, which
decays to Lithium and an alpha particle. The alpha particle is then trapped in the
polyethylene. Unborated polyethylene also attenuates neutron radiation by elastic
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scattering, photoelectric effect, and Compton scattering. The polyethylene also
attenuates Gamma radiation, providing further protection (Jarrett, 1992).
Polyethylene is currently being used as a makeshift radiation shield on the
International Space Station. A combination of ceiling water storage units and
polyethylene bricks is located in the temporary sleep quarters aboard the US Lab Module
(Space Radiation Health Newsletter, 2001).
PM] Radiation Shield
A primary radiation shield is mounted on PMl, mounted directly in front of the
fuel tanks. Other than some structural penetrations and piping, the shield is a solid mass.
The shield is 1.75 meters high by 2.34 meters wide, which is the cross sectional
area of the CM pressure volume at its maximum width and height. The shield is 0.304
meters in thickness. The shield density is 1041.2 kg/m3 (Jarrett, 1992), resulting in a
shield mass of 1300 kg.
This shield only provides protection in one direction, requiring the LTV to
properly orient itself during any solar particle event. It Offers no protection against
Galactic Cosmic Rays, but due to the short mission duration of the LTV this is not a
serious problem. Omni directional shielding would be required, however, for long
duration spacecraft, such as a Mars transfer vehicle.
The shield is being placed on PMl primarily due to mass considerations. The CM
is near the limits of both ELVS and PM2 and the shield mass would place it over its mass
limitations. PMl, however, has margin to easily absorb the shield mass.
If a radiation alert is issued, signifying some incoming radiation threat, the vehicle
will immediately — and autonomously — sound an alert to the crew and position itself such
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that its aft end faces the radiation source, thus providing a barrier between the crew and
the radiation source.
5.3 Avionics
Because PMl Spends the majority of its time as a combined vehicle, docked to the
CM, the only avionics located on PMl will be those absolutely necessary for it to
function during its few separated flight regimes. In many cases, redundancy will not be
achieved solely with PMl avionics. Separated flight is limited to initial deployment and
other brief periods in LEO, the transition from LEO to CM docking at L1, and a spare
PMl that will remain at Ll. At L1 and in LLO, sensor redundancy can be obtained by
docking with other LTV spacecraft. In all cases, PM] will use interchangeable sensors
with those on the CM, simplifying manufacturing processes. From the manufacturer’s
perspective, it will not matter which LTV spacecraft will receive a particular sensor being
manufactured.
A single SIGI GPS unit will be housed in PM]. Only one GPS will be onboard
PMl because it will never need GPS as a sole navigation source and it will not be
responsible for human spaceflight unless it is connected to the CM, which has two GPS
units. Four GPS antennas are located on PMl for signal reception. For additional
position and attitude determination, PMl will use two star sensors, just like the CM.
Additionally, PMl will house one horizon sensor and six sun sensors - one sun sensor on
each side of the vehicle.
Four laser rangefinders are on PMl, three surrounding the forward docking port
and the fourth at the ventral docking port. The three at the forward port are used for
precise position and attitude determination for dockings with the CM, PM2, or other
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spacecraft. The single rangefinder at the ventral docking port serves as a backup to the
navigation sensors on the Fuel Tanker or Aeroshell Module when either is attempting to
clock.
The same autonomous navigation system used on CM will be utilized on PMl,
using a sensor fusion from PMl sensors and the sensors of whatever vehicle(s) PMl is
docked to.
Two flight computers are carried onboard PMl to house the flight software. As is
the case with the CM computers, each computer will contain multiple copies of all flight
software and will utilize a wireless network.
5.4 Docking Systems
PM] will be equipped with two docking ports, a forward port on the front end'of
the vehicle, and a ventral port on the vehicle underside towards the vehicle aft. The
forward port will be used to dock with PM2 and the CM. The FT and AM will use the
ventral port. The ventral port is located on the PMI underside so as to place it as far
away as possible from any potential EVA activity, thus reducing the possibility of spilled
propellant from contacting the crew hatch on the CM’s dorsal port. This positioning is
also advantageous for docking with the Aeroshell Module, as will be seen in chapter
seven.
Both docking ports will use MDAS-augmented APAS mounts, just like the CM
ports. The forward port can serve as either an active or passive MDAS, while the ventral
port is always the active MDAS. When the forward port docks with PM2, it is the active
system, but when it docks with CM it is passive. Consequently, the forward port has the
active-passive configuration described in chapter four — a steel plate surrounding each
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boom, such that the plate is flush with the electromagnet when the boom is fully
retracted. The ventral port is the active MDAS system for both AM and FT dockings.
The AM has a magnetic guide system that will be explained in chapter seven that
works in concert with the MDAS, so the entire PMl-AM docking process could be
described as semi-active for both vehicles. PMl has six steel plates for use by the AM’s
magnetic guide system, arranged similarly to those on the CM.
Both docking ports contain fuel, power, and thermal fluid transfer conduits.
When the CM/PMl is docked to a FT, the FT can refuel the CM through PMl.
Additionally, the CM and PMl can provide supplemental power and thermal control to
each other through the PMI forward port’s mating to the CM aft port.
5.5 Thermal Control
An active thermal control system (TCS) will be used on PMl to reject waste heat.
The maximum thermal load for PM] is equivalent to the vehicle maximum power level,
which will be Shown later in this chapter to be 1.549 kW.
Like with the CM, the first step in designing the TCS is to size heat exchangers.
Because PMl does not have a cabin, cabin air heat exchangers used on the CM cannot be
used on PMl. Coldplates, however, are still used for avionics and are sized just as they
were with the CM. Heat pipes are used to complete the heat exchange system. Heat pipe
mass is Sized by the parametric 0.000294 x capacity (in W) x length squared. The
parametric 0.000000203000294 x capacity (in W) x length squared is used to determine
the power requirement in watts (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
Plumbing and valves, instruments and controls, fluids, and a two-sided radiator
complete the TCS and are sized with the same parametrics used in chapter four for the
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CM. The total TCS mass is 216 kg and the system requires 36 W. The radiator is
divided into two radiator wings, each measuring 3 meters by 2.12 meters. The radiators
are mounted on the underside of the solar array wings, perpendicular to the array surface,
such that the radiators are always in the shade when the solar arrays are tracking the sun.
5.6 Communications
The PMl communications architecture is virtually identical to that aboard the
CM, with the exception that PMI is sized to transmit the entire 384,400 km distance
between the Earth and moon, while the CM is only Sized to transmit from L1 to Earth.
Nominally, PMl will perform communications duties while the two are docked.
However, when the LTV is in range of the lunar FTDRSS satellites, both CM and PMl
may transmit together. This will allow a doubling of the data rate, up to 24 Mbps that can
be transmitted to mission control. Of this, 4 Mbps is reserved for telemetry and other
data while 20 Mbps is allocated for video or other transmissions.
To provide for a simpler and lower cost manufacturing process, the PMI will use
identical 0.779-meter diameter antennas as those used by the CM. Conducting the link
analysis performed in chapter four with this restriction results in a 123 W transmit power
and a 57 kg transmitter mass (The antenna mass is the same as the CM antenna mass).
To ensure coverage, regardless of vehicle orientation or FT docking, three U-band
antennas will be mounted on PMl, one on the dorsal center, one on the ventral forward,
and one on the ventral aft (behind the ventral docking port). Two transmitters will be
provided for redundancy. Unlike the CM, no satellite phones are carried onboard PMl.
141
5.7 Propulsion
PM] will use the same propulsion hardware used on the CM. The PM] main
propulsion system (MPS) will consist of two RS-72 engines and the attitude control
system (ACS) will consist of sixteen R-4D engines.
MPS Configuration
The MPS engines will be gimbaled, much like the shuttle OMS engines, allowing
for thrust vector control and the ability to perform a single engine burn in an engine out
scenario. The gimbal mass is estimated using the same parametric used to estimate the
solar array drive system: (0014 x engine mass + 20.6) x engine mass/100 (Larson and
Pranke, 1999).
MPS Performance
The MPS is used for seven burns during the course of a lunar mission. The first
burn captures PM] at Ll following transfer from LEO to L] (by PM2). Once the CM has
arrived and docks with PM], the MPS is used again to place the CM/PMl LTV on a
transfer to the moon. The third firing places the vehicle into a 100 km altitude polar low
lunar orbit (LLO). The fourth MPS burn is used to leave LLO on a trajectory for L1 and
the fifth burn captures the LTV at Ll. After CM/PM] dock with the AM, the sixth burn
places the CM/PMl/AM LTV on a transfer to Earth. After the aerocapture atmospheric
pass, the AM separates from CM/PM] and the seventh burn is performed to circularize
the CM/PM] orbit in LEO. Delta-v, vehicle mass, fuel mass, MMH mass, N204 mass,
and burn time are summarized for each burn in table 5-1. Burn times assume a two-
engine burn. Times would be doubled for a single-engine burn. It should also be noted
that the fuel mass is the fuel consumed in the burn, which is not the total fuel onboard.
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ACS Configuration
ACS engines will be mounted in four clusters of four engines on the top, bottom
and sides of PM], at the vehicle center of mass. Each cluster is configured in a “+”
shape, much like the Apollo Service Module thruster configuration. On the Side clusters,
the solar array mast protrudes through the center of the cluster. Engine numbering is
shown in figure 5-2 and table 5-2.
Like the CM, PM] will be capable of performing any X, Y, or Z—axis translation,
or any roll, pitch, or yaw rotation with a two-engine burn. Roll and X translation are also
redundant for any single engine and certain two-engine failures with no loss in
performance and no increase in fuel expenditure. In the case of other engine failures,
other rotation and translation maneuvers can be accomplished with a combination of
maneuvers in remaining axes (i.e. roll-pitch-roll to accomplish yaw). And while
connected to the CM or a FT, all maneuvers are redundant for any single engine failure
and most are redundant for any two-engine failure with zero performance loss or
propellant use increase. Generally, when PM] is docked to the CM, all forward firing
thrusters (engines 1, 5, 9, and 13) are deselected and the forward firing thrusters on the
CM are used in their place. Additionally, when PM] is docked to a FT, engine 16 is
blocked by the FT and is accordingly deselected, affecting +X translation and +pitch.
The resolution to this problem will be discussed in chapter eight and will involve a
combination of CM and FT thrusters. Attitude control thruster selection for each single
axis maneuver is shown in table 5-3.
ACS Performance
Like the CM, simple rectangular block estimations were used to approximate the
PM] moments of inertia. When CM and PM] are docked, the vehicle moment of inertia
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is the sum of the individual CM and PM] moments of inertia. Using the average PM]
mass, the PM] moments of inertia are Ixx = 81112, Iyy = 18658, Izz = 94041. The
combined CM/PM] moments of inertia are Ixx = 124833, Iyy = 156397, Izz = 245378.
Because of the symmetry of PMl’s design, all thrusters have the same moment
arm, hence the same torque: 1.2 m moment arm and 588 Nm torque. The ACS is
designed to maintain a deadband of 10 degrees in roll, pitch, and yaw, just like the CM.
Its maximum allowed angular velocities are Slightly different, however, 0.009 degrees per
second in roll, 0.007 deg/sec in pitch, and 0.022 degrees per second in yaw, again taking
maximum advantage of the R-4D’s minimum impulse bit, thus minimizing propellant
consumption.
Docking, separation, and daily attitude control fuel requirements are determined
in the same manner as for the CM. Because PM] is refueled, it only needs carry required
fuel for its current flight phase. For the outbound LEO to L1 segment, 54 kg are
required. From L] to LLO, 53 kg are required. From LLO back to L1, another 97 kg are
used. Finally, from L1 to LEO, 45 kg are required. Hence, for tank sizing purposes, the
ACS fuel requirement is 97 kg, of which 37 kg is MMH and 61 kg is N204.
PM] Refueling
Refueling is a major activity in the PM] flight profile. Under the constraints of
using existing launch vehicles and technologies, it is impossible to launch a propulsion
module that contains all fuel required to support a lunar transfer. Consequently, PM]
must refuel at various points along its trajectory. It is first fueled before beginning a
lunar mission, but with only enough fuel to reach L]. It refuels three additional times: at
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L1 outbound, in lunar orbit, and at Ll inbound. Each fueling tops Off the ACS tanks and
provides only enough MPS propellant for it to reach the next refueling point.
Tank Sizing
Unlike the CM, the MPS and ACS share the same fuel tanks. However, multiple
fuel and oxidizer tanks are used. This achieves tank redundancy, such that a
rrricrometeoroid impact or other tank failure will not destroy the entire fuel supply. The
propellant lines are cross-linked, so that the MPS and ACS engines can receive fuel from
any tank onboard PM], as well as any tank in the CM or a docked FT. The system will
also allow tank-to-tank transfers, such that for instance, if MMH tank 1 develops a leak,
fuel can be transferred from it to MMH tank 2 and/or CM APS MMH tank, preventing a
total loss of that tank’s fuel. Consequently, each PM2 tank is sized to carry a maximum
fuel load equal to 90% of the capacity of its corresponding CM APS tank. The APS
tanks carry roughly half the fuel load used by the MPS, so PM] carries two MMH tanks
and two N204 tanks. All tanks are domed cylinders with an arbitrarily chosen radius of
0.6 m. The length of a domed cylinder (with a hemispherical dome on both ends) can be
expressed by L = (V-4/31tr3)/(ttr2)+2r, where V is the volume and r is the radius. The
necessary volume for each fuel tank is found by dividing the fuel mass by its density (880
kg/m3 for MMH and 1450 kg/m3 for N204). PMl’s MMH tanks are each 1.54 m in
length, with a mass of 278 kg and an 1123 kg fuel capacity. PMl’s N204 tanks are each
1.82 min length with a mass of 569 kg and a 2304 kg capacity.
5.8 Power
PM] receives electrical power through a solar array and battery configuration
similar to that of the CM. The power profile for PM] is more consistent than that of the
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CM, however, as it does not have different power loads based on flight regime. Instead,
it experiences a consistent 1.55 kW power load, as shown in table 5-4.
Like the CM, PM] will use lithium metal dry polymer electrolyte batteries.
Eclipse periods are, of course, the same as those experienced by the CM with the
exception that PM] does not have an Earth entry flight phase. Table 5—5 Shows eclipse
periods and eclipse kWh, which is the driving factor in battery sizing. Lunar orbit
imposes the greatest requirement with 1.202 kWh. The sizing process is identical to that
used in chapter four for the CM and in this case yields a battery mass of 5 kg.
Continuing with the process used in chapter four, a charge power of 1.68 kW is
calculated and a charge kWh of 1.013 is found for LEO and 1.307 is found for LLO. The
lunar requirement is the greater, and thus the system driver. It in turn yields an array
charge power requirement of 1.097 kW for LLO, which adds to the 1.55 kW power load
to produce a total array power requirement of 2.65 kW.
The same type of SLA triple-junction arrays used on the CM supplies this power.
A total of 16.4 m2 of array surface (8.2 m2 for each of the two array wings on PMI) is
obtained by iterating through the algorithm used with the CM. This yields an array mass
of 27.38 kg. The drive system, like its CM counterpart, is responsible for actuating both
the solar arrays and radiator. The drive system is sized at 25.35 kg. Each array wing has
dimensions of 1.82 m by 4.5 In. Like the CM, sun sensors on each array enable it to track
the sun for optimum energy generation. The array wing provides for 360-degree rotation
along its axis and 180 degree rotation perpendicular to its axis, thus enabling it to track
the sun regardless of vehicle orientation.
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5.9 Mass Properties
Table 5-6 gives the final mass summary for the CM. A 15% growth margin is
included to account for any unforeseen growth in vehicle systems. Vehicle dry mass is
constant throughout the lunar transfer mission, but total mass varies with refueling as
each leg of the trip requires a different fuel load. Vehicle structure is estimated as
21.06% of the dry mass, which is the average value reported by Larson and Wertz (1992)
for selected spacecraft.
5.10 ELV Deployment
PM] is launched into space on the same Atlas V Heavy that carries the CM into
orbit. The booster is responsible for lifting the vehicles into a 407 km altitude orbit at a
28.5-degree inclination. A payload attach fitting will hold PM] in place in the booster
payload shroud. The fitting will interface with the PM] aft structure and the forward
APAS mount will be docked to the CM. The booster is not responsible for supplying any
power or thermal conditioning to PM] after launch (though the launch pad does need to
supply both). If necessary, PM] can supply inertial and GPS guidance data to the
booster. The booster will separate as soon as orbit has been achieved. PMl-Spare
(described below) will be launched with the AM on an Atlas 532.
5.11 PMl Redundancy
In order to ensure that the crew is not Stranded in space due to a PM] total failure,
a backup PM] (PMl-Spare) will be located at L]. Clearly, Should the primary PM] fail
before the CM is delivered to L1, the mission will Simply be delayed until a new PM]
can be launched. If, however, PM] fails after the CM leaves Earth orbit, PMl-Spare will
be used.
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If the failure is at Ll, PMl-Spare is already present and can dock to the CM.
Based on decisions from Mission Control, the LTV will either complete or abort the
mission, using PMl-Spare as the propulsion module. If the failure is in LLO, PMl-Spare
can leave L1 and propel itself to LLO. After receiving fuel from a FT in lunar orbit,
PMl-Spare can dock to CM. Again, based on decisions from Mission Control, the LTV
will either complete or abort the mission, using PMl-Spare as the propulsion module.
If the failure is in transit between L] and LLO, the CM will separate from the
failed PM] and use its APS engine to return to L1 and dock to PMl-Spare. If the failure
is in transit from L1 to Earth at the end of mission (after the PM] L] departure burn),
then no action will be taken as PMlis not absolutely required (though its absence will
complicate Earth arrival procedures). Options are greatly reduced if there is a failure
during PM] burn that prevents PM] from completing the burn. However, given the high
reliability of a hypergolic engine, the fact that PM] carries two RS-72 engines, the fact
that PM and CM can share propellant, and the compartmentalization of PM] fuel tanks it
is highly unlikely that any failure could result in PM] being unable to complete its burn.
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Chapter Six - Ascent Descent Vehicle
6.1 Overview
Unlike the Crew Module, no existing spacecraft can fulfill the role of a lunar
lander. Competing possibilities for adaptations of existing spacecraft are station-derived
cylinders, SpaceHab modules, Spacelab modules, open cockpit landers, and TransHab-
derived inflatables. An open cockpit lander was not given serious consideration for the
ADV, due to the chilly response it received in NASA’S HLR studies. Of the remaining
possibilities, the TransHab inflatable is clearly the lightest. Mass reduction is a driving
consideration for the ADV because as the last link in the LEO to lunar surface chain,
mass increases to the ADV carry the greatest impact to the overall program cost
(financial and mass). Consequently, the ADV will utilize an inflatable crew
compartment. Most vehicle systems will be housed in this compartment, making in-flight
maintenance simpler. The ADV is shown in figure 6-1.
Implications ofSurface Base on ADVDesign and Operations
The location of the lunar surface base has significant impacts on the ADV design
and operations. Depending on the location of the base and the latitude of the orbit, access
to and from the base may be limited. Because Trailblazer assumes a South Pole location,
the ADV will utilize a polar orbit. For orbital inclinations greater than 85° combined
with base latitudes greater than 85°, continuous access to the surface is possible. Lunar
mass concentrations (mascons) cause gravity anomalies that can result in small altitude
drifts (~20 km) for objects in orbit (Eckart, 1999).
Base locations at equatorial sites along with equatorial orbits would also allow for
continuous access to the surface (continuous ascent opportunities, descent windows every
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two hours), but would have resulted in ADV altitude drifts of up to 80 km while in orbit
due to lunar mascons. Base locations between 5° and 85° with correspondingly inclined
orbits would have limited ascent/descent windows (~one every 14-27 days) and orbits
would experience altitude drifts up to 140 km due to lunar mascons (Eckart, 1999).
It should be noted that orbital inclination also affects windows for objects to
depart on direct trajectories to rendezvous with an object in Earth orbit. This, however, is
not a factor for the Trailblazer design because all vehicles departing lunar orbit will refuel
at L1. L1 has continuous access to and from all lunar orbital inclinations.
Differencesfrom other Lunar Lander Concepts
A key difference between the Trailblazer ADV and its corresponding vehicle in
Duke and Spudis’ lunar studies (Portree, 2002) or the current lunar return strategy under
development at NASA-JSC (Fletcher, 2002) is the range of the ADV. Duke’s LBV
travels from the lunar surface to L2 and back, while Spudis and JSC’S vehicles travel
from the lunar surface to L1 and back. Unlike those vehicles, the ADV travels only from
the surface to a 100 km lunar orbit and back.
The advantage of L1/L2 is that it leaves the mission completely unrestrained by
orbital mechanics phasing considerations. A spacecraft can launch from any point of the
moon at any time and head directly for L1 or L2. For a lunar orbit rendezvous, the
launch must be properly timed in order to rendezvous with an orbiting spacecraft.
However, the disadvantage of L1/L2 is that it requires a much larger spacecraft. In
addition to the greater delta-v required to reach L1 or L2, the spacecraft must also support
the crew for a much longer period of time - a one-way trip is roughly two days, as
opposed to a few hours at most. This means that the life support system is larger, more
150
crew accommodations are required, and the fuel resupply requirement is considerably
greater.
It will be evident from this dissertation that a lunar orbital rendezvous scheme
taxes the capabilities of existing launch vehicles to the limit. An L1 or L2 rendezvous is
even more demanding. It does not appear that the basic architecture of Duke, Spudis, and
JSC can be accomplished without a new launch vehicle (and potentially a new launch
pad, new payload processing facilities, etc).
A significant difference between the ADV and all other human spacecraft is that it
is unpressurized for the majority of its operational life. When it docks to the CM (prior to
descending to the lunar surface), the cabin will pressurize. Once pressurized, the
astronauts will transfer over from the CM. They will transfer over fully suited, however,
or will at least suit up prior to sealing the hatches and separating the two vehicles. AS
soon as the ADV separates from the CM, it will begin to depressurize, in preparation for
its arrival on the lunar surface. By the time it has landed, it will have equalized to the
lunar vacuum. It will remain unpressurized while the astronauts are at the lunar base.
When the astronauts return to the ADV at the end of their lunar mission, the ADV will
begin to pressurize once the vehicle lifts off and will equalize pressure with the CM once
it has docked. Once the CM has departed to return to Earth, the ADV will gradually vent
its cabin atmosphere to space.
6.2 ADV Configuration
The ADV is divided into two basic sections: the crew compartment and the
propulsion unit. The propulsion unit contains the vehicle propulsion systems, batteries,
thermal systems, conrrnunications systems, navigation sensors, landing gear, and a
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docking mount used to dock with Fuel Tankers. A ladder for egress to the lunar surface
is also mounted on the propulsion unit.
The crew cabin is a TransHab-derived inflatable structure that provides space for
two EMU-suited astronauts, flight controls, cargo, maintenance tools, and life support
systems. It also has a docking mount used to dock with the Crew Module. A hatch on
the cabin sidewall is used for egress to the lunar environment.
Radiation shielding is not provided on the ADV due to the limited mission
duration. As Jarrett (1992) relates, potential radiation exposure can be reduced by
variation in any combination of time, distance, and Shielding. As compared with the
CM/PMl, distance (to the sun) is essentially the same. Shielding is eliminated, thus
increasing the potential exposure, but the time is drastically lower (several hours as
opposed to several days), thus decreasing the potential exposure. In fact, the mission
time is less than that of a typical lunar surface EVA, where there is also no radiation
Shielding provided. Hence, another advantage of a lunar orbit rendezvous is that it
reduces the flight time sufficiently that overall radiation exposure risk for an unshielded
ADV is no greater than that for the shielded CM/PM]. Were the ADV to rendezvous at
Ll instead of lunar orbit, radiation shielding would be required because the mission
would then be several days in duration.
ADV Cabin Wall Thickness
Gary Spexarth of the NASA-JSC Engineering Directorate provides some
background information on the JSC TransHab material thickness and density. The JSC
TransHab assumed a LEO micrometeorite and orbital debris (MMOD) environment. The
level of protection required (which influences thickness) was based on the “probability of
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no penetration.” Because the JSC TransHab model was so large in size (27.7-foot
diameter, 40-foot length) the probability of a hit was high. Consequently, they needed a
large amount of MMOD protection, resulting in a 16-inch thick shell. The average aerial
density for their shell is 5.07 lb/ft2 (Spexarth, 2002).
Lunar orbit is not nearly as severe a MMOD environment as LEO. Additionally,
because the ADV is much smaller than the TransHab, the “viewing area” (potential
points of impact) is greatly reduced, correspondingly lowering the risk of penetration.
The risk is further reduced by the Short fight time of the ADV. The criticality of an
impact is also minimized due to the fact that the astronauts are fully suited during landing
and liftoff and the vehicle is unpressurized during those periods. Consequently, the wall
thickness for the ADV is reduced proportionately to the surface area ratio between the
TransHab (435.36 m2) and the ADV (28.26 m2), resulting in a thickness of 1.04 inches.
Were the ADV to be used for any function beyond that of surface to orbit taxi, a thicker
cabin wall would be required.
6.3 Life Support
Life support provisions on the ADV will be minimal. The cabin is only
pressurized after CM docking and it gradually depressurizes during descent. Matching
the CM for dockings, the ADV will pressurize to a cabin atmosphere of 68-kPa with
27.94% oxygen, 72.06% nitrogen content. Assuming an EVA suit pressure of 35 kPa
using pure oxygen, this will result in an R-factor of 1.4 and will not require any
prebreathe time. Air for pressurization will be supplied by the CM, which will carry
enough oxygen and nitrogen for 3.5 pressurizations - 2 nominal and 1.5 in reserve. The
life support system will allow crew members to perform in-flight maintenance in a
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shirtsleeve environment while the ADV is docked to the CM. However, once separated,
the crew will remain in EMUS as the cabin slowly depressurizes. It is equipped with
consumables for a single EVA, allowing the crew to recharge their EMUS upon landing.
This equipment will be recharged on the surface, allowing the crew again to recharge
their EMUS just prior to launch for their return to the CM at the end of the lunar mission.
6.4 Avionics
Unlike the CM and PM], the ADV will not carry GPS. In general, GPS is not
useful beyond the NAVSTAR constellation (though on occasion, GPS signals can be
acquired during cislunar transit). It will however, carry a new sensor not included on the
CM and PM]. A Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit (MIMU) will provide 3 axis
angular rate and velocity measurement (MIMU, 2001). For redundancy, three MIMUS
will be carried onboard. MIMU is a lightweight sensor, drawing only 34 watts and
massing only 4 kg (MIMU, 2001). The ADV will also use two star sensors, two horizon
sensors, and six sun sensors to enhance its situational awareness. Like other LTV
vehicles, the ADV will be equipped with three laser rangefinders at each docking port
(six rangefinders total) for close range situational awareness during docking Operations.
Finally, the ADV will be equipped with two laser altimeters for altitude measurements.
The ADV will use as its laser altimeter the same LIDAR unit used on the Clementine
mission. The total mass for each LIDAR is 2.37 kg and the power required is 16.3 watts
(Clementine LIDAR Performance, 2002 and Clementine HIRES Camera Performance,
2002) The LIDAR has a range of 640 km (Clementine Laser Rangefinder, 2002).
The autonomous navigation system used across LTV spacecraft will also be
utilized on the ADV, integrating sensor data from the ADV’S various sensors.
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Three flight computers are carried onboard the ADV to house the flight software.
As is the case with other LTV flight computers, each computer will contain multiple
copies of all flight software and will utilize a wireless network.
6.5 Docking Systems
The ADV’S two docking ports are located on the dorsal cabin surface and on the
propulsion unit’s side directly opposite the crew egress hatch (This side of the propulsion
unit will be designated the forward side of the vehicle). The dorsal docking port is used
to dock with the Crew Module for crew transfer, while the forward docking port is used
to dock with Fuel Tankers for vehicle refueling.
The dorsal port has a passive MDAS configuration while the forward port is an
active-passive MDAS. The dorsal port contains a hatch used to facilitate crew transfer.
The forward port contains fuel, power, and thermal fluid transfer conduits. When the
ADV is docked to a FT, the FT can provide fuel, as well as limited power and thermal
control.
6.6 Thermal Control
An active TCS will be used on the ADV to reject waste heat. The maximum
thermal load for the ADV is equivalent to the vehicle maximum power level, which will
be shown later in this chapter to be 2.350 kW. The ADV TCS is virtually identical to the
PM] configuration. While the ADV does have a cabin, it is depressurized for the
majority of the time, making cabin air heat exchangers impractical. Consequently, a
combination of cold plates and heat pipes are used. Plumbing and valves, instruments
and controls, fluids, and a two-sided radiator complete the TCS and are sized in the same
way as their counterparts on the CM and PM]. The total TCS mass, including radiators,
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is 100 kg and the system requires 54 W. The radiator is divided into two square radiator
wings, each measuring 1.85 min width and height and 0.06 min thickness. The radiators
are mounted on the sides of the propulsion unit, each halfway between the crew egress
ladder and the forward docking port.
6.7 Communications
The ADV communications system is exactly the same as the system used on
PM]. Both are sized to communicate from lunar orbit to FTDRSS. The ADV will use
the same size and mass U-band antennas used on PM]. It will also use an identical
transmitter, operating at the same power levels. In all aspects, component for component,
the ADV and PM] communications systems are identical, with the one exception that the
ADV only carries two antennas, where PM] carries three.
6.8 Propulsion
The ADV’S Spacecraft Landing System (SLS) and Attitude Control System
(ACS) provide all propulsion for the vehicle. The SLS will consist of a Single RS-72
engine and the ACS will consist of sixteen R-4D engines (Axis conventions are +X =
forward [through the docking port], +Y = port, +Z = up, +roll = port radiator up, +pitch =
forward docking port up, +yaw = forward docking port right).
SLS Configuration
The SLS engine will be gimbaled, just like the PM] engines, allowing for thrust
vector control during landing. The gimbal mass is estimated using the same parametric




The first task of the SLS in a typical lunar mission is the successful deorbit and
landing of the ADV (As will be explained later in this chapter, it must also capture into
lunar orbit during its initial deployment. But this is a once in a vehicle lifetime engine
burn and is not repeated during lunar missions). An initial deorbit burn is followed by an
extended powered descent. The ADV remains on the surface of the moon, powered
down during the crew’s lunar mission. Ascent involves powered ascent, followed by
circularization. A 0.2 km/s Av is also budgeted for LTV rendezvous phases, one prior to
descent and one after ascent. Delta-v, vehicle mass, fuel mass, MMH mass, N204 mass,
and burn time are summarized for each burn in table 6-1. It should also be noted that the
fuel mass is the fuel consumed in the burn, which is not the total fuel onboard.
ACS Configuration
ACS thrusters will be mounted in four-thruster clusters reminiscent of the Apollo
Lunar Module. While similar to the PM] configuration, the thruster orientation is
slightly different due to docking port and crew egress hatch considerations. The clusters
will be mounted on the vehicle sides, encircling the vehicle center of mass along the
propulsion unit’s perimeter. One is at the forward starboard, forward port, aft starboard,
and aft port. Each cluster has :tZ axis thrusters and outward firing thrusters in the X and
Y axes. Engine numbering is shown in figure 6-2 and table 6-2.
Like the CM and PM], the ADV will be capable of performing any X-axis
translation or any yaw rotation with a two-engine burn. Yaw is also redundant for any
single engine and certain two-engine failures with no loss in performance and no increase
in fuel expenditure. Pure Y and Z-axis translation and roll and pitch rotation require a
four-engine burn (Two-engine translation burns in these directions will produce a
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rotational component). Single or greater engine failures in Y or Z—axis translation or in
roll or pitch rotation will require combinations of maneuvers in other axes to maintain
flight capability in the failed axis. Attitude control thruster selection for each single axis
maneuver is shown in table 6-3.
ACS Performance
Moments of inertia were estimated in the same manner as for the CM and PM].
Using the initial lunar orbit ADV mass of 21407 kg, the ADV moments of inertia are In
= Iyy =86219, In =37602.
Because of the symmetry of the ADV’S design, all thrusters have the same
moment arm, hence the same torque: m moment arm and Nm torque. The ACS is
designed to maintain a deadband of 10 degrees in roll, pitch, and yaw, just like the CM.
Its maximum allowed angular velocities are slightly different, however, 0.033 degrees per
second in roll, 0.033 deg/sec in pitch, and 0.033 degrees per second in yaw, again taking
maximum advantage of the R-4D’s minimum impulse bit, thus minimizing propellant
consumption.
Docking, separation, and daily attitude control fuel requirements are determined
in the same manner as for other LTV spacecraft. The ACS system requires roughly 32 kg
of propellant, of which 12 kg are MMH and 32 kg are N204.
ADV Refueling
A successful ADV refueling must take place before a CM can be cleared to depart
Earth orbit for a lunar mission. Chapter eight will provide more details with respect to the
fueling process, but the ADV will require fueling visits from two Fuel Tankers to
completely fuel the lander. The ADV fuel requirement is roughly 1.64 times the capacity
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of a Fuel Tanker. Consequently, over the course of eight lunar missions, 14 FTs will be
required to provide the ADV with the fuel it needs.
It should be noted that the ADV is only fueled in lunar orbit. This is because it
saves mass, fuel, and expense to refuel in orbit rather than on the surface. Until the moon
can produce its own fuel it is more cost effective to conduct fueling operations in space.
The impact of this is that the ADV must receive power, thermal control, and attitude
control while in orbit. The ADV will provide most of this support itself. However, by
remaining docked to a FT between missions, the ADV can use FT resources for attitude
control, as will be explained in chapter eight.
Tank Sizing
Because the ADV is only refueled between missions, it must carry its entire load
of fuel. The craft requires 14,795 kg of propellant for its lunar landing and ascent
mission. Like, PM], the SL8 and ACS Share fuel tanks. Also like PM], multiple tanks
are used. In this case, the ADV tanks are identical in size to the APS tanks on the CM.
Should PM] experience a tank failure, fuel can be transferred from the ADV to PM].
The reverse is also true, but generally if there is an ADV failure, either a spare ADV will
be used or the mission will be aborted. A crew would not land on the moon in a suspect
vehicle.
The ADV will carry a total of eight fuel tanks, four MMH and four N204. It
carries a maximum MMH load of 4935 kg and a maximum N204 load of 9860 kg. Like
PM], the ADV tanks are fully cross-linked.
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6.9 Power
Initially, an all-battery configuration was chosen for the ADV, similar to the
power system for the Apollo Lunar Module. However, the ADV mission is different
from that of the Apollo LM in a manner that renders batteries inappropriate.
The problem with the batteries is that the ADV has a 30-hour lunar orbit period
budgeted into the vehicle’s flight profile and a 3.2-day transfer from LEO to lunar orbit.
An extremely massive battery system would be required to keep the vehicle alive during
these periods, even assuming a significantly reduced power profile for those times.
A possible alternative is a flywheel or fuel cell system. However, a fuel cell
system would require resupply or an additional energy transfer system for reactant
recovery (in the case of a regenerative fuel cell). This would have a significant, adverse
effect on mission operations and program expense. A flywheel system would
significantly increase ADV mass, thus requiring a greater propellant budget, again
significantly, adversely impacting mission operations and program expense. The least
expensive system is a solar array and battery system.
Consequently, the ADV will feature two retractable SLA triple junction solar
array wings. The wings will provide power during the initial deployment to lunar orbit
and while awaiting a mission in lunar orbit. The wings will retract for lunar landings and
ascent. The same lithium polymer electrolyte batteries used throughout the Trailblazer
LTV spacecraft will power the ADV during eclipse periods, landing, and ascent.
Solar arrays are sized in the same manner used for other LTV spacecraft.
However, because the ADV will operate in the lunar environment, a dust factor is being
added over and above conventional sizing estimates. It is assumed that the solar arrays
160
will experience 40% degradation in array performance due to lunar dust,
micrometeorites, and debris impacts. Even assuming this degradation in array
performance, the power system is lighter than that required for an exclusively battery
powered vehicle. A battery-only system would require a battery mass of 234 kg, due to
the need to provide battery power (at drastically reduced power levels) during cislunar
transit. Even if this requirement were somehow avoided, the ADV would still require a
battery mass of 294 kg, due to the 30-hour period it spends in lunar orbit rendezvousing
with the CM/PMl. Using solar arrays instead, a battery mass of 26 kg and an array mass
of 93 kg is required. (This includes the mass of the array drive system, which will also
drive the radiator panels.)
ADV power levels will vary by flight phase, depending on which systems need to
be powered for particular flight profiles. Table 6-4 will describe ADV power
requirements by flight phase.
6.10 Mass Properties
Table 6-5 lists the final mass summary for the ADV. Like the other LTV
spacecraft, a growth margin provides for mass impacts due to unforeseen additions to the
vehicle systems. The Larson and Wertz (1992) structural mass parametric estimation of
21.06% dry mass is applied only to the portions of the vehicle located in the propulsion
unit. The crew cabin structural mass is Sized using the TransHab shell density given by
Spexarth (2002). The two values are added for the total structural mass.
6.11 ELV Deployment
The ADV is launched on an Atlas V or Delta IV booster to LEO, where it awaits a
PM2. The PM2 will transfer it directly to LLO, with the ADV firing its SLS engine to
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capture into lunar orbit. It will immediately dock with a series of two Fuel Tankers to
take on fuel for its lunar mission. It will remain docked to the second FT and will await
the arrival of the CM/PM] in that configuration.
162
Chapter Seven — Aeroshell Module
7.1 Background
Departing the moon following a lunar mission, the combined CM and PM] will
use aerocapture to be captured into Earth orbit. To conduct an aerocapture analysis, the
entry environment must be determined, particularly the flight trajectory and entry
heating. In order to achieve the required delta-V for orbital capture, the LTV must
descend to the proper altitude. This atmospheric passage will generate significant
thermal loads, partially as a function of altitude.
Once the entry environment has been established, a thermal protection system
(TPS) can be developed. Depending on the heat loads, either ablative or non-ablative
heat shields can be used. Given that lunar return will cause tremendous heating, it is
suspected that an ablative system will be required. Unfortunately, such a system is non-
reusable and massive, as compared with a non—ablative system. Preliminary estimates
suggest the heat shield will cause the CM to exceed the mass capabilities of present day
launch vehicles if it is flown integrated with the vehicle. Not only will existing rockets
be unable to lift it into orbit, but also PM2 will be unable to place the CM on a trajectory
to L1 (PMl might also have the same problem as the CM). Even if the mass were not a
problem, an integrated, ablative TPS would create a need to extensively service the CM
and PM] between missions.
Consequently, a separate aerocapture module is required for the LTV. This
module will rendezvous with the LTV during its inbound flight from the moon and will
be discarded following aerocapture. AM rendezvous will be accomplished at Ll. At the
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Earth-Moon L], the mated CM and PM] will rendezvous and dock with a pre-deployed
AM. PM] will then fire its engines to place the LTV on an Earth intercept trajectory.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to determine the entry environment
experienced by an LTV experiencing aerocapture and (2) to size the Aerocapture
Module. Thermal constraints regarding entry into earth orbit are critical elements in the
sizing of this module, particularly in determining the appropriate TPS material and
thickness, as well as the resulting TPS mass.
The design requirement to restrict launch vehicles to existing rockets makes lunar
travel an extremely challenging problem. The area of aerocapture is no exception. A
human spacecraft must pursue a relatively rapid transfer from the moon to Earth,
eliminating options such as weak stability boundary, solar sails, and low thrust engines.
Consequently, a high-thrust, impulsive transfer is required. This energy must be
dissipated in order to be captured at Earth for either a direct entry or capture into orbit.
The Trailblazer concept will endeavor to avoid direct entry (i.e. Apollo) in order
to avoid the costs associated with recovery and re-launch of the LTV. Consequently,
initial priority will be given towards sizing the vehicle for capture into LEO. Two
Options are available: propulsive insertion and aerodynamic braking.
Propulsive insertion requires a delta-v of roughly 3.3 km/s and is simply too great
for the Trailblazer’s PM]. The only viable propulsion module capable of providing
delta-V’s anywhere in that vicinity is PM2, which is cryogenic and cannot be stored in
space for the necessary periods of time. Consequently, propulsive insertion is not an
opfion.
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This leaves aerodynamic braking as an option. The inbound LTV must dive into
Earth’s atmosphere and use the resulting drag to Slow down to an orbital velocity. This
can be done in either of two fashions: aerobraking uses multiple passes through the
atmosphere to slow down, while aerocapture accomplishes all deceleration in a single
pass. Aerobraking is a time—intensive process, requiring a time Span potentially on the
order of a month or longer. This would expose the crew to too much radiation and would
increase the life support consumables, driving the vehicle to an impractically large mass.
Therefore, the thermally intense process of aerocapture is the preferred option because it
reduces the mission duration for the flight crew.
Aerocapture has never been attempted, existing only in spacecraft conceptual
design studies. Aerobraking has been used with two Mars probes and is planned for
future interplanetary probes. No form of aerodynamic braking has ever been used to
capture a human spacecraft into planetary orbit, making this perhaps the most crucial
technology development area of the Trailblazer design. In the late eighties and early
nineties, NASA initiated a flight test experiment called the Aeroassist Flight Experiment
(AFE) that was intended to provide experimental data (Squire, 2002). Unfortunately, the
project was cancelled before the vehicle flew.
7.2 Aerocapture Module Dimensional Restrictions
It is almost immediately obvious that the CM’s thermal protection system is
entirely inadequate to protect the vehicle from the thermal environment encountered in
aerocapture from lunar orbit or L1. The thermal environment of aerocapture is much
more severe than that of entry from LEO. A new system is required. Clearly, a massive
thermal protection system is required to protect the LTV, given that both the CM and
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PM] must be protected by the TPS. The LTV TPS, if attached in a conventional fashion,
will push the CM mass beyond PM2’S payload capacity, as one might suspect from a
casual glance at the delta-v data in chapter three and the PM2 performance data in
chapter six. Due to the intense heating environment of aerocapture, the TPS would most
likely be ablative and is consequently non-reusable. A conventional TPS attachment to
the spaceframe would require extensive servicing between flights, requiring the LTV to
land and be re-launched, significantly increasing the operational expense of the LTV.
Consequently, a separate Aerocapture Module will be designed for the LTV. This
module will rendezvous with the LTV during its inbound flight from the moon and will
be discarded following aerocapture.
The size of the module is driven by a combination of aerodynamic considerations
and the requirement to completely enclose the CM and PM]. The CM measures 9.14
meters in length, 4.42. meters in width and 3.2 meters in height. PM] is estimated at 5.64
meters in length and 2.4 meters in both width and height. The module will therefore need
a minimum internal clearance of 14.78 meters in length and 2.41 meters in radius.
Possible aeroshell shapes considered for this vehicle are the raked cone and the
domed cylinder. Both shapes are reasonable in that they can be launched as a single
piece (requiring no on-orbit assembly) and these shapes have been used in several
existing aerocapture studies, thus providing data points for comparisons.
Because data in other studies showed lower heating rates for domed cylinders
than for raked cones (Williams, Gietzel, Rochelle, and Curry, 1991), the Aeroshell
Module will be a domed cylinder in Shape, as shown in figure 7-1. It must allow for
sufficient clearance for the LTV to enter it and dock. One additional constraint is that the
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Aerocapture Module’s mass must remain below 18,416 kg (including structure, any
avionics, propellant and thrusters) or it will exceed PM2’s payload capability for transfer
from LEO to L1.
7.3 Aerocapture Module Flight Profile
The constraint of no new launch vehicles has forced the adoption of a highly
modular strategy for the Trailblazer LTV. Because of this, the Aeroshell Module will
pursue a different flight path from the rest of the LTV, such that AM rendezvous with the
LTV takes place at the Earth-Moon L1.
Because the AM is an unmanned vehicle with no other constraints on its time in
space, numerous alternative trajectory options can be employed to reach L1, including
electric propulsion or weak stability boundary. If a slow transit method is utilized, then it
must be pre-deployed sufficiently far in advance of the lunar mission that it does not
delay the launch of other components that cannot leave Earth orbit until the AM is in
place. This study will assume the use of a PM2 with Hohman transfers for the transfer
from LEO to L1.
Following a lunar mission, a Trailblazer LTV (CM and PMl) will return to L]
from lunar orbit. At L], the mated CM and PM] will dock with a waiting AM. The
LTV’s PM] will then place the vehicle stack on an aerocapture trajectory. Once
atmospheric passage has been completed, the CM/PM] will separate from the AM before
performing a circularization burn. This will allow the used AM (with its perigee still




An entry velocity can be estimated for preliminary design purposes by
approximating an orbit with the correct energy (Carlise, 2002). This can be
accomplished by assuming a perigee that just enters the Earth’s atmosphere, an altitude of
100 km. The apogee is the Earth-Moon L1 point, a distance of roughly 346,069 km.
Using such an orbit, the entry velocity is calculated at an altitude of 125 km. Using a
simple two body orbit formula,
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the entry velocity is determined to be 10.97 km/s. Desautel has provided a means by
 
which an approximate analytical solution can be obtained for perigee conditions (1985).
For a given entry velocity vector, his solution determines a Zeta function
proportional to density divided by m/CDA at perigee as a parametric function of the exit
velocity vector and constant L/D. This Zeta function can then be used to determine
perigee velocity as a parametric function of m/CDA.
It is useful in preliminary design work such as this endeavor to be able to quickly
and simply characterize the perigee Aerotherrnodynarrric regime, based on initial and
final orbits and vehicle properties. However, such a solution is not possible using
classical analytical trajectory solutions.
Previous efforts, such as the Chapman Zeta function (Chapman, 1958) and Loh’s
unified trajectory solution (Loh, 1968) fail, however, to even predict the occurrence of
perigee solutions for entry angles steeper than —2 degrees (Desautel, 1985).
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Based on Vinh’s derivation for exact three-dimensional entry equations of
motion, (1980) Desautel derived the following Zeta function:
1+k7-(L/D)- 1+kr (L/D) v
[ t t_ f f ZP=210g V—f ,  
151:7, 15k7f ,
where k is a weighting factor found to be 0.30 to 0.35. The perigee velocity can then be
solved from:
V 1 1+k7~(L/D)-
1 —” =— ‘ ' 2
0g[ Vi] 2[ 151(71' :I P
This velocity was determined to be 9.35 km/S. Using this perigee velocity and the
 
heat flux engineering correlation for a sphere, a perigee density (to be used to determine
altitude) can be estimated as indicated by Scott, Reid, Maraia, Li, and Derry (1985):
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Using the maximum convective heat flux (calculated later in this paper) and the
9.35km/S perigee velocity, a perigee density of 0.000069 kg/m3 is obtained. Perigee
altitude can then be obtained from the relation given in Griffin and French (1991):
_ ‘11.]
.0 = PSL6( ’6 )2
where pSL is sea level density, H is altitude and [3’1 is atmospheric scale height, resulting
in a perigee altitude of 65.55 km.
Entry Heating
The previously mentioned change in velocity, from 10.97 km/s down to a perigee
velocity of 9.35 km/s (the spacecraft will also lose additional velocity on its way out of
the atmosphere) is accomplished solely through atmospheric braking. This generates a
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tremendous level of heating. A percentage of this heating, dependent on aerodynamic
Shape and surface properties, is transmitted to the surface of the vehicle (Sherman, 1968).
In order for the spacecraft to survive the inferno it creates, the heating environment must
first be properly determined so that an appropriate thermal protection system can be
designed.
Spacecraft heating results from the dissipation of the initial total energy primarily
through two heat-transfer mechanisms: convection and radiation. In convective heating,
the air is heated by passage through a strong bow shock in front of the vehicle and bathes
the vehicle hull in a hot fluid stream. Radiative heating occurs when the air is hot enough
to radiate significant thermal energy as well. Radiative heating is generally most
important at entry speeds greater than 10 km/s, which is the flight regime of lunar transfer
vehicles and other interplanetary Spacecraft. Peak heating most often occurs in
stagnation point regions on the Spacecraft, generally the nose, leading edges, or other
protrusions (Griffin and French, 1991).
Unfortunately, entry heating is an area where much work remains to be done.
Various methods have been proposed to estimate the entry heating environment, but there
is considerable disagreement in their predictions. Further complicating the problem,
there is little flight data. Direct entry has only been conducted seven times (Apollo),
aerobraking only twice (Mars probes), and aerocapture has never been attempted.
Williams and Scott approximately agree with respect to convective heating, but differ
substantially on the radiative heating to be expected from an Apollo-style capsule
experiencing aerocapture (Scott, et al, 1985; Williams, Curry, Bouslog, and Rochelle,
170
1995). Entry heating analyses are considered to be an order—of-magnitude theory, useful
for preliminary design but not for detailed work (Griffin and French, 1991).
Much of the entry heating analysis performed today is conducted using a number
of proprietary computer codes. NASA-JSC utilizes the MINIVER program to calculate
the initial approximation of convective heating rates for LTV entry trajectories. BLIMP
then is used to compute the convective stagnation heating rate and QRAD is used to
calculate the radiative heating. RIFSP is also used in. the case of biconic aeroshells to
calculate radiative heating rates (Williams, Gietzel, et al, 199]). In general, these codes
are not available for external distribution (Curry, June 4, 2002). Consequently, other
methods must be employed in this research to estimate the heating environment.
Convective Heating
Scott, et a1 (1985) utilized a number of trajectory simulations in order to develop a
parametric estimate for the influence of the vehicle’s configuration on heating. Their
work indicates that the peak convective heat flux is most sensitive to m/CDA and is
represented by the following approximation:
m 0467 L —0.242 W V;
' R = 7.3 — — m , where R is the vehicleQmax N [CDA] (D) ( cm2)( ) N
nose radius in cm.
Before using this approximation for the Trailblazer heat Shield, it is important to
test its predictions against existing data. Williams, et al. determined convective and
radiative heating data for three scaled versions of the Apollo command module — 1.0, 1.5,
2.5 scale (Williams, Curry, et al, 1995). In a separate paper, Williams performed the
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same task for three domed cylinders (Williams, Gietzel, et al, 1991). His data can be
compared to Scott’s approximation.
While useful, Scott’s approximation leaves something to be desired. Applied to
the domed cylinders and scaled Apollo capsules, this approximation has an average
percent error of 14.5%, clearly too great an error for preliminary design work.
Table 7-1 shows the heating results obtained by Williams, et. al (both Williams
references) for various aeroshell configurations. Table 7-2 indicates the convective
heating obtained by the approximations of Scott, et. al. for each of the vehicle
configurations prepared by Williams and provides a percent error, assuming Williams’
calculations to be the truth condition.
Clearly, the variation in disagreement with Williams’ data makes it difficult to
attach any confidence to Scott’s parametric estimate. However, a process can be
implemented to better correlate Scott’s function with reality. Scott either over or
underestimates the convective heating, producing a positive or negative delta.
The first step is to take the standard deviation and skew for the six deltas. In this
case, it is 12.58 and 0.626, respectively. If Deltai is equal to the skew, where i indicates
the particular vehicle in question, then the following formula determines the new
convective heating:
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This calculation is performed for each of the six vehicles, thus improving the
results of Scott’s estimate. Iterating this process ten times for all six vehicles reduced the
average percent error to 0.04%. This strategy provides a correction mechanism that can
be applied to convective heating estimates for other vehicles. However, the correction is
only valid for maximum convective heating estimates less than or equal to 81 W/cmz.
The corrected convective heating identified for the LTV aeroshell is 59.97 W/cmz.
Radiative Heating
Between radiative and convective heating, radiative is clearly the less understood.
Scott points out that there is a great deal of uncertainty in evaluating radiative heating,
particularly in the ultraviolet region (Scott, et al, 1985). In addition to the contradictions
in Williams’ and Scott’s methods, Gupta poses an equation of his own but warns that it is
only an approximation to a very complex calculation that itself is in need of experimental
confirmation, and hence should be used with caution (Gupta, Jones, and Rochelle, 1992).
The atmosphere, when subjected to the shock wave of an entry vehicle, becomes an
ionized, chemically reacting gas, not at equilibrium, with significant radiative energy
transfer (Griffin and French, 1991). Radiative heating appears to be negligible for a
vehicle entering at speeds on the order of 6 km/s and below, but at higher velocities it
becomes significant (Williams, Gietzel, et al, 1991). At L1 or lunar return speeds, it
cannot be ignored, and unfortunately, none of these methods appear to be particularly
viable.
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Lacking any reliable algorithm to estimate maximum radiative heating rate, a
correlation was developed, based on the radiative heating values obtained by Williams
for ten aeroshells (Williams, Gietzel, et al, 1991; Williams, Curry, et al, 1995). (This
includes the six previously discussed, plus another four that did not include sufficient
data in their reports to be used in the convective heating correlation.) For each aeroshell,
the ratio of radiative to total heating was calculated and an average was taken of these
ratios. Additionally, the aeroshell closest in configuration and performance to the LTV
aeroshell was also identified. The maximum between the average ratio and the ratio of
the aeroshell most similar to the LTV aeroshell was chosen as the ratio to use for
calculations. This ratio was then used as a multiplier to obtain the LTV radiative heating
estimate, which was determined to be 42.35 W/cmz, thus giving a total maximum heating
rate estimate of 102.32 W/cm2 for the LTV. (In actuality, the radiative and convective
maximums do not occur at the same time, though they are in approximately the same
region of the flight profile. Summing both to obtain a total estimate allows for a
conservative heat shield design.)
7.5 Thermal Protection Systems Overview
The role of the thermal protection system is, of course, to protect the vehicle from
aerodynamic heating by either blocking, absorbing, or radiating the heat. Now that the
heating rate has been estimated, it is possible to select a TPS material for the LTV. There
are several kinds of TPS materials, the two most common of which being ablative and
radiative types. Other TPS systems are heat-sink, transpiration and film cooling, and
convective cooling.
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The primary advantages of radiative systems are that they are passive and
potentially may not require complete refurbishment between flights (Sherman, 1968).
They are nearly independent of the total heat input but are limited by the material service
temperatures. Unless the material is also a sufficient insulator, insulation materials may
also be required beneath the TPS material. The space shuttle uses a variety of radiative
systems for its entry protection.
Equally simple as radiative systems are heat-sink systems. Favorable aspects of
these systems, used on Mercury and Gemini spacecraft, include their simplicity and
reliability. They are relatively simple to analyze and design, and they undergo rises in
temperature without melting, vaporizing, or chemically reacting. On the other hand,
however, the materials are limited by total heat input and material temperature limits.
Thus, their use is confined to low-ballistic coefficient vehicles and to relatively cool areas
of lifting entry bodies where there is a low total heat input (Sherman, 1968).
Transpiration and film cooling systems are those where liquid or gaseous material
is injected into the boundary layer. This reduces surface heat transfer by cooling and
thickening the boundary layer. These systems are anticipated for use on surfaces subject
to extremely high heating rates (Sherman, 1968). This is perhaps the most complex of all
TPS systems and the most difficult to implement.
Convective systems remove heat from the inner surface of the TPS material, as
opposed to (or in concert with) all other systems, which remove heat from the outer
surface. This process is accomplished through the internal circulation of a fluid that
absorbs heat through temperature rise and often through a phase change as well. If the
fluid is a gas, it is dumped overboard. In the case of a multiple-fluid system, the
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“primary” fluid(s) are recirculated and the “secondary” fluid(s) are vaporized and
dumped overboard (Sherman, 1968).
The most prevalent thermal protection systems in actual use are ablative systems.
In general, ablative systems combine the performance of a radiative heat shield with the
heat blockage of a transpiration or film cooling system, absorbing heat energy in various
phase-change processes. They are categorized as subliming, oxidizing, melting-
vaporizing, or charring. Subliming ablators decompose directly from solid to gas. The
material absorbs energy until the surface reaches the sublimation temperature, which is a
function of local pressure. Energy is absorbed in the sublimation process and heat flux is
reduced by the transpiration effect of the evolving gases. Oxidizing ablators are similar
to subliming ablators, but they undergo oxidation during the process of sublimation,
which provides an additional heat transfer path. Melting-vaporizing ablators melt at high
heating rates, absorbing heat, and then vaporize, absorbing additional heat and providing
transpiration heat blockage. However, if the surface shear or pressure gradient is large,
the liquid layer may be removed before it vaporizes, reducing the ablative effectiveness.
Charring ablator effectiveness is generally proportional to density, while its insulation
effectiveness is inversely proportional to density. Consequently, to reduce density
without sacrificing effectiveness, microballoons are often added. The microballoons are
hollow spheres roughly 40 microns in diameter, often made of phenolic resins or glasss
with a wall thickness of 1 to 2 microns. Because of the numerous energy-absorbing
mechanisms employed in ablative thermal protection systems, it is difficult for theoretical
models to precisely predict ablator performance (Sherman, 1968).
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7.6 TPS Material Selection
The leading candidates for an LTV TPS are ablative and radiative systems.
Ablative systems are generally more capable of withstanding the intense heating
environment associated with planetary capture. However, they are non-reusable, a
significant liability in any lunar transfer architecture. An analysis of available TPS
materials in the context of the previously discussed entry environment will reveal suitable
candidates.





This temperature and the maximum heating rate typically determine the material
selected for the TPS. In the case of the LTV, a maximum surface temperature of 1812°C
will be experienced at the maximum heating rate of 102.32 W/cmz. These two
parameters are so intense that they eliminate most TPS materials currently in use. Shuttle
tile, for instance, is limited to a maximum heating rate of 45 W/cm2 and a maximum
temperature of 1470°C (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
It should be noted that the entire surface is not exposed to this heating rate.
Consequently, it would be wasteful to design an entire aeroshell to these specifications.
Programs such as MINIVER, BLIMP, and QRAD are used to determine the heating
profile across the vehicle. Individual TPS material selections are made for regions of the
vehicle surface. Generally, the maximum heating and temperature profiles apply to the
vehicle leading edges, lower surface, and nose region.
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Precluding the use of shuttle-era TPS materials, the intense temperatures and
heating rates of lunar return have plagued many lunar studies, forcing designers either to
revert to the considerably heavier Apollo-era ablators or to assume the development of a
new class of materials. The studies conducted by Williams, mentioned earlier in the
Convective Heating section of this paper, utilized both techniques. Apollo ablators were
used in the scaled-Apollo studies (Williams, Curry, et al, 1995), while the domed
cylinders discussed (Williams, Geitzel, 1991) assume development of new TPS materials.
The LTV requires an aeroshell that will accommodate a vehicle measuring
roughly 16.2 meters in length, 4.4 meters in width, and 3.2 meters in height. Since one of
the domed cylinders investigated by Williams is on this same order of scale, that type of
structure is of particular interest in the development of the LTV. Williams’ 57-degree
angle of attack domed cylinder measures 19.8 meters in length, with a diameter of 8.53
meters (Williams, Geitzel, 1991). Since this model is clearly larger than the one required
for the LTV, it is more than adequate in size to accommodate the LTV. Accordingly, an
investigation regarding the compatibility of this model with the LTV design holds a great
deal of merit.
Unfortunately, some of the TPS materials used in Williams’ study do not exist as
flight certified materials. In the early nineties, Lockheed proposed developmental
activities for new ceramic TPS materials with higher temperature capabilities than those
used for the shuttle (Curry, June 6, 2002). This effort was not funded and the materials
were never developed. At the time, however, it appeared that these and other materials
would be forthcoming and several proposed materials were used in design studies.
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In Williams’ study, Rigid Fibrous Ceramic (RFC) and HTP-6 are two such
materials. Williams acknowledged that the materials were not flight certified, but
indicated that it seemed reasonable that the materials would be developed within the next
ten years (Williams, Geitzel, 1991). Unfortunately, it has been slightly more than ten
years and there are no such materials.
RFC was intended to be a high performance version of FRCI-12. The assumption
was that a new material, perhaps zirconium based, would be developed to have a similar
density and therrnophysical properties as FRCI—12, but be capable of operation at
temperatures between 1483°C and 1927°C (Williams, Geitzel, 1991). HTP-6 was also an
advanced ceramic material, with a density of 96.1 kg/m3.
Of the two, RFC presents the more critical problem as it is the material intended
to protect the surfaces exposed to the most severe heating environments. Without some
currently existing thermal protection material to take the place of RFC, there can be no
human lunar missions in the near future. Several materials, however, do fall within the
performance range required and could be considered as replacements for RFC.
Avco 5026-39 was the ablator used for the Apollo Command Module. It is
currently the only TPS material that has been used to protect humans from temperature
extremes associated with planetary capture or entry. It has a density of 512 kg/m3 and a
thermal conductivity of 1.3759 (TPSX, 2002). It has no significant manufacturing limits,
but its high density and thermal conductivity would result in a very heavy vehicle, most
likely too massive for currently available propulsion options.
A slightly better perfomer, Phenolic Nylon has a density of 1201 kg/m3 and a
thermal conductivity of 0.1904 (Williams and Curry, 1992). Despite it’s being a much
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denser material, the thermal conductivity is significantly lower. Both the density and
thermal conductivity, however, are still too high to provide a usable solution.
Acusil I is the thermal protection material on the forward heatshield of the
METEOR recovery capsule for space microgravity experiments. It is a moderate-density,
filled silicone syntactic foam in a phenolic-fiberglass honeycomb. Acusil I has a density
of 480 kg/m3 and a thermal conductivity of 0.11. It has excellent ablation and insulation
performance, exhibiting no surface recession for convective heat fluxes up to 140 W/mz.
It also has the advantage of an Apollo-proven honeycomb design that allows applications
in high shear and/or pressure gradient environments (TPSX, 2002).
SLA-561V has been used on Viking, Mars Trailblazer, Mars 98, Stardust, and is
slated for use on Mars 2003. It has a density of 264 kg/m3 and a thermal conductivity of
0.0592. It experiences no recession at heat fluxes below 70 W/cmz. Between 70 to 170
W/cmz, there is surface recession and melt. Above 170 W/cmz, there is surface melt and
rapid vaporization. It is also limited by a stagnation pressure limit of 0.25 atm. Above
this pressure, the material exhibits spalling due to the high shear loads. It additionally,
and perhaps more critically for this vehicle, is limited by a manufacturing thickness limit
of 2.11 cm (Szalai, 2002).
Silicone Irnpregnated Reusable Ablator (SIRCA) is perhaps the most capable of
the new TPS materials developed at NASA-Ames. It was used on the back of the Mars
Pathfinder, the forebody of the Deep Space H probes, and is currently selected to be used
on the back of Mars 2003 (Szalai, 2002). SIRCA 15F has a density of 240 kg/m3 and a
thermal conductivity of 0.059 (TPSX, 2002). SIRCA is somewhat of a blend between
radiative and ablative TPS materials. It is composed of an ablative silicone infiltrated
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into a ceramic (shuttle tile) substrate (Szalai, 2002). SIRCA typically does not recede at
heat fluxes less than 150 W/cmz. A conversion process creates a thin, strong char layer
that re-radiates most of the heat away from the material surface (Szalai, 2002). As a
result, under certain conditions, SIRCA is reusable. It is made in billets measuring
roughly 13” x 13” x 5” and machined to the desired tile shape.
While the nonexistent HTP-6 is a lower temperature material and does not present
the same level of urgency as RFC, it still must be replaced if the Williams domed
cylinder is to be incorporated into the LTV. While virtually any existing TPS material of
equal or superior thermophysical performance to HTP-6 could be used, it is best to
consider the one that will produce the lowest mass impact. Three TPS materials in
particular, AETB-12, FRCI-12, and LI-2200, offer similar performance to HTP-6.
AETB-l2 is a relatively low density, low thermal conductivity TPS material. It
was flown on the shuttle as an experimental material on the top of the body flap. It has a
density of 192 kg/m3 and a thermal conductivity of 0.06 (TPSX, 2002). FRCI-12 is a
relatively low density, low thermal conductivity TPS material that is substantially
stronger than LI-900 and equivalent in strength to LI-2200 at a lower density. It has been
flying on the shuttle since its adoption shortly after the shuttle Challenger was built. It
has a density of 192 kg/m3 and a thermal conductivity of 0.08 (TPSX, 2002). LI-2200 is
a relatively high density, high thermal conductivity TPS material. It is currently flying on
all orbiters, but to a very limited extent due to its weight. It has a density of 352 kg/m3
and a thermal conductivity of 0.23 (TPSX, 2002).
Having surveyed candidate materials to replace RFC and HTP-6, it is now
possible to select replacements. Offering slightly better material properties than SLA-
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561V and significantly better material properties than any of the other ablators, SIRCA
15F is the ideal selection to replace RFC for the LTV AM TPS. Similarly, AETB—12 is
the best candidate to replace HTP-6. Interestingly enough, SIRCA 15F and AETB-12
provide better performance than RFC and HTP-6, suggesting that the LTV aeroshell may
require slightly less TPS material than assumed in the Williams aeroshell.
7.7 TPS Sizing
Once TPS materials have been identified, the next step is to size those materials.
The surface area has already been constrained by the decision to use Williams’ domed
cylinder. The thickness, however, must now be determined.
The peak surface heat rate is used to pick the material type; then the heat load is
used to determine the TPS thickness (Kowal, 2002). The thickness of any TPS material
is driven by heat soak from the surface down to the sub-structure (i.e. the vehicle frame).
A higher heat load generally implies thicker TPS (Cerimele, July 2002). All of the
energy absorbed by the vehicle during atmospheric passage must be either rejected or
stored by the TPS (Squire, 2002). The temperature limits of the vehicle frame or the
binding agent (between the TPS material and the frame) limit how much heat is allowed
to soak through and be stored by the vehicle interior (Cerimele, July 2002). The peak
temperatures for the TPS adhesive and vehicle structure determine the maximum
temperature at the TPS inner surface. The peak surface heat rate determines the
maximum temperature at the TPS outer surface. Finally, using the heat load and these
two temperatures, the thickness is varied until these limits are not violated (Kowal, 2002).
As an approximation, a simple steady-state, one-dimension heat conduction equation is
used (Larson and Wertz, 1992):
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q =(%XT1 —T2), where (jis the total heat transfer rate in watts, k is the
2
9
thermal conductivity, A is the cross-sectional area normal to the heat transfer area in m
Ax is the material thickness in meters, and T1 and T2 are the temperatures at the material
inner and outer surfaces in degrees Kelvin.
This equation is used to determine the heat shield thickness for the SIRCA 15F
portion of the aeroshell. T2 is constrained to be 450.15 K by material limitations of the
vehicle structure. T1 is the surface temperature Tw and is thus determined by the heat
rate. A is the surface area of the’vehicle to be covered with SIRCA 15F and k is the
thermal conductivity for SIRCA 15F. Using the maximum heat transfer rate as the worst-
case scenario and solving for Ax, a material thickness of 2.10 cm is obtained.
Because 4 and T1 for the sections of the domed cylinder shielded by HTP-6 are
not reported in Williams’ study and cannot be estimated with available parametric
equations, an alternate method will estimate the thickness for AETB-12. Assuming that
AETB-12 will protect from roughly the same heat profile that HTP-6 was intended to
shield, the heat conduction equation can be set equal to itself for both HTP-6 and
AETB-12.
k _ A . k _ A
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Canceling equal terms gives:
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The'mass is then determined by multiplying this thickness by the surface area
previously occupied by HTP—6 and the density of AETB-12. Given an HTP-6 thickness
of 2.45 cm, this results in an AETB-12 thickness of 0.73 cm and a mass of 20.11 kg.
Finally, because the LTV flight profile is relatively similar to that in Williams’
study, the sections of the domed cylinder containing LI-900 and FRSI will be assumed to
experience the same heating predicted by Williams and will thus require no changes to
their configuration. The parameters of 227.36 kg for LI-900 and 191.55 kg for FRSI will
mmmn
7.8 TPS Structure
Beneath the TPS material, a structure is required to absorb the loads generated by
aerodynamic forces. The structural configuration used by Williams — and also assumed
for the Aeroshell Module — is a lightweight honeycomb composite consisting of graphite
epoxy face sheets with a NOMEX paper honeycomb core. The face sheets are 0.4064
mm thick and they sandwich a 3.81cm honeycomb core. The structure has a maximum
use temperature of 177°C and a 1.4 factor of safety (Williams, Gietzel, et al 1991).
The structural weight (consisting of the aeroshell and rings, stringers and
stiffeners) is often a significant percentage of the total vehicle mass and is generally
heavier than the TPS material itself. Williams describes a parametric relationship
between the total vehicle weight, structural weight, and TPS weight, termed TPS penalty








firs = ”T + 775
In Williams’ study, his 57—degree angle of attack domed cylinder obtained a m of
6 and a 113 of 9, resulting in a TPS mass of 1790 kg and a structural mass of 2685 kg
(Williams, Gietzel, et al 1991). As was seen in the previous section, the Aeroshell
Module has a slightly lighter TPS, resulting in an Aeroshell Module m of 5.2. This
decreased mass should translate into a lower required mass for the vehicle structure.
However, as a conservative estimate, the Williams 115 of 9 will be retained, resulting in an
overall ms of 14.2 and a structural mass of 2685 kg for the Aeroshell Module.
7.9 Systems Sizing and Mass Properties
Like all of the other components of the Trailblazer LTV, the Aeroshell Module
must function on its own as a complete spacecraft during some portions of its mission.
Consequently, it cannot simply be TPS material, adhesive, and structure, but must contain
a full suite of spacecraft systems. Ensuring commonality across the LTV, where possible
the AM will use systems also employed aboard the X-38 CM and PM].
Avionics
The AM avionics will ensure that the vehicle will be capable of proper guidance,
navigation and control in LEO, en route to L1, and at Ll. Two flight computers will
provide redundant computational capabilities for the module. Autonomous attitude
determination will be attained with two star trackers. A single GPS unit will provide
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state vector information while the AM is in LEO. In the event of a failure, ground
tracking can still uplink state vectors that can be propagated by the onboard software.
Four GPS antennas will allow the GPS system to also perform attitude determination,
thus providing a backup system to the star trackers, as well as a means to use star tracker
data to verify GPS performance. Six laser rangefinders will be used in conjunction with
the docking systems. Video cameras on the AM exterior and interior surfaces, along with
lighting on the AM interior, will provide video feeds to the Crew Module, allowing crew
to look outside the CM when docked to the CM. Miniature cameras can provide
acceptable video quality with minimal power requirements. A combination of low
wattage lights and reflected sunlight can illuminate the AM interior.
Communications
The communications system is responsible for providing telemetry between the
AM and Mission Control at distances ranging from LEO to L1. It will also communicate
with the LTV, which can be in LLO, or at any point between LLO and L1. It is also
responsible for taking over for the PMI communications system when the LTV is inside
the AM. As such, it must support the PMl’s communications data rate of 12 Mbps. The
most demanding communications link will be that between the AM and Earth, when the
AM is at Ll, roughly 346,000 km. To meet this requirement, the AM will be equipped
with two 0.779-meter antennas and two redundant transmitters. The antennas will deploy
from the aft end of the aeroshell, positioned on opposite sides of the opening such that a
communications line of sight can be maintained regardless of vehicle orientation.
Propulsion
Similar to the other LTV modules, the AM uses sixteen R4-D engines (R-4D,
2002) for its reaction control system and L1 capture. All engines are hypergolic, using
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monomethyl hydrazine for the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide for the oxidizer. The AM
carries 1422 kg of fuel and its tanks mass approximately 176 kg. RCS thruster engine
numbering is shown in table 7-3 and figure 7-2. Unlike other LTV spacecraft, the AM
does not have a main engine — its RCS thrusters provide L1 capture. It is capable of
performing any roll, pitch, or yaw rotation and any X-axis translation with a two—engine
burn. It will not nominally perform Y or Z-axis translations. Roll, pitch, yaw, and +X
translation are redundant for any single engine and certain two-engine failures with no
loss in performance and no increase in fuel expenditure. In the case of other failures, or a
need to perform a Y or Z-axis translation, other rotation and translation maneuvers can be
accomplished with a combination of maneuvers in remaining axes. The AM also has
“Fast” and “Entry” maneuver modes. The Fast mode utilizes three or four-engine burns
to shorten burn times in circumstances where it is desirable to maneuver faster than in the
nominal case. The Entry mode uses two or three-engine burns to maximize vehicle
maneuverability during entry. Table 7-4 shows RCS thruster selection for each single
axis maneuver.
Cylinder approximations were used to estimate the AM moments of inertia, such
that 1xx = MR2, 1W = IZZ = MR2/2 + ML2/12. When the CM and PMl are docked to the
AM, the vehicle moment of inertia is the sum of the AM, CM, and PMl moments of
inertia. The AM-only moments of inertia are Ixx = 149219, Iyy = 122 = 342880 and the
docked moments of inertia are Ixx = 274052, Iyy = 499278, and 122 = 588258.
Depending on thruster location, AM thrusters have moment arms of 9.9 or 4.3
meters and torques of 9707 and 4180 Nm respectively. The AM is designed to maintain
a deadband of 10 degrees in roll, pitch, and yaw. Its maximum allowed angular velocities
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are 0.015 degrees per second in roll, 0.009 degrees per second in pitch, and 0.016 degrees
per second in yaw.
There are no fuel requirements for dockings and separations due to the use of the
magnetic docking system described in the next section. Daily attitude control, L1
stationkeeping, and L1 capture fuel mass requirements are sized in the same manner as
for other LTV spacecraft. Aerocapture fuel requirements are sized assuming continuous
thrusting throughout the 500-second atmospheric passage and assuming a seven-engine
burn, indicating thrusting in all three axes. The AM has a total fuel requirement of 1422
kg, of which 466 kg is MMH and 956 kg is N204. The AM does not refuel during the
course of a lunar expedition.
Propellant tanks are sized in the same manner as for other LTV spacecraft. The
AM uses four MMH tanks and four N204 tanks, with each set positioned next to one of
the engine clusters. Each MMH tank masses 14 kg and each N204 tank masses 30 kg.
Docking
In order to dock to the Aeroshell Module, the LTV CM/PMl stack must enter the
module and secure itself to two Androgynous Peripheral Assembling System docking
mounts. To avoid propulsive firings inside the AM, a somewhat modified version of the
Magnetic Docking Aid System (Schneider, Nagy, Schliesing, 1996) used across the LTV
modules will be employed.
The AM will be equipped with two passive APAS docking mechanisms, one
located on its upper forward interior to mate with the CM’s dorsal active APAS and one
located on the lower aft interior to mate with PMl’s ventral active APAS. Each AM
APAS will be augmented with MDAS steel plates in order to receive electromagnets
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from the MDAS systems onboard each LTV module. Each APAS requires 116 W of
power during the docking phase (Patrick, 2002).
In addition to this standard MDAS configuration, a magnetic guide system (MGS)
will be employed to position the LTV inside the AM. This MGS will consist of two
guide rings mounted on a cable/winch system running along the interior wall of the LTV.
The forward ring will be capable of traversing the distance between the forward and aft
APAS mechanisms. The aft ring will traverse the distance between the aft APAS and the
aft of the AM. Each ring will be capable of 360-degree-roll rotation. Each will also be
equipped with three MDAS-derived extendible booms with an electromagnet and a laser
rangefinder on each boom. Each electromagnet will be capable of exerting a 2025N
holding force (Dura Magnetics, 2002).
Figures 7-3 to 7-6 Show a graphical sequence of the LTV docking with the AM.
The “star” symbols on the LTV represent the locations of steel plates that the AM
electromagnets will capture. Figure 7-3 shows the LTV at close approach to the AM. At
this point, final thrust burns from the LTV and AM RCS systems will neutralize any
angular rates between the two vehicles and establish a slow rate of closure.
Figure 7-4 shows the LTV after it has begun to enter the AM. At this point, the
two guide rings have captured the LTV and are slowly drawing the LTV into the AM.
The rings will also rotate the LTV to correct any roll error, while the extendible booms
on the rings will correct any pitch or yaw errors.
Figure 7-5 shows the AM and LTV after the guide rings have nearly completed
positioning the LTV within the AM. At this point, it can be seen that the APAS docking
mounts of both the CM and PM] are about in line with the AM’s APAS docking mounts.
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The laser rangefinders on the LTV will begin to communicate any small position errors,
which will be nullified by the extendible booms on the MGS.
Figure 7-6 shows the final docked configuration. Having completed their task,
the guide ring electromagnets and extendible booms are deactivated. As the final step,
the MDAS electromagnets and extendible booms on the LTV will activate, nullifying any
remaining position errors and attaching themselves to the steel plates on the AM’s
passive APAS docking ports. The APAS ports will then secure themselves to each other
and the docking clamps will secure. It should be noted that the APAS docking mounts
are attached to variable height platforms that will adjust as needed in order for the
docking mounts to be able to complete their attachment.
Power
As is the case with the other LTV modules, triple junction solar arrays and lithium
polymer electrolyte batteries will supply power. A single 13 square meter array will
provide 1.97 kW of power and will mass roughly 22 kg. The array drive mechanism
masses 4 kg. Batteries to power the vehicle during 36-minute eclipses in LEO will mass
roughly 3 kg. The batteries will only rarely be needed after the LTV departs for L1, but
may be needed on occasion, during periods where the Earth or moon eclipses the sun.
The array will be mounted on a mast that deploys from the aft of the vehicle to track the
sun’s position. Sun sensors on the array drive system will orient the array with respect to
the sun.
Because the Aeroshell Module will contain the LTV inside it during the three-day
flight from L1 to atmospheric interface, the LTV’s solar arrays will be useless during this
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period. Consequently, the AM will contain a disposable solar array measuring 57 m2 and
massing 67 kg to provide power.
The array will be jettisoned at atmospheric entry and will burn up in the Earth’s
atmosphere. The AM’s primary array is not disposed along with this array because it is
needed after aerocapture to power AM systems in preparation for its disposal maneuver.
It instead retracts inside the AM prior to atmospheric entry and redeploys following LTV
departure.
Thermal
Like the power system, the AM thermal system consists of a primary active
thermal control system to handle AM thermal control and a supplemental radiator wing to
shed excess heat generated by the LTV during the inbound flight from L1 to the onset of
aerocapture. Because the AM is not reused, the thermal system does not attempt to
control the heat soak resulting from atmospheric passage.
A simple, fully redundant TCS flow loop consisting of cold plates, heat pipes,
pump and radiator — similar in configuration to those on other LTV modules — will be
used on the Aerocapture Module. The system will draw roughly 45 W and will
accommodate a 1.97 kW heat rejection requirement. The most demanding flight phase in
terms of radiator size is LEO, where a heat rejection of 104 W/m2 combined with a
slightly higher power load (due to avionics used only in LEO) will result in a radiator size
of 9.45 m2, assuming two-sided radiators.
The supplemental radiator wing, measuring 16.94 m2, will deploy from the ventral
aft of the AM while the primary radiator wing will deploy from the dorsal aft. Both
wings can be tracked to ensure that radiator surfaces are always parallel to incoming solar
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radiation. The primary wing will be stowed prior to atmospheric passage, while the
supplemental wing will be severed and discarded shortly before the vehicle enters Earth’s
atmosphere.
Ballast
As previously stated, the Williams 57-degree angle of attack aeroshell (Williams,
Gietzel, 1991) will be used as the baseline for the LTV Aeroshell Module. However, in
order to take advantage of the relevant portions of thermal analysis data, the AM must
perform aerocapture with exactly the same mass that Williams used. Because of changes
made to satisfy LTV criteria, the mass is not the same. Fortunately, the LTV AM is
lighter and the difference can be made up with ballast. This mass delta also provides a
measure of margin if some mass estimates should prove to be too small.
At present, there is approximately a 352 kg difference between the LTV AM and
the Williams domed cylinder. Options for the use of this potential cargo capability
include reserve fuel (for post-aerocapture maneuvering) and/or batteries, heat sinks, or
additional TPS material, thus giving the AM capabilities beyond its design trajectory.
However, because design uncertainties may easily cause this delta to fluctuate, or even
vanish altogether, no conceptual design elements for the LTV will assume use of this
mass capability.
Mass Properties
AM Systems Mass Summary
Table 7-5 provides a summary of the Aeroshell Module’s systems and their
masses. A small growth margin is included to account for any growth in vehicle systems.
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Total Vehicle Mass Summaries
Vehicle masses vary significantly at various points along the AM’s flight profile
because elements are added to, or removed from, the module. The AM has essentially
five mass configurations.
The first configuration encompasses the flight regimes of Earth launch, LEO, and
outbound flight to L]. At this point the vehicle masses 9,025 kg, consisting of the
structure, TPS, spacecraft systems, LTV support systems (thermal and power), and all
propellant.
In the second configuration, L], the vehicle has dropped 813 kg of propellant in
the L1 arrival maneuver and is down to a mass of 8,193 kg. At L1, it will lose anywhere
from negligible amounts of propellant up to a maximum estimate of 32 kg, depending on
how long it remains at L] and how close to the actual L] point the AM can hold its
position.
In its inbound configuration (returning to Earth from L1), the vehicle sees a
massive jump in mass to 36,821 kg and falls to 30,607 kg, because it is carrying the LTV,
consisting of the CM and PM]. The mass delta is due to the propellant expended by PM]
in the departure burn from L].
For aerocapture, the mass drops to 29,837 kg as the AM discards the LTV support
solar array and radiator in order to meet the mass specifications of the Williams
(Williams, Gietzel, 1991) study. The vehicle will maintain this mass throughout the
aerocapture maneuver.
In its final configuration, post-aerocapture, the vehicle masses 7,391 kg, having
separated from the LTV. Other than minor deltas due to RCS thruster firings, it will
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maintain this mass until it breaks apart and is destroyed in the Earth’s atmosphere during
its second atmospheric pass.
7.10 Aeroshell Deployment
Earth Launch
The Aeroshell Module will be lifted from the Earth’s surface by expendable
launch vehicles only. A potential complication is due to the fact that the aeroshell
diameter is roughly 2.5 times larger than the maximum payload shroud diameter for any
launch vehicle in the Atlas and Delta launch vehicle families (Delta III, Delta IV Payload
Planners Guides, 200; Atlas Launch System Mission Planner’s Guide, 2001, Atlas
Launch System Mission Planner’s Guide Atlas V Addendum, 1999). In terms of mass,
the Delta III, Delta IV Heavy, Atlas HI, and Atlas V Heavy can all lift the Aeroshell
Module to its target orbit of 407 km. However, this increased diameter will have adverse
performance impacts on any vehicle attempting to lift the module into orbit, due to
increased drag associated with the greater diameter. Because the module is near the
performance limits of the Atlas III and Delta III, it would be a conservative assumption to
assume those boosters will be unable to place the module in orbit. However, even with
degraded performance due to increased drag, the Delta IV and Atlas V should have no
problem lifting the Aeroshell Module into LEO. Consequently, the baseline assumption
will be the use of Delta IV and Atlas V vehicles to place Aeroshell Modules in LEO.
Trans L1 Injection
LEO is not the destination for the Aeroshell Module. It will spend the majority of
its time at L], where it will await its intended LTV. The AM will be boosted from LEO
to L] by a PM2. A second Delta IV or Atlas V ELV will place the PM2 into LEO, where
it can then dock with the AM. The docking will use an MDAS-augmented APAS
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docking mount on PM2’s forward ventral surface to dock with the AM’s aft APAS. The
AM’s aft Guide Ring will be used to position PM2 for this docking (Altemately,
depending on final masses and the impact of drag on Atlas performance, it may be
possible for the AM’s PM2 to be launched already mated to the AM on an Atlas V 500
with five strap on boosters. This will be discussed further in chapter eleven, as cost
drivers are critical for making the final selection). The PM2-AM stack will then depart
LEO. The AM will separate from PM2 upon Centaur burnout and continue to L1 alone.
L1 Stationkeeping
The AM will propulsively capture into position at L] (requiring roughly 752 kg of
propellant). The craft will then hold its position at Ll, awaiting a CM/PM] stack needing
its services for the return leg from L1 to LEO following a lunar mission. The AM will be
able to stationkeep at L] for up to a year. As indicated in Chapter 3, stationkeeping at L1
is not a particularly fuel-intensive maneuver and can be conducted for extended periods
of time with only minor fuel expenditures. A Lissajous orbit with a 2840.6 km radius
will be used as a worst-case baseline. This is clearly much greater than any desirable
orbital radius. Such an orbit requires a delta-v of only 36.104 m/s per year to maintain.
This translates to roughly 15 kg of propellant every six months, a virtually negligible
amount.
Aeroshell Module Redundancy
Due to the criticality of the Aeroshell Module, a minimum of two operational
AMs must be present at Ll before a CM can be cleared to depart LEO for a lunar
mission. In the event that any failure renders the primary module unusable, the second
module will serve as a backup (This backup module will become the primary module for
the next lunar mission if it is not used during the current mission). Each module is sized
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to spend up to a year at Ll, assuming worst-case stationkeeping Av requirements, so there
is considerable flexibility in leaving modules in position as backups.
Aeroshell Module Disposal
The Aeroshell Module is not reusable and is discarded following each lunar
mission. Upon exiting the atmosphere (following an aerocapture maneuver), the LTV
will exit the AM. After reaching an acceptable separation distance, PM] will fire its
engines to place the LTV in a circular orbit. The AM, however, will still be in an
elliptical orbit with a perigee inside the atmosphere. It will be destroyed during its
second atmospheric pass by rotating to expose its open aft section to the velocity vector,
resulting in the vehicle breaking apart and burning up in the atmosphere.
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Chapter Eight — Fuel Tanker
8.1 Overview
Like all of the other components of the Trailblazer LTV, the Fuel Tanker must
function on its own as a complete spacecraft. Ensuring commonality across the LTV,
where possible the FT will use systems also employed aboard other Trailblazer
spacecraft. In many aspects, the FT is simply a tanker version of PM].
8.2 Fuel Tanker Missions
Without a steady supply of fuel, the LTV can go nowhere. The Fuel Tanker,
shown in figure 8-1, is the primary logistical link in the Trailblazer LTV concept and it
represents a key technology development area for the Trailblazer program. Currently,
only Russia is capable of orbital spacecraft refueling, using their Progress spacecraft.
While the United States did successfully conduct an orbital refueling system flight
demonstration experiment aboard the space shuttle Challenger in 1984, it does not have
an operational capability (MICREX, 2002). Approximately six FTs will be used during
each lunar expedition for five refueling missions.
Low Lunar Orbit Refuel Mission 1 (FT-M1)
The first refueling mission of every lunar expedition involves the ADV, which
will be in a polar low lunar orbit. Depending on the expedition number, one or two FTs
will also be sent to lunar orbit to fuel the ADV, giving it enough fuel to land and then
return to orbit following a surface mission. Technically, the ADV requires the capacity
of 1.64 FTs. Consequently, for expeditions with multiple FTs sent to refuel the ADV, the
second FT (FT-Mlb) will remain in lunar orbit and will provide fuel for the next lunar
expedition. Assuming the planned eight Trailblazer mission, a total of 14 FTs are
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required for ADV fueling. This mission must be successfully completed before there is
any point in attempting the remainder of flights involved in a lunar expedition.
LE0 Refuel Mission (FT-M2)
For the next refueling step in support of a lunar expedition, the FT will be called
upon to fuel the Crew Module and Propulsion Module 1 in LEO. The two modules will
be in the docked LTV configuration at an altitude of 407 km and a 28.5-degree
inclination. A single FT is required for this purpose. The same shuttle that delivers the
Trailblazer crew to the CM later recovers the FT. The FT is serviced and re-launched for
subsequent missions.
Outbound L1 Refuel Mission (FT-M3)
CM and PM] will travel separately to L1 and both will exhaust their propellant
tanks capturing themselves at Ll. CM will not be refueled at this point. PM], however,
will require fuel. A pre-deployed FT will provide PM] with enough fuel to move itself
and CM from L1 to lunar orbit. Lacking any ability to return the FT to Earth for
servicing, the FT is discarded following this mission by directing it into a path that will
eventually impact the lunar surface.
Low Lunar Orbit Refuel Mission 2 (FT-M4)
Having exhausted its fuel again by capturing it and the CM into lunar orbit, PM]
will again require fuel. The FT will provide it with enough fuel to travel from lunar orbit
back to L1. Lacking any ability to return the FT to Earth for servicing, the FT is
discarded following this mission by impacting it into the lunar surface.
Inbound L1 Refuel Mission (FT-M5)
Another pre-deployed FT will rendezvous with the lunar transfer vehicle at Ll
during the LTV’s inbound trajectory, docking to PM] prior to the LTV’s docking with
the Aeroshell Module. The FT will provide PM] with sufficient fuel to push the
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CM/PMI/AM stack from L1 into an aerocapture trajectory, as well as the fuel PM] will
need to circularize the orbit for the CM/PM] stack following atmospheric passage. It
will also fuel the CM, providing it the fuel it may need for a contingency deorbit burn.
Lacking any ability to return the FT to Earth for servicing, the FT is discarded following
this mission by directing it into a path that will eventually impact the lunar surface.
8.3 Avionics
Like most of the Trailblazer LTV spacecraft, the FT uses the SIGI GPS. Two
units are installed onboard each FT. Beyond LEO, the INS portion of the SIGI is used
for inertial measurement. The FT also carries two star sensors, two horizon sensors, six
sun sensors, and three laser rangefinders (on the FT’s single docking port). The
autonomous navigation system used across LTV spacecraft will also be utilized on the
ADV, integrating sensor data from the ADV’s various sensors. Three flight computers
are carried onboard the ADV to house the flight software. As is the case with other LTV
flight computers, each computer will contain multiple copies of all flight software and
will utilize a wireless network.
8.4 Docking
The FT is equipped with a single docking port mounted on the front of the
vehicle. The port uses an active-passive MDAS-augmented APAS mount. It is equipped
for fuel, thermal fluid, and power transfer to vehicles it docks with.
The FT is designed to be capable of docking with the CM, PM], ADV, PM2, and
another FT. The MDAS is passive for docking with CM, PM], and ADV. It is active for
dockings with PM2. When two FTs dock, one vehicle will be active and the other will be
passive. The FT is not designed to dock with the AM.
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In an emergency situation, however, a FT can serve the CM as a surrogate PM],
propelling the CM between LLO and L]. In such a case, the AM will capture the CM as
normal, but the FT will separate before the AM draws the CM inside. After aerocapture,
the CM can either use its APS engine to circularize its orbit or it can go ahead and
perform an entry and landing.
8.5 Thermal
An active TCS will be used on the FT to reject waste heat. The maximum
thermal load for the FT is equivalent to the vehicle maximum power level, which will be
shown later in this chapter to be 1.25 kW. The FT TCS is virtually identical to the PM]
and ADV configurations. Like PM], the FT does not have a cabin, making cabin air heat
exchangers unusable. Consequently, a combination of cold plates and heat pipes are
used. Plumbing and valves, instruments and controls, fluids, and a two-sided radiator
complete the TCS and are sized in the same way as their counterparts on other LTV
spacecraft. The total TCS mass, including radiators, is 140 kg and the system requires 29
W. The radiator is divided into two rectangular radiator wings, each measuring 1.86 m in
width, 2.72 m in length, and 0.06 m in thickness. The radiators are mounted on the
underside of the solar array wings, perpendicular to the array surface, such that the
radiators are always in the shade when the solar arrays are tracking the sun.
8.6 Communications
The FT communications system is identical to the system used on the ADV,
which is virtually the same as the PM] communications system. It is sized to
communicate from lunar orbit to FTDRSS. The FT uses the same size and mass U-band
antennas used on PM] and the ADV. It will also use an identical transmitter, operating at
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the same power levels. In all aspects, component for component, the FT and ADV
communications systems are identical.
8.7 Propulsion
The FT propulsion system is composed of the Main Propulsion System (MPS)
and the Attitude Control System (ACS). The MPS consists of a single RS-72 engine and
the ACS consists of sixteen R-4D engines. Axis conventions are the same as for the
ADV and other LTV spacecraft.
MPS Configuration
The MPS engine will be gimbaled, just like the PM] and ADV engines, allowing
for thrust vector control during burns. The gimbal mass is estimated using the same
parametric used with the other spacecraft. The single engine is mounted directly along
the FT center of mass.
MPS Performance
The MPS is generally used for a single burn to capture into its destination,
whether LLO or L1. The MPS is not fired during missions to LEO. However, LEO FTs
are recovered by the shuttle and returned to Earth for servicing. They are launched again
on missions beyond LEO where the MPS is used. Table 8-1 details Delta-v, vehicle
mass, fuel mass, MMH mass, N204 mass, and burn time for each FT mission. It should
be noted that the fuel mass is the fuel consumed in the burn, not the entire fuel load.
ACS Configuration
ACS engine configuration is identical to that for PM], with engines mounted in
four clusters of four engines on the top, bottom and sides of the FT, at the vehicle center
of mass. Each cluster is configured in a “+” shape, much like the Apollo Service Module
20]
thruster configuration. On the side clusters, the solar array mast protrudes through the
center of the cluster. Engine numbering is shown in figure 8-2 and table 8-2.
Given that the FT has an identical ACS configuration to PM], it will share PM] ’5
capabilities for maneuvering — it is capable of performing any X, Y, or Z-axis translation,
or any roll, pitch, or yaw rotation with a two-engine burn. Roll and X translation are also
redundant for any single engine and certain two-engine failures with no loss in
performance and no increase in fuel expenditure. In the case of other engine failures,
other rotation and translation maneuvers can be accomplished with a combination of
maneuvers in remaining axes (i.e. roll—pitch-roll to accomplish yaw). And while
connected to any LTV spacecraft with a functional ACS, all maneuvers are redundant for
any single engine failure and most are redundant for any two-engine failure with zero
performance loss or propellant use increase.
Generally, when the FT is docked to another vehicle, all forward firing thrusters
(engines 1, 5, 9, and 13) are deselected and appropriate thrusters on that vehicle are used
in their place. Additionally, when the FT is docked to PM], it blocks PMl’s engine 16,
affecting PM] ’3 ability to perform +X translation and +pitch.
To resolve the pitch problem, FT ACS thrusters 6 and 10 will replace PM] ACS
thruster 16 and PM] ACS thrusters 5 and 9 will replace PM] ACS thruster 1. This will
replace the two-engine 1-16 combination with a four-engine FT 6-10, PM] 5-9
combination. For +X translation, another four-engine combination will be used: PM] 8-
12 and FT 6-10. Attitude control thruster selection for each single axis maneuver is
shown in table 8-3.
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ACS Performance
Moments of inertia for the FT are estimated in the same manner as for PM], using
the average vehicle mass. The FT-only moments of inertia are Ixx = 12077, Iyy = 74454,
IZZ = 74454. When docked with the ADV, moments of inertia are Ixx = 98296, Iyy =
160673, Izz = 112056. Like PM], all thrusters have the same moment arm and torque: 1.2
m moment arm and 588 Nm torque. The FT is designed to maintain a deadband of 30
degrees in roll and 10 degrees in pitch and yaw. Its maximum allowed drift angular
velocities are 0.090 degrees per second in roll, 0.013 degrees per second in pitch, and
0.013 degrees per second in yaw. Like other spacecraft it takes maximum advantage of
the R-4D’s minimum impulse bit, thus minimizing propellant consumption.
Docking, separation, and daily attitude control fuel requirements are determined
in the same manner as for other LTV spacecraft. These requirements vary with the Fuel
Tanker mission being performed. For the LEO refueling mission, a single docking and
separation is required. Other missions involve two to three dockings and separations.
Attitude control requirements are relaxed during standby loiter times. Table 8-4
summarizes ACS propellant requirements by FT mission. The maximum requirement is
shown to be during the outbound L1 refuel mission and is 20 kg. Hence, for tank sizing
purposes, the ACS fuel requirement is 20 kg, of which 8 kg is MMH and 12 kg is N204.
Refueling Operations
Each lunar expedition requires servicing from several Fuel Tankers. Table 8-5
indicates the fuel payloads, vehicle serviced, refueling location, refuel mission, and Fuel
Tanker(s) involved for each lunar expedition.
As was previously stated, the ADV requires multiple tankers. One to two tankers
will be launched for each lunar expedition, but because some tankers service multiple
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missions, there can be anywhere from two to three FTs servicing the ADV for a particular
expedition. Odd numbered expeditions will be serviced by two FTs (designated FTla
and FT1b) while even numbered expeditions will be serviced by three FTs (designated
FTla,FT1b, and FTlc).
FTla denotes the first FT to dock with the ADV during any particular expedition.
It will transfer its entire fuel payload and will be destroyed upon completion of its
mission by destructively impacting the lunar surface. In even numbered expeditions,
Fle will also transfer its entire fuel payload and will be destroyed in the same manner.
In odd numbered expeditions, FT1b will have a fuel surplus after the ADV is filled and it
will remain in lunar orbit to await the next mission. The same is true for FTlc in even
numbered expeditions. In those subsequent expeditions, the remaining FT (whether it
was Fle or FTlc) will be designated FTIa and it will act in the role of the FT1a during
its original mission.
It should be noted that FT3 is used in both Mission 3 and Mission 5. During
Mission 5, the CM/PMl LTV requires 10344 kg of fuel, which is 465 kg more than a FT
can provide. However, during Mission 3, it only requires 1417 kg. Consequently, FT3
will carry the 1417 kg, plus 1.5 times the 465, for a total of 2114 kg. Meanwhile, FT5
will carry 9646 kg, which is the 10344 kg minus 1.5 times the 465 kg.
Tank Sizing
The maximum propellant load drives tank sizing, just as with other LTV
spacecraft. In the case of the FT, this maximum load occurs during Mission 5 where
4564 kg of MMH and 9312 kg of N204 are required.
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Like PM] and the ADV, multiple tanks are used and the MPS and ACS share the
same tanks. The FT tanks are identical in size to the APS tanks on the CM and the ADV
fuel tanks. The FT tank configuration is identical to that of the ADV, carrying a total of
eight tanks: four MMH and four N204. Like other LTV spacecraft, these tanks are fully
cross-linked.
8.8 Power
Like other LTV spacecraft, the FT uses a combination of SLA triple-junction
solar arrays and lithium polymer electrolyte batteries to supply vehicle power. Unlike
PM], the FT does experience varying power levels depending on flight phase. Table 8-6
provides a summary of FT power requirements by flight phase.
Solar arrays and batteries are sized in the same manner as those onboard other
LTV spacecraft, with the exception that the dust factor applied to the ADV is not applied
to the FT since the FT never lands on the moon.
A total of 13.85 m2 of array surface (6.92 m2 for each of the two array wings on
the FT) is obtained by iterating through the algorithm used with the CM and other LTV
spacecraft. This yields an array mass of 23 kg. The drive system, like its CM
counterpart, is responsible for actuating both the solar arrays and radiator. The drive
system is sized at 5 kg. Each array wing has dimensions of 3.72 m by 1.86 m. Like other
LTV spacecraft, sun sensors on each array enable it to track the sun for optimum energy
generation. The array wing provides for 360-degree rotation along its axis and 180 degree
rotation perpendicular to its axis, thus enabling it to track the sun regardless of vehicle
orientation. Roughly 204 kg are estimated for the masses of wiring, regulator/converters,
and a power control unit. Roughly 4 kg of battery are required.
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8.9 Mass Properties
Table 8-7 provides a summary of the Fuel Tanker’s systems and their masses. A
small growth margin is included to account for any growth in vehicle systems. Like
PM], vehicle dry mass is consistent across all tankers throughout the Trailblazer
program, but total mass varies with refueling mission. Like other LTV spacecraft,
vehicle structure is estimated using the Larson and Wertz 21 .06% parametric (Larson and
Wertz, 1992).
8.10 ELV Deployment
The Fuel Tanker will be lifted from the Earth’s surface by Delta IV and Atlas V
expendable launch vehicles. The ELV will place the FT into a 407 km altitude, 28.5-
degree inclination orbit. The ELV is not responsible for supplying any power or thermal
conditioning to the FT after launch (though the launch pad does need to supply both). If
necessary, the FT can supply inertial and GPS guidance data to the ELV. The ELV will
separate as soon as orbit has been achieved. For the LEO refuel mission, the ELV targets
it to intercept the CM/PM]. For other missions, the FT will await a PM2, which will
transport it to L1 or LLO, depending on its mission.
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Chapter Nine - Propulsion Module 2
9.1 Overview
PM2 is the “dumb booster” of the LTV. It serves the role of the Saturn V’s S-
IVB stage, propelling LTV spacecraft beyond Earth orbit onto a trajectory towards either
L1 or lunar orbit. Like the CM, PM2 is a modification of existing spacecraft. Both the
current Centaur and the Delta IV second stage (Delta 4-2) have the basic characteristics
required for PM2 (It should be noted that there are two configurations for the Delta 4-2, a
4-m diameter version and a 5-m diameter version. This dissertation will refer only to the
5-m version whenever the Delta 4-2 is mentioned). For purposes of this conceptual
design it is not necessary to make any decision between the Centaur and Delta 4-2, and in
all likelihood an eventual Trailblazer system would use both, applying cost and
performance as the deciding factor to select one for a particular flight. Analyses will be
conducted for both the Centaur and Delta 4-2 variants of PM2.
In general, the Centaur and Delta 4-2 will not be significantly modified. PM2 will
use the same avionics, thermal, propulsion and attitude control systems on the existing
Centaur/Delta 4-2. The most significant impact is the requirement for PM2 to dock with
a waiting target and then propel the target beyond LEO. Normally, an upper stage is
already attached to its payload. Unfortunately, ELV payload restrictions do not allow for
most LTV spacecraft to be launched with PM2.
9.2 Centaur Summary
The Centaur was developed in 1958 to launch NASA robotic spacecraft on lunar
and interplanetary missions. Since that time, it has flown over a hundred commercial,
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military, and government missions on Atlas and Titan rockets (Atlas Launch System
Mission Planner’s Guide, Atlas V Addendum, 1999).
The current version of the Centaur is 3.05 m in diameter and 12.68 m long. In
figure 9-1, a Centaur is shown being raised into position to be mated to a launch vehicle.
It uses the RL-10A-4-2 engine, in either a single or dual engine configuration. It burns
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen with an Isp of 450.5 seconds. In the single engine
configuration it has a mass of 1914 kg and in the dual engine configuration it has a mass
of 2106 kg. The single engine configuration uses one electromechanically actuated 51-
cm Columbium fixed nozzle, while the dual engine configuration uses two
electromechanically actuated 51-cm Columbium extended nozzles. Inertial guidance is
provided by ring laser gyros and accelerometers (Atlas Launch System Mission Planner’s
Guide, Atlas V Addendum, 1999).
A polyvinyl chloride foam provides insulation for the liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen cryogenic propellants. Pressure stabilized stainless steel tanks are separated by a
common ellipsoidal bulkhead. Helium and hydrogen provide tank pressurization (Atlas
Launch System Mission Planner’s Guide, Atlas V Addendum, 1999).
The standard Centaur supports a mission with park orbit coast times up to 65
minutes. This can be extended to a three-hour coast by replacing the 150-amp-hr main
battery with two 250-amp-hr batteries and adding a LH2 tank sidewall radiation shield
(Atlas Launch System Mission Planner’s Guide. Revision 9, 2001).
9.3 Delta 4-2 Summary
Information concerning the Delta 4-2 is less readily available, presumably
because the Delta 4-2 is still in development, whereas the Centaur has been flying since_
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the dawn of the space program. However, Boeing has made some Delta 4-2 information
publicly available.
The Delta 4-2 is derived from the Delta HI second stage and has a gross mass of
30,710 kg (Delta 4H-2, 2002) and carries 27,200 kg of propellant (Delta IV Payload
Planner’s Guide, 2000), suggesting a dry mass of 3490 kg. Figure 9-2 shows a Delta 4-2.
It uses a single RL-10B-2 engine with an extendible nozzle and an electromechanically
actuated gimbal. The RL-10B-2 is shown in figure 9-3. It has an 1125 second burn time
and an Isp of 462 seconds. The Delta-4-2 can sustain a seven-hour mission (Delta IV
Payload Planner’s Guide, 2000).
Boeing Rocketdyne Propulsion & Power and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
have teamed up to develop a new upper stage engine that may eventually replace the RL-
10B-2. The MB-60 is a high performance liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine with an
expected Isp of 467 seconds and a 267 kN thrust. It has a mass of 591 kg. Full-scale
development began in 1999 and it is slated to begin flight operations on the Delta IV in
2004 (MB-XX, 2002). The MB-60 is shown in table 9-1.
9.4 PM2 Docking Systems
PM2 is equipped with a single passive MDAS-augmented APAS for docking with
other LTV spacecraft. For the AM mission, the APAS is mounted on the ventral side of
PM2. In the case of the Delta 4-2, this will mean mounting the APAS on the LH2 tank.
This PM2 will also feature six MGS steel plates. This is necessary due to the docking
configuration inside the AM, as explained in chapter seven. PM2 will be captured by the
AM in the same manner that the vehicle captures the CM/PM]. For all other missions,
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the APAS is mounted on the front of PM2. During docking operations, PM2 will always
be the passive vehicle.
9.5 Communications
PM2 will not feature any modifications to the Centaur/Delta 4-2 communications
systems other than a short-range transmitter to enable PM2 to communicate over the
wireless network with other LTV spacecraft. PM2 will have the ability to transmit
through other LTV spacecraft to the FTDRSS network when docked.
9.6 Power
The Delta 4-2 power system will be unchanged for PM2. However, to give the
Centaur equal endurance to the Delta 4-2, a minor change will be made. As previously
mentioned, the Centaur uses one 150-amp-hr battery or two 250-amp-hr batteries,
depending on mission duration. Taking the latter and using the electrical power formula
P=IV to convert to kWh (assuming the 2.3 V used on other LTV spacecraft solar arrays),
the Centaur requires 1.15 kWh for a 3-hour mission. Dividing this by 3 hours, it is seen
that the Centaur uses 0.383 kW. Using the same sizing methods used for other LTV
spacecraft, a 7-hour lithium polymer electrolyte battery can be sized for the Centaur. The
required battery mass is 11 kg.
9.7 PM2 Missions
PM2 is responsible for eight different vehicle/trajectory combinations, though all
of these will not be featured in every lunar expedition.
CM
PM2 is used to propel the CM from LEO to L1, starting a crew on their lunar
journey. This mission is required every lunar expedition.
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PMI/AM
Because PM] is relatively light in its outbound configuration, it can be
transported to L1 along with the AM. In order to accomplish this, both PM] and PM2
must dock with the AM. PM] will be captured upside down and will be positioned in
place to dock with the forward dorsal docking mount, the mount normally used for the
CM. PM2 will be captured in a normal orientation and will be positioned in place to
dock with the aft ventral docking mount, the mount normally used for PM]. Once PM2
completes its burn, PM2 will separate and be discarded. PM] will also separate from the
AM so that the AM and PM] can individually perform their L1 capture burns. This
mission is required every lunar expedition.
PMI-Spare/AM-Spare
Similarly, PM] and the AM both have spares that must be deployed to L]. Like
their primary units, they will ride together to L1 under the power of a PM2. This mission
is required only once, at the beginning of the Trailblazer program before any lunar
expeditions take place.
ADV
PM2 is also used to transport the ADV from LEO to lunar orbit. This mission is
required only once, also at the beginning of the Trailblazer program and prior to the first
lunar expedition.
FT Missions
The FT(s) used to fuel the ADV must be transported by PM2 from LEO to lunar
orbit. During the first expedition and during even numbered expeditions, two identical
FTs are transported to LLO (FT Mission 1 and 1b). During all odd numbered expeditions
other than the first, one FT is transported to LEO (FT Mission 1). A PM2 must also
transport a FT to L] for use in fueling PM] during its outbound journey to the moon (FT
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Mission 3; Note there is no PM2 required for FT Mission 2 because that mission is to
LED). Another PM2 sends a FT to LLO for the purpose of fueling PM] once it reaches
lunar orbit (FT Mission 4). Finally, a PM2 sends a FT to L] for use in fueling the
CM/PM] during the inbound return flight from the moon (FT Mission 5).
9.8 Propulsion
Each PM2 performs a single main engine burn to propel its payload spacecraft
away from Earth. As previously stated, PM2 uses the Centaur/Delta 4-2 propulsion
systems without alteration. However, fuel tank loading varies significantly with each
mission. Table 9-2 shows propellant requirements for each PM2 mission (as indicated by
the LTV spacecraft PM2 is propelling), assuming the use of a Centaur as PM2. Table 9-3
shows the same requirements, assuming the use of a Delta 4-2 with the RL-lOB-2 engine
and table 9-4 shows the same, assuming the use of a Delta 4-2 with the MB-60 engine.
These tables show that performance drops off with the use of the Delta 4-2, which is not
necessarily the intuitive result, given that the Delta 4-2 uses higher efficiency engines.
The problem that limits the Delta 4-2 is that its fuel tanks are too large for either the Delta
IV or Atlas V to lift into orbit when fully loaded. Consequently, if the Delta 4-2 is used,
it must launch without full fuel tanks, creating an immediate performance penalty. The
Centaur, however, is small enough that it can be launched fully loaded and therefore
suffers no performance penalties.
9.9 Mass Properties
It should be apparent by now that PM2 total mass varies significantly depending
on the spacecraft PM2 is transporting, orbital destination, PM2 upper stage selected, and
engine selected (in the case of the Delta 4-2). This has some impact on launch vehicles,
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because in some cases, PM2 mass could exceed the published mass limits of available
expendable launch vehicles. The most powerful ELVs are the heavy versions of the
Delta IV and Atlas V, which can lift roughly 23,000 to 25,000 kg into orbit. Even the
most efficient PM2 is useless if it cannot be lifted into orbit. Table 9-5 shows PM2 total
mass and the percentage of the Delta IV and Atlas V’s maximum payload capacities
required to place PM2 in orbit for each PM2 mission, assuming a Centaur PM2. Tables
9-6 and 9-7 show the same data, assuming a Delta 4-2 RL-10B-2 PM2 and a Delta 4-2
MB-60 PM2, respectively.
9.10 ELV Deployment
While it is likely that both Delta IV and Atlas V payload capabilities can be
enhanced if Boeing and Lockheed Martin are provided sufficient incentive, doing so
would not be a cost-free endeavor and one of the constraints of this dissertation is no new
launch vehicle development, which includes major enhancements to existing vehicles.
Consequently, published Delta IV and Atlas V limits will be considered real limits for
PM2 mass. This constrains several PM2 missions to use only the Centaur PM2, if flying
on the Delta IV: CM, PMl-S/AM-S, ADV, FT-M], and FT-M5. The other PM2
missions — PM1/AM, FT-M3, and FT-M4 — can be conducted with any of the three
possible PM2 vehicles. The Atlas V imposes no such limitations due to its maximum
payload capacity of 25,000 kg. While several missions do push the Atlas V to its upper
performance limits, it can launch all PM2 missions using any PM2 vehicle.
Atlas and Delta launch vehicles will be required to target a rendezvous time of
five hours or less after launch for PM2 rendezvous with its L1 or LLO payload. This is
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necessary in order to complete docking and subsequent injection burns before PM2
exhausts its battery power or boils off too much propellant.
In order to minimize propellant boiloff, the ELV’s upper stage will remain
attached to PM2 and will point its aft section towards the sun. Thus, residual cryogenic
propellants in the ELV upper stage and the stage’s physical structure will serve as an
additional insulator for PM2.
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Chapter Ten - LTV Mission Control Analysis
Mission Control operations are a significant aspect of any space program’s
ongoing costs. Mission Control operations are also central aspects. of the safety and
success of any space mission and should be considered at the earliest stages of program
development. Before designing the mission control architecture for the LTV, it is worth
considering previous mission control architectures. Limited descriptions were obtained
of the mission control center configurations for Apollo 11, shuttle, and ISS. Much of the
data in this chapter regarding current Mission Control Center (MCC) operations was
gleaned from the author’s personal experience as an undergraduate NASA Scholar and
graduate co-op in space shuttle Mission Control, in the Guidance and Control Systems
Group (referred to in this chapter as console position GNC).
In general, mission control centers have one central room and one or more support
rooms, which have gone by various names. The central room is the one commonly seen
on television when references are made to mission control. In the Apollo program this
room was known as the MOCR, which was short for Mission Operations Control Room.
The nomenclature in ISS and shuttle is FCR, short for Flight Control Room.
The ISS and shuttle programs are supported by MPSRs — Multi-Purpose Support
Rooms. These are additional consoles distributed throughout Building 30 at Johnson
Space Center (the mission control building). A team of one or more MPSR consoles
supports each console in the FCR.
Similarly, Apollo MOCR consoles were supported by a wide variety of
supplemental consoles. The documentation available did not specify whether the MPSR
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acronym was in use at that time (Apollo 11 Reunion Committee, 1989). One thing,
however, was clear. The Apollo mission control architecture was much larger than that
for shuttle or ISS. In recent years, automation has enabled mission managers to
implement smaller flight control teams.
(It should be noted that every console position acronym will not be translated in
this section, nor is it necessary to do so. Advocates of proper English are often quick to
criticize NASA for its use of acronyms — it has been said that there are more NASA
acronyms than there are words in the English language. A quick glance at either of
NASA’s main acronym dictionaries makes one inclined to believe the statement is true.
At any rate, some acronyms are so thoroughly integrated into day-to-day life that the
origin of an acronym is sometimes forgotten. Some of the mission control acronyms are
easy to translate; others could probably only be explained by those engineers who
participated in naming them — provided they themselves haven’t forgotten what the
acronyms stood for.).
According to the Apollo 11 20th Anniversary Flight Operations Reunion souvenir
book, the Apollo MOCR had 27 console positions with an additional 154 support
positions (Apollo 11 Reunion Committee, 1989). By contrast, according to data supplied
by Systems Division Deputy Chief Stan Schaefer and available on the intemet at NASA’s
spaceflightgov site, the shuttle FCR has 22 console positions and the ISS FCR has 18
console positions (Schaefer, 2002; Blue FCR; Shuttle Mission Control Center). Data was
not provided for shuttle and ISS MPSR positions. Assuming an average of two to three
MPSR positions per FCR position, however, anywhere from 36 to 66 positions is a
reasonable guess.
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However, the decrease in flight controllers for ISS is arguable as to whether or not
it is a legitimate decrease. For the most part, there is a one to one correspondence
between shuttle and ISS flight control positions, with a few exceptions. One exception is
an increase. The shuttle position EECOM is analogous to two ISS positions: THOR and
ECLS. The net drop in ISS FCR positions is due to the fact that there is no counterpart
position to FDO, Rendezvous, Booster, or MOD. The MOD position is simply a console
reserved for senior NASA management if they wish to observe mission operations. FDO,
Rendezvous, and Booster all are primarily concerned with dynamic flight phases. ISS is
incapable of dynamic flight. Its limited flight control abilities have been absorbed by
ADCO, the ISS’s counterpart to shuttle’s GNC. Thus, the only shuttle FCR positions
without counterpart positions on ISS are those for senior NASA observers or those for
functions ISS does not perform. So on the basis of FCR personnel per vehicle function,
ISS actually has a slight increase with the splitting of EECOM into THOR and ECLS.
Both shuttle and ISS are trying to reduce their flight control teams, however.
Shuttle has implemented a program called FCR-only. During selected periods where a
particular console position experiences light activity, that position will operate without
MPSR support. Taking the reduction a step further, ISS has implemented Gemini
operations during weekends (and eventually third shift). Under Gemini, the FCR
positions of PHALCON, THOR, and ECLS are combined into a single position: ATLAS,
while the positions of ODIN, ADCO, and CATO are combined into a separate position:
TITAN. Thus, six console positions are reduced to two. ATLAS and TITAN are also
both FCR-only positions. Many ISS FCR positions are also FCR-only during Increment
Ops (when ISS is in a low activity period, with no visiting vehicles present) and use
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MPSR support during Assembly Ops (where the shuttle is present and there is more
dynamic activity).
10.1 Apollo, Shuttle, and ISS MOCR/FCR Positions
Apollo MOCR Positions
Director of Flight Operations LM/EMU
Flight Director Surgeons
Assistant Flight Director Experiments Officer
CSM/Guidance, Navigation & Control Network Controller
CSM/EECOM ALSEP Network Controller
CSM/INCO Operations and Procedures Officer
Flight Dynamics Officer Public Affairs Officer
Retrofire Officer PAO Assistant
Guidance Officer PAO Photographers
Booster Systems Engineer — ] TV Edit
Booster Systems Engineer - 2 Audio/TV Coordinator
Booster Systems Engineer — 3 CAPCOM
LM/Control Flight Activities Officer
LM/Telcom
Shuttle FCR Positions with descriptions
Flight Director - Flight
Flight serves as leader of the flight control team, and is responsible for the conduct of the overall
team. Acts as the focal point for all decisions made relative to the on-orbit mission
Spacecraft Communicator (CAPCOM).
CAPCOM serves as the prime communications link between MCC and the crew aboard the
station.
Russion Inerface Operator - RIO
RIO serves as primary interface between the United States and Russian control teams
Extravehicular Activities — EVA
EVA monitors all aspects of the spacewalks based out of the shuttle and station. This includes
monitoring the technical operation of the spacesuits and the activities to be carried out as trained
prior to the mission
Surgeon
The Surgeon monitors crew health, provides crew consultations, coordinates crew medical
operations and advises the Flight Director of any related issues that may affect mission success.
Public Affairs Officer — PAO
PAO provides mission commentary to supplement and explain air-to-ground transmissions and
flight control operations to the news media and the public.
Ground Controller — GC
GC directs maintenance and operation activities affecting Mission Control hardware, software and
support facilities. GC coordinates the ground Space Flight Tracking and Data Network and the
TDRSS used for data and voice transmissions between the MCC and the shuttle or station.
Mission Operations Directorate — MOD
MOD provides a link from the FCR to top NASA and mission managers
Payload Deployment and Retrieval Systems — PDRS
PDRS monitors operation of the RMS used to deploy, retrieve and position satellites and other
cargo in the payload bay
Flight Activities Officer — FAQ
FAQ plans and supports crew activities, checklists, procedures and schedules and plans/manages
the orientation of the shuttle in space
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Payloads
Payloads coordinates onboard and ground system interfaces between the flight control team and
payload user, and monitors in-cabin and cargo bay systems experiments and satellites
Flight Dynamics Officer — FDO
FDO plans maneuvers and monitors trajectory in conjunction with the guidance officer
Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures — Rendezvous
Rendezvous supports shuttle missions during deploy, rendezvous, proximity operations phases,
docking and undocking; whenever complex crew procedures are affecting orbit dynamics
Shuttle Data Processing Systems — DPS
The DPS determines status of data processing systems including the five onboard general purpose
computers, flight-critical and launch data lines, the multifunction display system, mass memories
and systems-level software.
Shuttle Comm & Tracking Systems — INCO
The INCO plans and monitors in-flight communications and instrumentation systems
configuration, and controls shuttle television systems from the ground.
Shuttle Ascent Propulsion — Booster
Booster monitors and evaluates the main engines, solid rocket boosters and external tank
performance during the pre-launch and ascent phases of missions.
Shuttle Mechanisms, Hydraulics and Maintenance — MMACS
The MMACS monitors operation of the orbiter’s structural and mechanical systems, and follows
use of onboard crew hardware and in-flight equipment maintenance.
Shuttle Guidance Navigation & Control Systems — GNC
The GNC monitors all vehicle guidance, navigation and control systems; notifies the flight
director and crew of impending abort situations and advises crew regarding guidance hardware
malfunctions.
Shuttle Propulsion Systems — Prop
The PROP monitors and evaluates reaction control and orbital maneuvering system jets and
propellants and other consumables available for maneuvers.
Shuttle Electrical Power Systems — EGIL
EGIL monitors electrical systems, fuel cells and associated cryogenics, AC and DC power circuits,
vehicle pyrotechnics and lightning, and hardware caution and warning systems.
Shuttle Life Support & Thermal Systems - EECOM
The EECOM is responsible for passive and active thermal control of the vehicle, cabin atmosphere
control, avionics cooling, supply/waste water system management and fire detection/suppression.
ISS FCR Positions with descriptions
Flight Director — Flight
Flight serves as leader of the flight control team, and is responsible for the conduct of the overall
team. Acts as the focal point for all decisions made relative to the on-orbit mission
Spacecraft Communicator — CAPCOM).
CAPCOM serves as the prime communications link between MCC and the crew aboard the
station.
Russion Inerface Operator — R10
R10 serves as primary interface between the United States and Russian control teams
Extravehicular Activities — EVA
EVA monitors all aspects of the spacewalks based out of the shuttle and station. This includes
monitoring the technical operation of the spacesuits and the activities to be carried out as trained
prior to the mission
Surgeon
The Surgeon monitors crew health, provides crew consultations, coordinates crew medical
operations and advises the Flight Director of any related issues that may affect mission success.
Public Affairs Officer — PAO
PAO provides mission commentary to supplement and explain air-to-ground transmissions and
flight control operations to the news media and the public.
219
Ground Controller - GC
GC directs maintenance and operation activities affecting Mission Control hardware, software and
support facilities. GC coordinates the ground Space Flight Tracking and Data Network and the
TDRSS used for data and voice transmissions between the MCC and the shuttle or station.
Robotics Operations Systems Officer - ROBO
ROBO monitors the operation of the station’s SSRMS and the Mobile Servicing System
Assembly and Checkout Officer - ACO
ACO maintains inventory of all supplies and equipment aboard ISS. ACO is also responsible for
getting supplies to and from ISS
Operations Planner — OP
OP is responsible for developing and coordinating operations plans and crew work schedules, or
timelines, during periods when the shuttle is not docked to the station
ISS Data Processing Systems — ODIN
ODIN manages computer hardware and software, caution and warning, command and data
processing as well as data interfaces with the International Partners.
ISS Comm & Tracking Systems — CATO
CATO manages the International Space Station’s on-orbit communication systems.
ISS Mechanisms and Maintenance - OSO
OSO manages all on-orbit maintenance activities, including development, training and analysis of
procedures on the ground before being carried out on orbit.
ISS Guidance Navigation & Control Systems — ADCO
ADCO is responsible for the integration of all guidance, navigation and control of the station.
ISS Electrical Power Systems — PHALCON
PHALCON manages the electricity available to operate International Space Station systems and
experiments.
ISS Life Support Systems - ECLS
ECLS oversees the assembly, checkout and operation of all environmental control functions and
life support systems.
ISS Thermal Systems — THOR
THOR is responsible for the assembly, checkout and operation of the International Space Station’s
thermal control system.
Gemini — ISS TITAN & ATLAS
Atmosphere, Thermal, and Lighting Articulation Specialist (ATLAS) is the combination of
PHALCON, THOR, and ECLS; and Telemetry, Information Transfer, & Attitude Navigation
(TITAN) is the combination of ODIN, ADCO, and CATO.
10.2 LTV MCC Development
An analysis of the shuttle and ISS FCR positions shows that between the two
spacecraft programs, most of the functionality required to operate a single spacecraft in
space have been represented.
Despite the fact that the Apollo MOCR is a type of LTV program, it is not as
useful as an analogue for Trailblazer LTV MCC operations as one might initially assume
because its positions assume the level of technology available in the 19603. Artists,
secretaries and audiovisual personnel present in the Apollo MOCR have been replaced by
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modern word processing and telecommunications equipment. Vehicle systems were
orders of magnitude simpler, reducing the level of MCC analysis necessary (though not
necessarily reducing the ground effort as many computations were literally done by hand
with slide rules, pencil and paper). These factors result in a very different MCC than any
that would exist today. It is still important to pay close heed to the Apollo MCC, because
some support room functions (e.g. space environment console and midcourse corrections
specialist) are important for cislunar travel but have no bearing on LEO travel and are
thus not represented anywhere within the shuttle or ISS MCC architectures.
In the Apollo program, the Apollo MOCR was responsible for all aspects of the
lunar mission. However, because Trailblazer assumes a permanent lunar facility that is
visited for 30-day periods, the surface and human lunar transit responsibilities will be
separated. The LTV FCR will only be responsible for the lunar transfer vehicle. As
such, its responsibilities encompass the six spacecraft that compose the LTV and only
include the hstronauts when they are aboard the LTV. Before the astronauts board the
LTV, they are the responsibility of the shuttle or ISS FCR (depending on the LTV’s point
of origin). Once they exit the LTV’s ADV on the surface of the moon, they become the
responsibility of a lunar base FCR and remain that FCR’s responsibility until they enter
the ADV to return to Earth. They then cease to be the LTV FCR’s responsibility as soon
as they exit the CM, whether they exit on Earth’s surface, at a shuttle, or at ISS.
There are several key differences between the LTV and shuttle, ISS and Apollo
that will affect the LTV FCR composition. Most important is that the LTV is composed
of multiple spacecraft in various locations. Apollo was similar in that the Apollo
Command/Service Module and the Lunar Module functioned as two separate spacecraft
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for significant portions of the mission. Apollo did have numerous positions devoted
specifically to either the CSM or the LM. Shuttle has no analogue to this. ISS’s closest
analogue is the Crew Return Vehicle, which is currently a Russian Soyuz, monitored by
its own control center in Russia. Unfortunately, the CRV’s fate is questionable due to
White House-imposed funding cuts. However, if the CRV does fly, a separate CRV
mission control has been developed at Johnson Space Center, including a separate FCR
with its own dedicated room and a MPSR that does not have its own dedicated hardware,
but uses consoles normally used by shuttle payloads. The X—38 CRV MCC consists of 23
FCR flight controllers and 12 MPSR flight controllers with a total of 70 MCC operators
(Rader, 2002).
Additionally, the LTV is a system of spacecraft in permanent flight, like ISS.
Some component spacecraft are permanently in space, while others are periodically
launched and have short life spans. After the initial deployment, a maximum of 14 and a
minimum of 5 LTV component spacecraft will be at various locations in space at any one
time. This is different from shuttle or Apollo in that both programs only experienced
short periods of actual flight. However, more like shuttle and Apollo, the LTV only has
crew onboard for a short period of time. So for the majority of any given year, the LTV
is a network of unmanned spacecraft.
So in short, the Trailblazer LTV is a network of spacecraft that maintain precise
positioning relationships with respect to each other. Some are permanently in space,
while others have brief missions. For most of the time they are unmanned, but for short
periods of time crews do come onboard. Orbital transfers, rendezvous, docking,
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refueling, and other critical spacecraft events may take place with or without human crew
onboard.
' It would be far too unwieldy to devote a separate FCR, or even a separate console
position to each LTV spacecraft. FCR positions will be based around LTV functionality,
with console operators responsible for all spacecraft capable of performing that particular
function. The LTV FCR will consist of 21 console positions, each of which are as similar
as possible to analogous shuttle and station console functions.
LTVFCR Position Descriptions
Flight — Flight Director
Flight serves as leader of the flight control team, and is responsible for the conduct of the overall
team. Acts as the focal point for all decisions made relative to the in-space mission. Flight is
identical to its shuttle and ISS counterparts.
CAPCOM - Capsule Communicator
CAPCOM serves as the prime communications link between MCC and the crew aboard the LTV.
CAPCOM is identical to its shuttle and ISS counterparts.
Surgeon — Flight Surgeon
The Surgeon monitors crew health, provides crew consultations, coordinates crew medical
operations and advises the Flight Director of any related issues that may affect mission success.
Surgeon is identical to its shuttle and ISS counterparts.
MOD - Mission Operations Directorate
MOD provides a link from the FCR to top NASA and mission managers. MOD is identical to its
shuttle counterpart.
PAO - Public Affairs Officer
PAO provides mission commentary to supplement and explain space-to-ground transmissions and
flight control operations to the news media and the public. PAO is identical to its shuttle and ISS
counterparts.
GC — Ground Controller
GC directs maintenance and operation activities affecting Mission Control hardware, software and
support facilities. GC coordinates the ground Space Flight Tracking and Data Network and the
TDRSS used for data and voice transmissions between the MCC and the LTV spacecraft. GC is
identical to its shuttle and station counterparts.
EVA — Extravehicular Activities
EVA monitors all aspects of any spacewalks based out of the Crew Module, or into/out of the
Ascent-Descent Vehicle when it is in lunar orbit. This includes monitoring the technical operation
of the spacesuits and the activities to be carried out as trained prior to the mission. EVA is
identical to its shuttle and ISS counterparts.
ELVIS — Earth Launch Vehicle Integration and Support Officer
ELVIS serves as primary interface between MCC and launch control teams for Earth launch
vehicles transporting LTV spacecraft into orbit. ELVIS is slightly analogous to the RIO position
in both shuttle and station control centers. The difference, of course, is that ELVIS interfaces with
the launch/mission control teams for the shuttle, Delta, and Atlas control centers as opposed to
RIO’s interface with the Russian space program.
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SABER — Solar and Battery Electrical Power Resource Officer
SABER is responsible for the operation of all solar array and battery systems on LTV spacecraft.
SABER is responsible for the electrical energy resource management including the planning
analysis necessary to ensure adequate resources are available for LTV operations. SABER is
similar to shuttle’s EGIL and ISS’s PHALCON.
LIFE — Life Support Systems Officer
LIFE is responsible for all life support systems on the Crew Module and Ascent-Descent Vehicle,
including cabin pressure, temperature and humidity control, atmospheric revitalization,
fire/smoke, waste collection, galley, and emergency response. LIFE is also responsible for all
preparation for extravehicular activities. LIFE coordinates with corresponding positions on other
flight control teams (i.e. shuttle, ISS) to ensure atmospheric compatibility during dockings to other
pressurized spacecraft prior to hatch opening. LIFE is similar to the portion of shuttle’s EECOM
responsible for life support and to ISS’s ECLS.
TEMPER — Temperature Management Officer
TEMPER is responsible for the management of all active and passive thermal control systems on
each LTV spacecraft. TEMPER is also responsible for thermal load sheds and thermal
assessments during all launch and flight phases. TEMPER is also responsible for Aeroshell and
Crew Module TPS. TEMPER is similar to the portion of shuttle’s EECOM responsible for
thermal control and to ISS’s THOR.
VADER — Voice and Data Relay Officer
VADER is responsible for maintaining a communications network consisting of all LTV
spacecraft, the FTDRSS constellation, MCC, the lunar surface base and its support vehicles, and
the White Sands Complex. VADER will oversee the autonomous configuration of LTV
spacecraft to serve as relays between FTDRSS and other LTV spacecraft. VADER is responsible
for photo/video, telemetry formats, and communications outage recorders. VADER is also
responsible for communication between LTV spacecraft and any EVA crewmembers. VADER is
similar to shuttle’s INCO and 188’s CATO.
VEHICON — Vehicle Configuration Manager
VEHICON is responsible for maintaining real-time configurations of all LTV spacecraft.
including masses and moments of inertia. VEHICON also is responsible for LTV mechanical
systems, crew systems, and in-flight maintenance. VEHICON maintains cognizance of operations
and status of LTV mechanical assets related to structures and mechanical systems functions.
VEHICON is additionally responsible for monitoring the space environment, including radiation,
micrometeoroid, and orbital debris assessments. VEHICON is the FCR POC for RAT, Surgeon,
EVA, and LIFE when they are on-call. VEHICON trains crew and flight controllers for in-flight
maintenance. VEHICON is similar to shuttle’s MMACS and 188’s OSO, but is more involved
than either.
STAR — Sensors, Trajectory and Attitude Recognition Officer
STAR is responsible for preflight planning and monitoring and verification of the performance of
each LTV module’s autonomous navigation systems, including vehicle sensors and associated
navigation software. STAR is responsible for uploading trajectory and attitude targets to each
LTV and coordinating with EMCEE to adjust timelines as necessary. STAR is the FCR POC for
HYPER, DART, and ELVIS when they are on-call. STAR is analogous to a combination of
shuttle’s FDO and the Sensors portion of GNC, as well as the portion of ISS’s ADCO responsible
for sensors and trajectory.
PAC-MAN — Propulsion and Attitude Control Systems Manager
PAC-MAN is responsible for the Main Propulsion System and Reaction Control System on each
LTV module, excluding the cryogenic Propulsion Module 2. Working closely with STAR, the
PAC-MAN team builds and manages the attitude timelines and propellant budgets for each
vehicle, coordinating refueling with RAT and EMCEE. PAC-MAN is responsible for the overall
controllability of the LTV spacecraft and for health and performance monitoring of the thrusters,
controllers and effectors utilized to control the vehicles. PAC-MAN is analogous to a
combination of shuttle’s PROP and the Controls portion of GNC, as well as the portion of ISS’s
ADCO responsible for attitude control.
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CANDIES — Computers and Networked Data Interface Systems
CANDIES is responsible for the management of the LTV’s networked computer systems.
CANDIES is responsible for the integration of all computer activities and utilization and analysis
of computer resources. CANDIES is also responsible for the coordination of commands to LTV
spacecraft by other console positions. CANDIES is responsible for Caution & Warning
Management, Pre-Planned Command Package Management, file management, software and data
files updates, memory management, network administration, and Time-tagged Command Queue
Management. CANDIES is similar to shuttle’s DPS and ISS’s ODIN.
EMCEE — Mission Coordinator
EMCEE is responsible for the overall mission timeline, working with other console positions to
schedule and coordinate the relative positions of each LTV spacecraft. EMCEE coordinates LTV
interaction with all other spacecraft and landing sites and is the primary point of contact to other
mission control teams. EMCEE develops contingency schedules to accommodate missed launch
windows or other unplanned delays. EMCEE also plans and supports crew and automated
activities, checklists, procedures and schedules. EMCEE is similar to shuttle’s FAO and ISS’s
OP, but is more involved than either.
RAT — Resupply and Transfer Officer
RAT is responsible for scheduling of consumables resupply to all LTV spacecraft. RAT also
maintains inventory of all supplies and equipment aboard the Crew Module and Ascent-Descent
Vehicle. RAT coordinates with EMCEE and shuttle FAO and Payloads to develop timelines for
Crew Module servicing during shuttle dockings. RAT is similar to shuttle’s Payloads and ISS’s
ACO, but is more involved than either position.
AT-AT — Automated and Teleoperated Appendages and Tools
AT-AT monitors the performance of LTV manipulators, including the communications antenna,
solar array. and radiator drive mechanisms, steerable camera pointing mechanisms, the Aeroshell
Module’s Magnetic Guide System, and all Magnetic Docking Aid Systems. AT-AT is similar to
shuttle’s PDRS and ISS’s ROBO.
DART — Docking and Rendezvous Trajectory Officer
DART assists STAR in monitoring planned and in-progress vehicle trajectories and rates during
all rendezvous, proximity operations, ascent, descent, docking and undocking phases. DART is
similar to the shuttle Rendezvous position. ISS’s ADCO shares a greatly reduced version of
similar responsibilities.
HYPER — High Energy Propulsion Officer
HYPER is responsible for monitoring Propulsion Module 2 performance, including cryogenic
propellant tanks, main engine, attitude control, and inertial sensors. HYPER coordinates with
DART, STAR, ELVIS and AT-AT for all Propulsion Module 2 dockings to other LTV spacecraft.
HYPER is somewhat analogous to the shuttle Booster console position. There is no ISS
counterpart.
For the most part, these positions mirror the responsibilities shared by the shuttle
and ISS FCR teams, though some positions have additional responsibilities imposed by
aspects of the LTV systems and mission that are not present on the shuttle or ISS.
Perhaps the most striking difference is the merger of shuttle’s GNC and FDO into LTV’s
STAR. This combination is made possible by the extensive use of autonomous
navigation in the LTV. In the shuttle program, GNC is responsible for the operational
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readiness of sensors used to navigate, while FDO is responsible for the actual navigation
determination. However, in the LTV, most of those navigation tasks have been moved
onto the vehicle, reducing the ground workload in the FDO arena. Additionally, modern
avionics more fully incorporate built-in test equipment (BITE) and fault identification,
detection and resolution (FIDR), reducing the ground workload in the GNC arena as well.
LTVMCC Communications
While the LTV FCR is approximately the same size as a shuttle or ISS FCR, there
is a concern to reduce the workload on the Flight Director. It is a difficult task to
effectively manage a group of this size. Consequently, a nominal operations reporting
chain will be used.
In the shuttle and ISS FCRs, flight controllers talk over various communications
loops. The FCR is on one loop and all controllers in the FCR can hear each other.
Additionally, each FCR position has a loop for its MPSR, so that the FCR operator can
talk to his or her support personnel, without dragging the rest of the control center into
the conversation. For the Flight Director, it can be a challenging prospect to keep track
of all of the various communications on the FCR loop.
Consequently, the LTV FCR will implement loops within the FCR. For
emergency situations, each FCR flight controller will speak to Flight or other disciplines
over a FCR-wide loop. However, for nominal operations, several sub-loops will be
implemented: Ops, Astro, Schedule, Systems, and Bio.
The Ops loop is the primary command loop. Flight, CAPCOM, EMCEE, STAR,
VEHICON, LIFE, MOD, PAO, and GC will communicate over Ops. This is the loop for
activities relating to overall mission operations.
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The Astro loop is the primary navigation loop. STAR, PAC-MAN, HYPER, and
DART will communicate over Astro. This loop is for vehicle pointing, trajectory, and
navigation activities.
The Schedule loop is the primary scheduling loop. EMCEE, ELVIS and RAT
will communicate over Schedule. This loop is for coordination of vehicle scheduling
activities.
The Systems loop is the primary systems status loop. VEHICON, SABER,
TEMPER, AT-AT, CANDIES, VADER, STAR, and LIFE will communicate over
Systems. This loop is for ensuring proper vehicle functionality and non-critical fault
resolution. Any vehicle failures that threaten crew or mission safety will be addressed
over the FCR loop instead of just the Systems loop.
The Bio loop is the primary crew systems loop. LIFE, EVA, Surgeon,
VEHICON, and CAPCOM will communicate over this loop. This loop is for any non-
critical issues affecting crew health, life support, or crew accommodations. Like
Systems, any issues that threaten crew or mission safety will be addressed over the FCR
loop.
LTVMCC Staffing
Because of the unique nature of the LTV, it will not be necessary to staff all FCR
console positions at all times. While there will be 24 hour, 365 day MCC operations, it
will not apply to all disciplines. Some console positions only need to be staffed while
crew are onboard the LTV. Others need daily attention, but not necessarily 24 hour a day
attention. Still others need only be staffed during certain mission activities.
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CAPCOM, Surgeon and EVA will only be staffed while crew are onboard the
LTV, roughly 29 days per year. HYPER will only be staffed while PM2s are in service
(including a portion of the prelaunch activities), roughly 55 days per year. DART will be
staffed only when rendezvous activities are in progress, roughly 206 days per year. All
of these console positions will be staffed 24 hours a day when they are in use.
EMCEE, ELVIS, and RAT will be staffed 365 days per year, but only during the
day shift. While each of these positions requires daily attention, none of them need
moment-by-moment monitoring. Occasionally, these positions will require attention
during other shifts. On those days, the staffed shift will move from the day shift to the
shift in question.
MOD will only be staffed when senior NASA management wish to oversee LTV
activities. This would generally include personnel such as the Mission Operations
Director, JSC Administrator, Associate Administrator for Human Space Flight, and
NASA Administrator, or their designees. Normally, such personnel will only be present
during significant activities, such as a lunar landing.
The remaining 12 positions will be staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
Potentially, a Gemini-like structure could be implemented in the LTV FCR during
quiescent periods, such that LIFE, TEMPER, and SABER are combined into one position
(Gemini—1), STAR and PAC-MAN are combined into another (Gemini-2), and VADER,
CANDIES and AT—AT are combined into a third (Gemini-3), further reducing MCC
staffing to 7 during quiescent periods (The seven positions are Flight, PAO, GC, Gemini-
], Gemini-2, Gemini-3, and VEHICON). PAO may also be unstaffed during some of
these periods, reducing staffing to 6.
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MPSR support will be dependent on flight phase and relevant activities for each
discipline. Flight, CAPCOM, MOD, Surgeon, and PAO will assume no MPSR support
specific to the LTV program. GC, EVA, ELVIS, and RAT will each have a single MPSR
console. LIFE, STAR, CANDIES, EMCEE, AT-AT, DART, and HYPER will each have
two MPSR positions. Finally, SABER, TEMPER, VADER, VEHICON, and PAC-MAN
will each have three MPSR positions. At maximum FCR and MPSR staffing (i.e. during
lunar landing or other periods of intense flight operations), and taking into account the
number of shifts per day each console will operate (EMCEE, ELVIS, and RAT only staff
one shift), LTV Mission Control will utilize 145 console operators, a 35-person decrease
from Apollo.
Because personnel cannot spend their entire career on console — flight controllers
also have office work that must be done and must also devote time to training and
supporting various meetings — multiple flight control teams are required in most console
disciplines. (A flight control team is three shift’s worth of flight controllers.) Exceptions
are CAPCOM, Surgeon, EVA, and HYPER. Because these four disciplines spend so
little time on console, their flight controllers should have time to conduct other duties
during their off-console periods. Additionally, DART only requires two flight control
teams, due to their limited period of time on console. As a result, the entire LTV flight
control employment is 372 console operators.
(These numbers do not include personnel observing at the MOD console
position in either the Apollo or LTV programs).
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LTVMCC Console Configuration
In the past, shuttle flight control operators have indicated that it is sometimes a
challenge finding sufficient monitor space to display all necessary data screens. This
problem is increased by a drive to move console documentation and manuals online.
Typically, shuttle FCR operators have two to four computer monitors at their station and
can observe general information on three large projector displays at the front of the FCR.
Shuttle MPSR operators typically have three to four computer monitors at their station
and a television, which is often set to view either the main FCR projector display or a
space-to-ground video feed. Because the LTV consists of multiple spacecraft and each
MCC operator is responsible for systems on multiple vehicles, the problem of display
space will be more severe. Consequently, greatly expanded video capabilities will be
designed into the LTV FCR and MPSR environments.
A typical console layout for a FCR or MPSR operator will consist of three
computer workstations, driving twelve 18-inch flat panel monitors. The monitors will
typically (though not exclusively) be configured in a four-horizontal by three-vertical
matrix. Video and data can be displayed on any of the screens, with audio directed to
either the PC speaker or to the console DVIS (currently existing MCC audio network)
headset. Strip chart recorders (used in Apollo, early shuttle, and X-38 MCCs) will not be
used. PC-based programs such as the JSC-developed RT-Plot, used in the shuttle MCC
are capable of providing the same functionality. Ten printers will be located throughout
the FCR and MPSR to allow flight controllers to print hardc0pies of flight data. The
FCR also contains eight large wall display screens on the side and front walls for general
mission data and video.
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LTVMCC Facility Location
This dissertation will not attempt to precisely locate floorspace for the LTV MCC,
but it is assumed that the LTV FCR and MPSR(s) (whether the MPSR is in one room or
spread across several) will be located at Johnson Space Center inside Building 30, the
building where shuttle, ISS, and X-38 MCC consoles are currently located. Thus, the
LTV MCC will take advantage of existing physical floorspace, power, lighting, heating,
ventilation, cooling, security, communications racks, walker boxes (patched cable
distribution), phones, DVIS, television and facility video connections.
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Chapter Eleven - Cost Estimation
11.] Overview
The cost for space programs and projects has become increasingly dominant in
the discussion of the merits and demerits of particular programs. Cost drives almost all
modern space systems and strongly influences whether programs will proceed (Wertz and
Larson, 1996). Proposed programs are evaluated as much, if not more, on their cost
estimates as on their goals and objectives. “Conceptual designs must now account for
cost, particularly for large-scale efforts” (Larson and Pranke, 1999).
There is a strong tendency, however, among both government and private
agencies to not want to talk about real cost (Wertz and Larson, 1996). Unfortunately, the
emphasis on cost has at times led engineers and managers to hide cost data in order to
make a program appear less expensive. Costs can be buried in infrastructure costs, such
as the costs of managers or engineers who are supporting the program. Complicating
matters, cost data for any particular program may include or exclude data relating to
launch, ground stations, operations, infrastructure costs, support personnel, or any other
data that may potentially be excluded, making it difficult to compare costs for similar
programs (Wertz and Larson, 1996).
As an example of cost hiding at its worst, it is commonly known that nobody
knows what a Shuttle launch actually costs. Estimates can range from as low as $200
million to over $500 million (Wertz and Larson, 1996). Costs can also be buried in
international cooperation. The transformation of the space station from the US Space
Station Freedom to the International Space Station Alpha initially reduced American
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costs (at least on paper), though the final US cost is arguably greater than that for any
Freedom estimates.
While such tactics may prove useful in short-term budget battles, they have long-
term negative consequences when true costs become apparent, or when frustrated
legislators are unable to decipher where budgeted funds are going. A space program
should only be presented as “low cost” if it truly is so. Wertz and Larson (1996) define a
low cost mission as one that is “three or more times less expensive than typical missions
in that class.” Trailblazer does not pretend to be a “low cost” space program, though
efforts are taken to minimize costs where possible. This chapter will attempt to clearly
identify all relevant Trailblazer-unique expenses and compile a credible cost estimate for
the LTV. The following sources of expense will be included for determining Trailblazer
LTV costs:
Communications network




The sum of these costs will be taken to represent the cost of transporting the
Trailblazer crew to and from a lunar surface base.
11.2 Communications Network Costs
As explained in chapter three, a new communications network will be necessary
to support the Trailblazer program. Because NASA will need to replace the existing
TDRSS anyway, this dissertation will estimate communications network costs assuming
the Trailblazer’s communications network is designed into the TDRSS replacement
(described as FTDRSS earlier in this dissertation).
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In 1995, NASA awarded a $486.] million contract to Hughes Spacecraft for three
HS-601 series satellites as TDRSS replacements (ATDRS Quicklook, 2002). With a
multiplier of 2 (for six satellites instead of three) multiplied by an arbitrarily chosen
inflation factor of 1.5, this number will be used as the estimate for the FTDRSS
communications network cost.
However, Trailblazer will not be the sole user of FTDRSS. TDRSS currently
supports shuttle, ISS, and a host of other orbiting satellites, currently including Hubble,
GRO, Landsat, TOPEX, and EUVE (TDRSS Program, 2002). Consequently, some cost
sharing is in order. For simplicity, it will be assumed that Trailblazer will assume the
entire cost of the three L2 satellites (two active, one spare), but will bear only one-eighth
the cost of the GEO constellation, allowing for equal division between the eight users of
the GEO constellation. Thus, the Trailblazer cost is $486.1M multiplied by 1.5 (for the
L2 satellites) plus $486.1M multiplied by 1.5 divided by 8, for a total of $820.29 million.
11.3 Vehicle Development and Production Costs
In order to estimate the costs required to actually develop and produce the LTV
spacecraft designed in this dissertation, a NASA cost-estimating tool is applied to their
specifications.
The NASA Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM) is designed to provide a
useful method for quick turnaround, rough-order-of—magnitude estimating. It can be used
for estimating the development and production cost of spacecraft, space transportation
systems, aircraft, missiles, ships, and land vehicles (AMCM, 2002). It is maintained and
used by the Cost Estimating Group at Johnson Space Center.
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The AMCM uses six inputs to estimate a spacecraft’s development cost based on
historical data from previous space programs. The six inputs and their definitions are as
follows:
1. Quantity — total number of units to be produced, including prototypes, test
articles, operational units, and spares
Dry weight - the total empty weight of the system in pounds, not including
fuel, payload, crew, or passengers.
Mission type — classifies the type of system by the operating environment and
the type of mission to be performed
IOC Year — year of Initial Operating Capability, i.e. the year in which the
spacecraft or vehicle is first launched
Block Number — represents the level of design inheritance in the system. If the
system is a new design, then the block number is 1. If the estimate represents
a modification to an existing design, then a block number of 2 or more may be
used. For example, block 5 means that this is the 5th in a series of major
modifications to an existing system.
Difficulty — represents the level of programmatic and technical difficulty
anticipated for the new system. This difficulty should be assessed relative to
other similar systems that have been developed in the past. For example, if the
new system is significantly more complex than previous similar systems, then
a difficulty of high or very high should be selected.
It should also be noted that engines are not included in spacecraft cost estimates
and must be estimated separately. Table 11-] indicates the inputs used for each LTV
spacecraft and the resulting cost estimate.
For the Crew Module, a block number of 2 is used, assuming the X-38 CRV to be
the block 1 variant. An average difficulty is selected, because most CM systems reflect
little development effort. (An exception is autonomous navigation, which is accounted
for in the PM] cost.) A total of four units are to be produced: one flight article, one
ground spare, and two test articles/prototypes.
For PM 1, a block number of 1 is used. A high difficulty is selected, primarily
because of the autonomous navigation flight software and hardware used throughout the
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LTV program. It is assumed for cost purposes that the bulk of this development effort
will be completed as part of PMl’s development. Five units are to be produced: one
flight article, one L1 spare, one ground spare, and two test articles/prototypes.
A block number of one is also selected for the ADV, with an average difficulty
rating. Four units are to be produced: one flight article, one orbital spare, one ground
spare/test article, and one test article/prototype. The test articles are less constrained for
the ADV because most systems will be effectively tested on other LTV spacecraft, with
the bulk of the ADV testing being limited to test aspects related to the lunar surface
environment and ascent/descent/landing. Consequently, it is assumed a test article can be
designed with the capacity to later be pressed into service, just like the space shuttle
Challenger was (Space shuttle OV-99, Challenger, was originally a test article, but a
decision was made to convert it to a flight vehicle. Its sister test article, OV-101,
Enterprise, was deemed impractical to convert and was given to the Smithsonian.)
PM2 is given a block number of eight because it is at least the eighth variant of
the Centaur (assuming the Centaur is selected). A difficulty rating of very low is
assigned, because the modifications to the Centaur to produce PM2 are minimal and
simplistic. Fifty-five flight units and two ground spares/test articles are to be produced.
The Aeroshell Module is given a block number of one and an average difficulty
level. Eight flight articles, one L1 spare, and two test articles are to be produced.
The Fuel Tanker is given a block number of two, assuming PM] to be its block
one variant. It is given an average difficulty level. Forty-five flight units and two ground
spares/test articles are to be produced.
236
The RS-72 engine is given a block number of three, assuming the current RS-72
as block two and the XLR-132 and Aestus engines (from which the RS-72 was
developed) to be block one. It is given a difficulty level of very low. Sixty-five flight
units are to be produced. Fifty-seven RL-10 engine flight units are to be produced,
assuming a block number of 14 and a very low difficulty rating. Finally, a total of 1,136
R-4D thrusters are to be produced, assuming a very low difficulty rating and a block
number of 5.
11.4 Launch Costs
The most cost effective deployment strategy must carefully consider the mass
capabilities of potential launch vehicles and the associated costs with each launch system.
The Atlas V and Delta IV launch families will be used for all Trailblazer launches other
than transporting the lunar crew to orbit. All Earth to orbit transport flights for the crew
will be conducted on the space shuttle.
Space Shuttle
In order to most effectively utilize the shuttle, the Trailblazer program must be
carefully coordinated with shuttle upgrades as well as other shuttle missions. Because the
shuttle is presently America’s sole access to and from space, it must be available at the
beginning and end of every Trailblazer mission.
The ideal solution will be to fly only one shuttle mission per lunar expedition,
using upgraded versions of the Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) capabilities on Atlantis
and Endeavor to allow the same shuttle to deploy and later retrieve the Trailblazer crew.
The current EDO limitation for both shuttles is 28 days (16 days on Columbia and
Discovery has no EDO capability), but no shuttles have ever flown missions approaching
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this length. Several 16-day EDO missions have flown, using a pallet containing four
cryogenic (LH2, LO2) tank sets to provide extended power for the shuttle’s fuel cells.
The 28-day EDO kit carries eight tank sets (Braeunig, 1998).
Conceivably, increasing the 28—day EDO kit to sixteen or more tank sets could
allow a shuttle to remain in orbit for 45-50 days, thus allowing it to remain in space for
the entire lunar mission, from when the LTV departs LEO until it returns.
In the absence of a 45-day EDO capacity, Trailblazer will have to assume a
separate shuttle mission at the beginning and end of each lunar expedition. It cannot,
however, devote a billion dollars to shuttle launches (assuming $500 million per launch).
Consequently, the first of the two missions will be devoted specifically to Trailblazer and
will carry payload equipment for CM/PM] servicing. It will also recover the FT2, which
will have previously fueled the CM and PM] and will be loitering nearby awaiting shuttle
recovery. The second mission will simply carry an airlock capable of docking with the
CM and will fly at the proper orbital altitude and inclination, but it will have a non-
Trailblazer primary mission. In other words, NASA will need to identify two shuttle
missions per year during the four-year Trailblazer program whose payloads can accept a
shuttle flight at a 28.5-degree inclination, include payload bay volume and mass margins
for the shuttle to carry an external airlock and docking port, and allow sufficient time in
the mission timeline for a docking with CM/PMl and subsequent Trailblazer crew
transfer. This is both an operational as well as a financial necessity. By 2010, the shuttle
program does anticipate 12-15 flights per year (as opposed to the current eight), but there
would still be considerable resistance to seeing a significant portion of shuttle flights
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devoted exclusively to Trailblazer (particularly considering that a large percentage will
most likely continue to be consumed by ISS).
An additional possibility is dependent on the Trailblazer surface base design. If
the design lends itself to much longer surface mission durations (on the order of 3-6
months) it may be possible to use each shuttle mission to launch a new lunar crew and
recover a previous crew. This would, however, require additional flight articles for the
Crew Module and Propulsion Module 1. This .option' will not be explored in this
dissertation, but should be considered in a surface base design effort.
As a final option, during any Trailblazer missions where shuttle support at the end
of mission is impossible, the Crew Module can always exercise the option to deorbit and
land, but will need to be refurbished and launched as part of the shuttle mission that
deploys the crew for the next Trailblazer mission. Between these optiOns, it is reasonable
to assume Trailblazer will only need to account for the expense of a single shuttle
mission per Trailblazer expedition.
Expendable Launch Vehicles
The Atlas V and Delta IV launch families each consist of a variety of launchers
designed around common cores. By varying the number of attached solid rocket
boosters, upper stage engines, common cores, and payload fairing diameters, the boosters
achieve a variety of different performance capabilities.
Atlas V launchers are designated Atlas xyz, where “x” denotes a 4 or 5-meter
payload fairing, “y” denotes the number of attached solid rocket boosters (0 to 5), and “2”
denotes the number of engines on the Centaur upper stage (1 or 2). Thus, the Atlas 552 is
an Atlas V with a 5-meter diameter payload fairing, 5 attached solid rocket boosters, and
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a Dual Engine Centaur (DEC) configuration. As an exception to this nomenclature, the
Atlas V Heavy replaces the attached solid rocket boosters with two common cores. It
does use the DEC configuration. Atlas V launch costs range from a low of $85 million
for the Atlas 502 to a high of $130 million for the Atlas V Heavy (Atlas V Specifications,
2002.) Table 11-2 summarizes the payload capacities (to LEO) and launch costs for the
Atlas family.
The Delta launchers are the Delta IV M, Delta IV M+ (4,2), Delta IV M+ (5,2),
Delta IV M+ (5,4), and the Delta IV H. The nomenclature of each name identifies the
rocket. The “M”, “M+”, and “H” denote medium, medium plus, and heavy, respectively.
The (x,y) nomenclature identifies the size of the payload fairing and the number of
attached solid rocket boosters, with “x” indicating either a 4-meter or 5-meter diameter
fairing and “y” indicating either 2 or 4 solid rocket boosters. Like the Atlas V Heavy, the
Delta IV H features an additional two common cores used as liquid rocket boosters.
Delta IV launch costs range from a low of $70 million for the Delta IV M to a high of
$140 million for the Delta IV Heavy (Delta IV Specifications, 2002). Table 11-3
summarizes the payload capacities (to LEO) and launch costs for the Delta family.
ELVPayload Assignments
Table 11-4 shows the launch masses for each LTV spacecraft and the percentage
of each potential ELV’s capacity required to successfully place that craft in orbit. As the
table shows, some of the lighter LTV spacecraft require only a fraction of the payload
capacities of the more powerful ELVs. Consequently, several spacecraft can be teamed




Having determined which ELVs will launch which LTV spacecraft, it is now
possible to determine launch costs. All launches are not required for every mission, so it
is important to keep track of which launches are necessary.
The most expensive launch phase is the initial deployment, when the reusable and
spare LTV spacecraft must be deployed. Once these assets are in place, subsequent
launches will only launch expendable craft and the crew, keeping in mind that every
other expedition will require an additional Fuel Tanker, as described in chapter nine.
Table 11-6 lists the LTV spacecraft, launch mass, ELV, and launch costs for the
initial Trailblazer mission. Table 11-7 lists the same data for subsequent even numbered
missions and table 11-8 provides the same for subsequent odd numbered missions.
Given that Trailblazer is planned to be a four-year program with two missions per
year, the total Trailblazer LTV launch costs are $14.56 billion, with an average of $1.82
billion per expedition.
11.5 Spacecraft Propellant Costs
The cost data accumulated so far does not include the price of fuel, which is not
free and must be considered. The current prices per gallon for liquid oxygen and
hydrogen are 67 and 98 cents, respectively (NASA Facts, 2001). Much more expensive,
monomethyl hydrazine is $445.30 per gallon and nitrogen tetroxide is $133.35 per gallon
(NASA Facts, 2001). Hypergolic fuels are so expensive because of the safety
considerations associated with handling the toxic propellants.
Table 11-9 lists the fuel masses for all LTV spacecraft during the initial
expedition. Table 11-10 lists the same for even numbered expeditions and table 11-11
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lists fuel masses for subsequent odd numbered expeditions. Summing the fuel masses
for all eight LTV expeditions reveals totals of 281412 kg N204, 150448 kg MMH,
804901 kg liquid 02, and 134150 kg liquid H2. Table 11-12 summarizes these masses,
their volume in gallons, and the total cost for each fuel. Summing these costs reveals a
total Trailblazer LTV propellant cost of $27,569,440.
11.6 Mission Operations Costs
The final step in cost estimating for the Trailblazer LTV is to determine mission
operations costs. This includes mission control engineers, other support engineers, and
Mission Control Center hardware and software development and maintenance.
Trailblazer will assume that Mission Control Center facility space can be made
available in Building 30 at NASA — Johnson Space Center. Consequently, there will be
no associated construction expenses and building heating, lighting, power, HVAC,
security and maintenance will be considered to be part of existing JSC facility costs.
Mission Control Center Facility and Software Development
The development of the X-38 Vehicle 201 ground control center inside Building
30 will be used as a framework for estimating Trailblazer MCC expenses. Table 11-13
lists estimated expenses associated with its development, as compiled by JSC engineer
Steve Rader, who was involved with the development. Several elements in this table are
worth further discussion.
Rader indicated that this data is, “very informal data collection and does not
represent any sort of formal accounting” (Rader, 2002). It is, nonetheless, useful for
order of magnitude estimation.
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Rader also indicated that the strip chart recorders used are not actually necessary.
“Management direction was the reason for the strip chart recorders. I think they were
trying to demonstrate certain capabilities. In my opinion, they are not needed” (Rader,
2002). This is reasonable, based on the shuttle MCC. Strip chart recorders were used in
the early days of the shuttle program, but they have long since been replaced with RT
Plot, a JSC-developed computer program that runs on flight controller workstations.
It is a relatively simple undertaking to scale this estimate to the LTV MCC.
Figure ]]-14 shows estimates for the LTV MCC. From this data, total cost values can be
computed. However, before computing totals, a few items should be explained. Data
servers, telemetry interface servers, telemetry processing servers, and network switching
and communications equipment are all scaled by a factor of twelve. The reason for this is
because the number of units required for these items is partially a function of spacecraft
communications data rate (Rader, 2002) and the LTV has a data rate twelve times that of
the X-38 Vehicle 201.
Estimates for computer support personnel also require additional explanation.
The X-38 group used a four-person team for their software development. While the LTV
will also use a small development team, Trailblazer will assume a twelve-person team
due to the increased complexity and scope of LTV mission control functions.
Additionally, because the software will be more complex, a multiplier of 5 is used to
account for potential cost increases.
Despite the increased size of the LTV MCC, there is no corresponding increase in
network administration personnel, based on the recommendations of several computer
scientists. IBM staff software engineer Troy Howard suggests that network
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administration should require no more than a few personnel (Troy Howard, 2002). He
cautions, however, that properly designed configuration and maintenance of the network
is critical to avoid placing incredible workload burdens on the network administrators,
thus driving up staffing requirements.
“If the network grows in an ad-hoc fashion, it could take as much as one
administrator per ten machines to keep everything running. With proper planning and
design, it should be possible to maintain the entire system with a fixed number of
administrators, any more than five seems excessive” (Troy Howard, 2002). Use of hard
drive imaging is no more labor intensive than netwOrk booting and is much less
dependent on network conditions. It is orders of magnitude less labor intensive and error
prone than local installation and configuration (Troy Howard, 2002).
NC A&T Director of Web Support Services, Robin Howard, recommends two
people, because it is important to always have a backup. “If it is a crisis if the network
goes down, then twenty-four hour support is necessary. However this does not mean that
the administrator has to be onsite” (Robin Howard, 2002).
Cary Bumette, Senior Network Analyst for North Carolina A&T State University,
states, “One person should be able to handle it [MCC network administration] as long as
you’re not doing a bunch of updates” (Robin Howard, 2002).
Anthony Grice, NC A&T Network Research Administrator, states that if you
ghost the computer hard drives (meaning the same software configuration on all hard
drives), one person can handle it. He recommends a metric of one network engineer for
every 50-60 people (Robin Howard, 2002).
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To this end, the MCC CANDIES FCR and MPSR console operators will serve as
a backup to the two network administrators. The CANDIES operator is by definition also
a network administrator - responsible for the LTV onboard network — and can
consequently provide immediate response to a MCC network failure while the MCC
administrator(s) are being called in.
The total cost for hardware and software acquisition and development is the sum
of the 2.5 year software development ($22,875,000) and the hardware/software
acquisition cost ($3,224,500), for a total of $26,099,500 in one—time expenses. To
determine the total MCC cost, annual operations costs must be added to this figure. The
annual software operations cost of $857,280 must be carried over the 2.5 development
years and the 4 years of Trailblazer operations, for a total of $5,572,320. This adds to the
one-time expenses to yield a total MCC cost of $31,671,820.
Flight Controller and other Personnel Expenses
In addition to the expenses associated with developing and maintaining the
Mission Control Center, costs must also be included for the MCC flight controllers and
other engineers and managers who support the program.
Chapter ten described in detail the flight control positions involved in the
Trailblazer LTV. Table 11-15 lists the FCR console positions, associated MPSR
positions, days per year the console position is staffed, number of employees assigned to
that position (group size), and the total salary for that group of employees. The salary is
determined by the average salary of JSC Mission Control engineers, which is currently
$86,452 These salaries are summed to give a MCC flight controller annual salary and
then multiplied by 1.5 to estimate employee benefits, giving a total annual figure of
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$48,240,216 Other non-MCC Trailblazer expenses incurred by JSC’s Mission
Operations Directorate are sized at twice the flight controller expense, for a total of
$96,480,432 Engineering Directorate support is estimated at five times the flight
controller expense, for a total of $241,201,080 Finally, a miscellaneous expense category
is estimated at fifteen percent the flight controller expense, yielding $7,236,032 These
expenses sum for a total annual mission operations personnel and miscellaneous budget
(excluding MCC construction and software maintenance discussed in the previous
section) of $465,518,084 which sums over four years of Trailblazer operations for a total
mission operations personnel and miscellaneous cost of $2,793,108,506.
Mission Operations Cost Summary
Adding the mission operations personnel and miscellaneous cost to the MCC cost
of $31,671,820 gives a total mission operations cost of $2,824,780,326.
11.7 Cost summary
Summing cost totals in each of the previous sections yields a total Trailblazer
LTV program cost of $40.37 billion. Tables 11-16 and figure 11-3 summarize the
Trailblazer LTV costs. Table 11-17 shows the Trailblazer LTV cost by fiscal year,
indicating the annual budget NASA would need to allocate to Trailblazer to make the
LTV mission happen. These costs only reflect the Trailblazer LTV and do not include
surface base expenses, such as facility development, component launch and deployment,
surface operations or resupply expenses. The costs do include, however, all expenses
related to getting two astronauts from the surface of Earth to the surface of the Moon and
back.
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In an intriguing non-space-related comparison, the Forbes 400 list recently
reported the net worth of Bill Gates at $43 billion (The Forbes Four Hundred, 2002). The
second and third runners, Warren Buffett and Paul Allen, respectively have a net worth of
$36 and $21 billion (The Forbes Four Hundred, 2002). The net worth of Gates and Allen
consists primarily of stock in Microsoft, and Buffett's net worth is primarily in the stock
of Berkshire Hathaway. The cash equivalent of the net worth of an individual (albeit the
nation’s richest) could potentially single-handedly finance multiple lunar expeditions,
though this point is not made to suggest such a course of action. Dr. Robert Howard, Sr.,
Associate Professor of Finance at North Carolina A&T State University, points out that
“an attempt to liquidate completely the holdings of either of these individuals to provide
funds for a lunar expedition would be highly unlikely. Such a large scale sale of
securities over a short period of time would greatly depress the market price of the
securities being sold, and wipe out a large portion of the reported net worth; these
individuals would have to give up control of the financial empires they have spent a
lifetime building and managing; and other investors who watch these individuals closely
would also attempt to sell their shares, causing serious disruptions in the financial
markets” (Robert Howard, Sr., 2002). These figures are noteworthy, however, in that
they suggest the expenses of lunar travel and the financial assets of American
entrepreneurs are nearing a point where viable business models may be developed and
successfully implemented to create new industries or expand current operations.
According to Dr. Howard, Sr., “such models could include new advertising approaches,
the application of processes and techniques used in lunar travel to earthly pursuits, and
the development of new products and services (Robert Howard, Sr., 2002).”
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By comparison with other space programs, the cost for the Apollo program was
$167.8 billion in FY97 dollars (Reynerson, 2000). On the surface, Trailblazer may not
appear to compare as favorably with more recent lunar proposals: HLR claimed a $2.5
billion mission cost for an initial expedition and Duke’s Lunar Reference Strategy
claimed a $2.6 billion mission cost for the same (Portree, 2002). Extrapolating these out
to eight missions to compare with Trailblazer yields costs of $20 and $20.8 billion
respectively. (Technically, they would most likely claim lower costs as the $2.5 and $2.6
billion figures presumably included some infrastructure costs that would not be repeated
in subsequent missions.) However, applying the Advanced Missions Cost Model to
either program produces interesting results. The HLR_ Lunar Orbit Stage (LOS) masses
15,600 kg (Portree, 2002). According to the AMCM, a single block one, very high
difficulty spacecraft with a 2010 ICC will cost $9.2 billion. A very high difficulty is
selected because the LOS requires a reusable heat shield for its aerocapture return from
lunar orbit. Currently, there is no material in existence that could serve as such a heat
shield. It should also be noted that the AMCM $9.2 billion figure is just the production
cost of the LOS, and does not include the HLR surface habitat, two shuttle launches,
three Proton launches, an ISS Z2 truss (so that ISS can support HLR missions), a Lunar
Landing Vehicle, a propellant carrier/transfer system, the habitat lander, Trans-Lunar
Injection Stage 1, Trans-Lunar Injection Stage 2, or mission operations, all of which are
supposedly included along with the LOS for the $2.5 billion estimate.
Duke’s strategy is similar. Among other systems, he uses an 8,000 kg X-38 CRV
and two 8,000 kg Lunar Based Vehicles (LBVs) (Portree, 2002). It is highly
questionable as to whether his CRV can be as light as he claims, but for the moment an
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AMCM analysis will be performed taking his mass estimate at face value. However, this
CRV must either accept the same very high difficulty as the HLR LOS (because it also
assumes a nonexistent reusable TPS for aerocapture) or it must be non-reusable, in which
case eight CRVs are required in order to compare with Trailblazer. In the former case,
AMCM predicts a cost of $4.67 billion and in the latter case AMCM predicts a cost of
$6.64 billion. Additionally, AMCM predicts a cost of $3.73 billion for the two LBVs
(which must somehow solve the problem of cryogenic propellant storage in their
development as they use liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen). In Duke’s $2.6 billion
estimate, he only allocated $700 million for the development and production of the CRV
and both LBVs, along with a lunar surface fuel processing plant and a lunar surface
habitat, spending the remaining $1.9 billion on three shuttle launches (at $300 million
each), solar electric propulsion ($500 million) and nuclear power source development
($500 million). Keep in mind these AMCM estimates do not allow for developing any
spare vehicles or test articles, just the flight units.
When compared under the same cost models, Trailblazer LTV spacecraft compare
favorably against modern lunar LTV concepts, and do not suffer the same penalties of
reliance on not-yet-developed materials, nonexistent launch vehicles, or other dubious
capabilities.
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Chapter Twelve — Discussion and Implications
12.] Overview
The conceptual design work in this dissertation demonstrates that it is possible to
develop a lunar transfer vehicle within the constraints of existing technology and without
relying on the availability of super-heavy lift boosters. At less than $5 billion a year,
Trailblazer is clearly within reasonable budget levels and does not represent an
extraordinary program on the level of Apollo. Clearly, human lunar travel is feasible
now, without waiting for the development of a super-heavy lift booster.
12.2 Discussion of Design Details
LTV Summary
In order to conduct human spaceflight from Earth to the moon, an X-38 derived
Crew Module is used, propelled by a hypergolic Propulsion Module 1 and a Cryogenic
Propulsion Module 2 to lunar orbit, with a stop at L1 to change propulsion systems from
PM2 to PMl. There, the crew transfers to an Ascent Descent Vehicle for the ride down
to the lunar surface. After the surface mission, the crew rides the ADV back into orbit,
where the CM and PM] return to L1 to join up with an Aeroshell Module. Leaving L1,
the CM/PMl/AM travel to Earth, where the AM uses its heat shield to protect the crew
during aerocapture. Following aerocapture, the AM is discarded and the crew enters low
Earth orbit. Fuel Tankers are used to refuel the CM, PM], and ADV throughout the
mission. Space shuttles are used to transfer the crew between the surface of the Earth and
Earth orbit. A network of Boeing 702 TDRSS satellites in GEO and orbiting the Earth-
Moon L2 provide communications relay services. This architecture is intended to serve
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as the human transportation link for a lunar return program designed to conduct eight
missions over the course of four years, beginning in fiscal year 2010. Starting with FY
2003, this program would require less than a $5 billion increase in NASA’s annual
budget through program completion at the end of FY 2013..
Program Cost
Clearly, the cost of this program is intimidating to some extent. But it must also
be recognized that any cost figure for a lunar mission will be intimidating. A small
number, such as that proclaimed by HLR is intimidating in the sense that it is not
credible, while a larger number is intimidating for its sheer value.
In order to keep costs from escalating out of control, small management
infrastructures must be maintained throughout the program’s existence. Minimizing the
number of organizational interfaces has been shown in many case studies to be key to
reducing costs (Wertz and Larson, 2002). The small team approach used by the X-38
project is widely recognized as having contributed to minimizing costs in that program.
12.3 Satisfaction of Trailblazer LTV Requirements and Constraints
Assume no heavy launch vehicle development
The LTV does not assume any new classes of heavy launch vehicles and the
return to Saturn V class capabilities is not required for Trailblazer LTV flight operations.
Assume available launch vehicles will be limited to existing vehicles
In addition to not requiring heavy launch vehicles, the LTV can be deployed with
the existing national launch infrastructure. The shuttle, Atlas, and Delta are sufficient
and additional vehicles in their classes are not necessary.
Minimize the development ofnew space vehicles
The Trailblazer component spacecraft are existing spacecraft where possible: e.g.
X-38 Crew Module, Centaur PM2, Boeing 702 TDRSS. Those that are new spacecraft
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(PMl, ADV, AM, FT) are all developed from existing components. No technology
breakthroughs are required for any LTV spacecraft.
Develop intelligent navigation systems with maximum possible versatility
The Deep Space One autonomous navigation system is incorporated as a
navigation system baseline for LTV spacecraft. Use of autonomous navigation allows a
common navigation system architecture for the vehicles and minimizes the number of
flight specific alterations that must be made to flight software on each vehicle.
Have the ability to receive ISS and STS support but be capable ofoperating with
neither
The Trailblazer LTV is fully independent of ISS and is actually a more optimal
solution without the use of the station. It does, however, require some shuttle support, as
the shuttle is currently the only American vehicle capable of placing humans in space.
Once a crew has been transferred to the Trailblazer LTV, however, it can complete its
mission without further STS support if necessary (though there is a small cost increase if
the shuttle cannot recover the LEO fuel tanker). If a crew transfer vehicle (another
possible design adaptation to the basic X-38 spaceframe) were placed on the top of a
Delta or Atlas rocket, however, Trailblazer could operate without shuttle support. A
manned Delta or Atlas, however, is not considered an existing launch vehicle. Thus
Trailblazer is not and cannot be in full compliance with this constraint because it requires
one shuttle launch at the beginning of every mission. Trailblazer development would
require relaxation of this constraint to allow for such shuttle usage.
No more than $3-6 billion increase in NASA annual budgetfor Trailblazer LTV
activities
Cost estimates show an annual increase below $5 billion, fully satisfying this
requirement.
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Five to ten year development timelinefrom concept to first crew landing
Assuming a commitment in 2003, the first lunar mission takes place in 2010,
seven years later. The cost estimating parametrics are in part a function of the time from
concept to deployment and provide a level of estimation regarding the effort necessary to
produce operational vehicles within this timeframe.
Ten year design lifetime
A specific lifetime is not specified, but the entire scope of the Trailblazer mission
is intended to be completed within four years of the initial launch, suggesting the vehicles
will be retired long before their service life is over.
United States mission with limited or noforeign participation
The Trailblazer LTV is composed of US-developed spacecraft and does not
require significant foreign contributions.
Minimize ground operations support team (flight controllers, program offices, etc.).
While the LTV mission control team is not a “small” team by any standards, it is
a reduction from Apollo and a more efficient utilization of flight controller resources than
shuttle or ISS. In shuttle and ISS programs, flight controllers in specific disciplines are
only responsible for that system on one vehicle, while in Trailblazer, flight controllers are
responsible for their particular systems on all deployed Trailblazer vehicles. Onboard
automation and autonomy allows for the increase in flight controller responsibility
without adding additional personnel.
12.4 Conclusions
1. A series of eight lunar missions can allow NASA to begin to develop a lunar
infrastructure, evaluate the potential of the lunar south pole for commercial





The limitation to use existing launch vehicles and other trajectory limiting
factors do not prevent human lunar transfer, but they do impose severe
restrictions on the method of transfer, forcing a modular approach, very small
crew sizes, and the use of a double rendezvous staging trajectory.
The Earth-Moon L1 point is a viable location for storage of various LTV
component spacecraft and is an ideal rendezvous location.
NASA’s TDRSS can be upgraded to serve as a cislunar communications
system by placing three TDRSS satellites in L2 orbit.
Magnetic capture systems can reduce the risk and impact loads of spacecraft
dockings.
The X-38 can be adapted to serve as a crew module for a crew of two.
Radiation shielding is necessary to protect the crew from the possibility of
fatal exposure to solar particle events.
A high performance propulsion module can be developed around the Centaur
upper stage, but it must be used within a few hours of launch
The Centaur can optionally be replaced with the Delta 4-2, but a performance
penalty is incurred because current launch vehicles cannot place a fully fueled
Delta 4-2 in orbit.
A storable, lower performance propulsion module and a fuel tanker can be
developed using the RS-72 engine. This engine can also be used as an X-38
deorbit engine and a lunar ascent/descent engine.
A derivative of the TransHab inflatable structure can be used to reduce the









There is no need for the lander to be pressurized, except during crew transfer
from the CM to the ADV.
Aerodynamic braking in the form of aerocapture is a viable method for Earth
capture of the LTV at the end of a lunar transfer mission.
Propulsion limitations force the aeroshell to be a separate module and not part
of individual modules’ spaceframes.
Such an aeroshell module is within the abilities of present-day technology,
including all heat shield materials.
The aeroshell is not reusable and must be replaced for each mission.
Similarly, it is more cost effective to discard and replace fuel tankers sent
beyond LEO than to return them to Earth for servicing and reuse. The fuel
tanker sent to LEO can be recovered and reused.
A single mission control center can provide flight control operations for all
LTV spacecraft.
12.5 Future Work
travel with present-day systems, many key areas deserve further investigation.
While this dissertation has successfully demonstrated the viability of cislunar
Some
areas are appropriate for university pursuits; others will require resources or access
possible only within NASA or contractor organizations.
To complete the Trailblazer research effort, a conceptual design should be
performed for the Trailblazer surface base and its resupply link. With that effort, an
overall cost estimate can be performed for the entire Trailblazer program. It should be
noted that the surface base design might significantly increase the surface mission
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duration above the one-month baseline, with ripple effects throughout the LTV design. It
might also prove beneficial to place some resupply systems under the control of LTV
Mission Control. Thus, cost and other factors may experience an increase or decrease.
(An increase in surface mission duration may or may not increase LTV costs, depending
on how end of mission crew recovery is impacted.)
Low thrust electric propulsion engine design and weak stability boundary
trajectories must also be thoroughly investigated. Significant cost reductions could
potentially be realized through the use of weak stability boundary trajectories and/or low
thrust for AM and FT deployment missions, using those methods to replace PM2. It is
further strongly suspected that the additional flights required for the surface base resupply
and expansion will overwhelm the Delta and Atlas launch capacity unless weak stability
boundary and/or low thrust methods are used, thereby eliminating the need for PM2
flights in support of the surface base.
This will not, however, eliminate all uses of PM2. It will still be required for the
CM, and potentially also for PM]. The precise mass impact of converting Centaur and
Delta 4-2 stages to PM2 should be studied, as well as cryogenic boiloff rates.
The autonomous optical navigation system described in this dissertation should be
more thoroughly developed. Deep Space One validated autonomous navigation
technology applications beyond lunar orbit, but there is a need for experimental data in
the cislunar environment. Also in the area of navigation, space-based experiments should
be conducted to determine the maximum usable ranges beyond LEO for GPS signal
reception and resulting attitude and position determination.
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Design and test work for the MDAS should continue, including space evaluations
on the shuttle and ISS. While not vital, another potentially useful ISS/shuttle flight
experiment would be to develop and flight certify Iridium or other satellite phones that
can be used in LEO.
A detailed study of Atlas, Delta, and shuttle launch processing facilities should be
conducted in order to verify that existing facilities can process LTV spacecraft. It is
expected that some modifications will be necessary for the Aeroshell Module. These
modifications should be quantified with cost estimates.
The AFE program needs to be revisited and flown with a variety of aeroshell
configurations. There is a pressing need for more experimental data for entry
aerodynamics in order to develop analytical tools for use in mission and vehicle design.
In particular, AFE experiments should examine the performance of SIRCA under
simulated or actual lunar return velocities. It is possible that SIRCA might be reusable at
the heat fluxes experienced by the LTV. Because there is insufficient data to make a
determination, Trailblazer assumed it would not be reusable. If so, significant cost
savings can be achieved by eliminating the replacement of the AM every lunar mission.
Additional research should also continue in the area of reusable high temperature TPS.
Flight stability studies should be conducted for the AM, particularly determining
its stability and handling characteristics during entry and verifying that the R-4D thrusters
will allow for sufficient controllability during entry.
Docking dynamics for the AM should also be studied, including rate dampening,
bending moments, and torsional loads. Load analyses should also be performed on all
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array wings in order to refine mass estimates and ensure that array wings can support
vibrations and forces experienced during engine burns.
Some mass reductions could potentially be achieved on the ADV through the
design and use of a more optimized LIDAR than by simply incorporating the Clementine
LIDAR.
With respect to the lunar communications architecture, it would be useful to
verify that Boeing can supply 702 series satellites capable of processing 12 Mbps data
rates with multiple spacecraft positioned between Earth and lunar orbits. It might also
prove useful to see if the Boeing 702s can be adapted to serve as a rudimentary radio
navigation system, as a crude cislunar version of GPS.
In addition to the above technical research, it is also important to conduct future
research in the area of space program management. Many of the cost overruns that have
plagued major space projects are directly attributable to program management.
Conversely, many of the successful low cost missions can directly attribute their cost
savings to various deviations from traditional management structures. A uniform
approach to program management, however, does not exist at this point in time.
Finally, it is clear from a review of lunar design efforts, that there are no
established standards for the conceptual design of human space systems. This has
resulted in incomplete concepts, embarrassingly poor estimates of vehicle masses and
propulsion requirements, arbitrary and unrealistic cost and manpower estimates, and has
effectively guaranteed that proposals would not get funded for development. The
inability of the space community to produce credible conceptual design work has
hindered every major space project since Apollo (the only reason Apollo was not
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adversely affected was the political climate of the time). Significant research needs to be
devoted to developing a structured, credible spacecraft conceptual design methodology
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28.6 3107 1016 4123 3.065
28.6 3104 1011 4115 3.148
28.6 3101 4110 3.231
51.7 3093 4144 3.595
 
51.2 3095  4144 3.512 
Table 3-2. Transfers from LEO to L1
ight Time
(m/S)
28.5 to L1 Delta-V
(tn/S)
51.6 to L1 Delta-V
 
1 Day 6818.4 6832.5
2 Days 4443.1 4477.1
2.5 Days 4066.4 4112.2
3 Days 3878.3 3934.2
 4 Days 3794.2  3856.5  
Table 3-3. Transfer from L1 to LLO
 





2 Days  890.52  
Table 3-4. Transfers from LLO to LEO
Flight Time LLO to 28.5 Delta-V (tn/s) LLO to 51.6 Delta-V (m/s)
2 Days 1442 1767
 
2.5 Days 1 224 1628
3 Days 1158 No Solution
3.5 Days 1183 No Solution












2 Days 890.52  
Table 3-6. Transfers from L1 to LEO
 
  
Flight Time L1 to 28.5 Delta-V (m/s) L1 to 51.6 Delta-V (m/s)
1 Day 3286.9 3301
2 Days 1324.2 1358.1
2.5 Days 984 1029.7
3 Days 810.4 866.1
4 Days 732 794.1  
Table 3-7. Simulated Lissajous Orbits (Hoffman, 1993)
    
Simulated Lissajous Orbit Communications Coverage Orbital Radius (from L2) (km) Total Accumulated Av (mps/yr)
Case 1 60.96% 2130.4 22.821
Case 2 81.85% 2840.6 36.104
Case 3 96.00% 5681.7 124.164
Case 4 99.02% 11,367.] 524.380
Case 5 99.79% 22.7640 3063.513
Table 4-1. Water Mass Requirements
Potable Hygiene Totals Recovery Recovery
kg/p/d kg/p/d kg Losses (kg) Mechanism
Drinkirg 1.6 46.4 0.0 None
Food Preparation 0.8 21.8 0.0 None
Dishwashin 5 .5 23.1 20.5 MP]
Hand Wash 4.] 17.2 15.3 MP]
Urinal Flushin 0.5 2.1 1.9 MF2
EVA-Cooling 7.3 (kg/EVA) 58.4 0.0 None
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imensions (Meters)
System Component Quantity L W IH
Galley Pantry 1 0.508 0.432 0.909
Storage Locker 2 0.508 0.576 0.190
Oven 1 1.118 0.914 0.914
Water Dispenser 1 0.864 0.71 1 0.708
Wet Trash 2 0.274 0.274 0.274
Dry Trash 2 0.274 0.274 0.274
Housekeeping Storage Locker 20 0.508 0.432 0.254
Wet Trash 4 0.610 0.610 0.610
Dry Trash 8 0.274 0.274 0.274
WCS Storage Locker 1 0.508 0.432 0.254
Wet Trash 2 0.274 0.274 0.274
Dry Trash 2 0.274 0.274 0.274
Hand Washing
Station 1 0.914 0.71 1 0.708
Toilet 1 0.762 0.914 1.418
Seated Ops
Seating Console 2 0.914 0.914 1.575
Storage Locker 1 0.508 0.432 0.254
PhotoNideo
Equipment 1 0.630 0.630 0.630
Crew Storage Locker 14 0.508 0.432 0.254
jRower 1 1.240 0.881 1.575
Sleep Cabinet
(Shuttle) 2 0.762 0.762 1.905
Crew Member 2 1.900 0.488 0.889
EVA EMU Stcflge 2 1.918 0.848 0.686
Table 4-3. Space Radiator Heat Rejection (Larson and Pranke, 1999)
 
 
Radiator Location Average Radiator Approximate Heat
and Type Temperature (K) Rejection (W/mz)





290 251   
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Transmit Antenna Diameter 0.779 m  
Table 4-5. RS-72 Engine (RS-72, 2002)
 






Thrust (vacuum): 12,450 lbf.
(55.4 kN)
Specific Impulse (vacuum): 338 sec.
Chamber Pressure: 895 psia
(61.7 bar)












R-4D Bipropellant Rocket Engine
Engine R-4D
Propellants: NTO/MMH
Thrust (vacuum): 110 lbf.
(490 N)
Specific Impulse (vacuum): 315.5 sec.
Chamber Pressure: 108 psia




Valve Power: Various (46 watts @ 28
Vdc typical)
Steady State Firing: Unlimited (12,000 sec
demo)   
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+Pitch 1,14 11,6—)16,4—>12,5




























Table 4-9. Power Requirements by Flight Regime
 
[Flight Regime Power (kW)
LEO - Crewed 3.030
LEO - Standby 1.546
LLO - Crewed 3.032
LLO - Standby 2.844
TLI/TEI 2.929
Entry 1.781   
277




































otal Vehicle Mass 17784.]
17429. 
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Table 5-1. PM] MPS Burn Summary
 
        
Burn Av Vehicle Fuel Mass MMH N204 Mass Burn
# Burn Description (km/s) Mass (kg) (kg) Mass (kg) (kg) Time (s)
1 0.810 4441.39 1229.66 403.17 826.49 36.80
2 L1 Departure 0.636 4781.07 101 1.43 331.62 679.82 30.27
3 LLO Capture 0.254 4428.23 352.84 115.68 237.15 10.56
4 LLO Departure 0.636 4886.03 1033.64 338.90 694.74 30.93
5 L1 Capture 0.254 4525.45 360.58 1 18.22 242.36 10.79
6 L1 Departure 0.810 22445.58 6214.37 2037.50 4176.87 185.97
7 LEO Circularization 0.089 21849.63 595.95 195.39 400.56 17.83
S-l PMl-S LLO Capture 0.810 5910.54 1636.42 536.53 1099.89 48.97




Thruster Cluster Location Exhaust Direction
1 Dorsal + X
2 Dorsal + Y
3 Dorsal - Y
4 Dorsal - X
5 Starboard + X
6 Starboard + Z
7 Starboard - Z
8 Starboard - X
9 Port + X
10 Port + Z
11 Port - Z
12 Port - X
13 Ventral + X
14 Ventral + Y
15 Ventral - Y
16 Ventral - X   
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- Pitch 4,13 6,11 —>5,12—>7,1O
+Yaw 5,12 6,11—>1,16—->7,10
-Yaw 8,9 7,10—>1,16—>6,11
+ Roll 6,11 2,15
- Roll 7,10 3,14
+ X 8,12 4,16




-Z 6,10 4,13—>8,12—>1,16   










Total 1.549  
Table 5-5. PMl Eclipse kWh
 
 
flghtRflime Eclipse Duration (h) Eclipse kWh
LEO 0.60 0.932
LLO 0.78 1.202
TLI/TEI No Eclipse Period N/A   
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Power Wir_ing, etc. 185.96
P1 Array 27.38
Batteries 5.01




Allocated Growth +15% 4375.67  
Table 6-1. ADV SLS Burn Summary
         
Burn Av Vehicle Fuel Mass MMH N204 Mass Burn
# Burn Description (km/s) Mass (k ) (kg) Mass (kg) (kg) Time (s)
0 LLO Capture (initial) 1.009 18110.27 4751.45 1557.85 3193.60 284.38
1 LTV Rendezvous 0.2 20353.71 1273.65 417.59 856.06 N/A
2 Deorbit 0.019 19430.04 108.69 35 .64 73.05 6.51
3 Powered Descent 1.862 19321.35 8301.99 2721.96 5580.03 496.89
4 Powered Ascent 1.815 11019.36 4645.08 1522.98 3122.10 278.02
5 Orbit Circularization 0.019 6374.28 36.42 1 1.94 24.48 2.18
6 LTV Rendezvous 0.2 6337.86 396.60 130.03 266.56 N/A
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Thruster Cluster Location Exhaust Direction
1 Forward Port -X
2 Forward Port +2
3 Forward Port —2
4 Forward Port +Y
5 Forward Starboard -X
6 FonNard Starboard +2
7 Fonlvard Starboard -Z
8 Fonlvard Starboard -Y
9 Aft Port +X
10 Alt Port +2
11 . Aft Port -2
12 Aft Port +Y
13 Aft Starboard +X
l4 Aft Starboard +2
15 Aft Starboard -Z
16 Aft Starboard -Y  
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Table 6-3. ADV Single Axis Maneuvering Thruster Selection
 
 
   
Maneuver Primary Backup
+ Pitch 3,7,10,14 2,7,10,15 —> 4,16 —> 3,6,11,14
- Pitch 2,6,11,15 3,6,11,14—>4,16 ->2j.10.15
+ Yaw 4,16 5,9
- Yaw 8,12 1.3
+ Roll 3,6,11,14 3,7,10,14-44,16 —>2,6,11,15






-Z 2,6,10,14 2,6,11,15—>913 —>3,7,10,14  
Table 64. ADV Power Requirements by Flight Phase
 
         
Surface
(External LLO - LLO - Initial
Sjgtem Subsystem Descent Power) Ascent Rendezvous Uncrewed Dgloy
Avionics MIMU 0.102 0.000 0.102 0.102 0.000 0.000
Horizon Sensor 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Sun Sensors 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.00] 0.001 0.001
Star Tracker 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Laser
Ragefinder 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000
Flight Computer 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195
Laser Altimeter 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000
Communications 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
Life Support 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000
Crew
Accommodations 0.384 0.000 0.384 0.384 0.000 0.000
Thermal 0.029 0.008 0.029 0.038 0.008 0.017
Structure Dockthem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.31 1 0.000 0.000
Propplsion ACS 0.368 0.000 0.368 0.368 0.000 0.368
Total Power 1.266 0.344 1.266 1.659 0.346 0.723
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1 1 Dorsal -Y
12 Dorsal -X
1 3 Ventral +Y
l4 Ventral -Z
15 Ventral -Y
16 Ventral -X  
Table 7-4. AM Single Axis Maneuvering Thruster Selection
 
 
Maneuver Primary Backup Fast Entry
+ Pitch 2,6 10 2,6,10 2,6,10
- Pitch 4,8 14 4,8,14 4,8,14
+Yaw 11,15 3,5 3,5,11,15 3,5
- Yaw 9,13 1,7 l,7,9,13 1,7
+ Roll 4,6 9,15 4,6,12,15 9,15
-Roll 2,8 11,13 2,8,11,13 11,13
+ X 3,7 12,16 3,7,12,16 N/A
-X 1,5 2,12(180 deg) —) 3,7 —>4,15 (180 deg) N/A N/A
+ Y N/A ' 11,15,1,7 ' N/A N/A
- Y N/A 9,13,3,5 N/A N/A
+ Z N/A 4,6 —> 11,15,1,7 —) 2,8 N/A N/A
- Z N/A 4,6 —) 9,13,3,5 —) 2,8 N/A N/A    
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System Subsystem Mass (kg)_







Docking APAS, MGS, MDAS 855.43
Thermal Control Radiators 80.32
Heat Exchanger 8.24
Pumps 61.85





Allocated Growth 15% 293.18
Systems Mass 1954.56
Table 8-1. FT MPS Burn Summary
Vehicle Fuel Mass MMH Mass N204 Mass Burn
FT Mission Av (km/s) Mass (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) Time (s)
1 1.009 18110 13804 4526 9278 284
2 0.200 10062 5735 1912 3822 N/A
3 0.810 8347 . 4055 1336 2719 108
4 1.009 8443 4137 1378 2760 133
5 0.810 18183 13876 4564 9312 ~ 236      
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Thruster Cluster Location Exhaust Direction
1 Dorsal + X
2 Dorsal + Y
3 Dorsal - Y
4 Dorsal - X
5 Starboard + X
6 Starboard + Z
7 Starboard - Z
8 Starboard - X
9 Port + X
10 Port + Z
11 Port - Z
12 Port - X
13 Ventral + X
14 Ventral + Y
15 Ventral - Y
16 Ventral - X  
Table 8-3. FT Single Axis Maneuvering Thruster Selection
 
 
   
Maneuver Primary Backup
+Pitch 1,16 7,10—>5,12—>6,11
- Pitch 4,13 6,11 —> 5,12 —> 7,10
+Yaw 5,12 6,11—>1,16—->7,10
-Yaw 8,9 7,10—>1,16—)6,11
+ Roll 6,11 2,15
- Roll 7,10 3,14
+ X 8,12 4,16




-2 6,10 4,13—>8,12—+1,16  
Table 8-4. FT ACS Pr0pellant Requirements
 
FT MiSSiOD Fuel Mass (kg) MMH Mass (kg) N204 Mass (kg)
1 41 1 5 26
2 20 8 1 2
3 55 21 34
4 41 1 5 26
5 40 1 5 25   
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Table 8-5. FT Refueling Operations
 
     
 
 
Vehicle(s) Refueling Fuel Payload
FT Mission FI‘(s) Involved Serviced Location (5g)
1 FTla, Fle,FT1c ADV LLO 9011.76
2 FT2 CM, PM] LEO 5085.38
3 FT3 PM] L] 2114.17
4 F14 PM] LLO 1491 .44
5 FT3, FT5 CM, PM] L] 9646.36
Table 8-6. FT Power Requirements by Flight Phase
Power Requirements (kW)
System Subsystem LEO TLI LLO — Active LLO — Standby
Avionics SIGI GPS 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000
Star Tracker 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.000
Sun Sensor 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Horizon Sensor 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Laser Rangefinder 0.053 0.000 0.053 0.000
Flight Computer 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.065
Communications 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.000
Thermal Pumps 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.019
Structure Docking System 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Propulsion ' ACS 0.736 0.736 0.736 0.736
























[Thrust (vacuum): 160,000 lb f (267 kN)
\S/pcechfirc‘JTpulse (nominal, 467 sec
[Chamber Pressure: 11950 psia (134 bar)
[Mixture Ratio (O/F): [5.8:1.0
[Weight: [1300 lb (591 kg)
[Area Ratio: I300
itength: 1130 in (3300 mm)
(Restarts: [Multiple
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Table 9-2. Centaur PM-2 Capacity
 
 
       
 
       
 
      
Payload Fuel Mass % PM2
Payload Mass (kg) Destination Av (km/s) (_kg) Capacity
CM 1 7784 L1 3.068 20039 97%
PMl/AM 1 4696 L1 3.068 1 7200 83%
PM 1-S/AM-S 16572 L1 3.068 1 8825 91%
ADV 1 81 10 LLO 3.101 20672 100%
FT-Ml 1 81 1 0 LLO 3.101 20672 1 00%
FT-M3 8347 L1 3.068 1 0582 51%
FT-M4 8443 LLO 3.1 01 1 0840 52%
FT-M5 1 7936 L1 3.068 201 92 98%
Table 9-3. Delta 4-2 RL-lOB-Z PM-2 Capacity
Payload Fuel Mass % PM2
Payload Mass (k ) Destination Av(km/s) (kg) Capacity
CM 17784 L] 3.068 20868 98%
PMl/AM 14696 L] 3.068 18146 86%
PM 1 -S/AM-S 16572 L] 3.068 19695 93%
ADV 17828 LLO 3.101 21222 100%
FT-M] 17828 LLO 3.101 21222 100%_4
FT-M3 8536 L1 3.068 11917 56%
FT-M4 8364 LLO 3.101 . 11926 56%
FT-M5 17608 L] 3.068 20697 98%
Table 9-4. Delta 4-2 MB-60 PM-2 Capacity
Payload Fuel Mass % PM2
Payload Mass (k ) Destination Av (km/s (kg) Camity
CM 17784 L1 3.068 20846 100%
PM1/AM 14696 L] 3.068 18167 87%
PM 1 -S/AM-S 16572 L] 3.068 19690 94%
ADV 17545 LLO 3.101 20924 100%
FT-Ml 17545 LLO 3.101 20924 100%
FT-M3 8763 L] 3.068 12243 59%
FT-M4 8291 LLO 3.101 1 1969 57%
FT-M5 17254 L] 3.068 20340 97%  
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Table 9-5. ELV Lift Capacity for Centaur PM2
 
 
    
PM2 Total % Delta IV H % Atlas V H
Payload Mass (kg) Camity Capacity
CM 22253 97% 89%
PM1/AM 19413 84% 78%
PMl-S/AM-S 21038 91% 84%
ADV 22885 99% 92%
FT-Ml 22885 99% 92%
FT-M3 12796 56% 51%
FT-M4 13053 57% 52%
FT-MS 22405 97% 90%
Table 9-6. ELV Lift Capacity for Delta 4-2 RL-lOB-Z PM2
 
     
PM2 Total % Delta IV H % Atlas V H
Payload MassLkg) Caflcity Cgpacity
CM 24646 107% 99%
PMl/AM 21924 95% 88%
PMl-S/AM-S 23473 102% 94%
ADV 25000 109% 100%
FT-Ml 25000 109% 100%
FT-M3 15696 68% 63%
FT-M4 15705 68% 63%
FT-MS 24475 106% 98%
Table 9-7. ELV Lift Capacity for Delta 4-2 MB-60 PM2
 
 
    
PM2 Total % Delta IV H % Atlas V H
Payload Mass (k ) Capacity Capaci
CM 24922 108% 100%
PMl/AM 22243 97% 89%
PMl-S/AM-S 23766 103% 95%
ADV 25000 109% 100%
FT-M] 25000 109% 100%
FT-M3 16319 71% 65%
FT-M4 16045 70% 64%





Table 11-1. LTV Spacecraft Cost Estimates
 
        
Spacecraft Dry Program
or Engine Mission Type Block Difficulty Weight (lb) Total Cost ($3)
CM Spacecraft—Manned Reentry 2 Average 30402 4 6.284
PM] Space Transport - Upper Stage 1 High 9634 5 2.824
ADV Spacecraft-Manned Reentry 1 Avera e 1291] 4 4.592
PM2 Space Transport - Upper Stage 8 Very Low 4880 57 0.976
AM Space Transport - Unmanned Reentry 1 Average 17047 11 2.103
FT Space Transport - Upper Stage 2 Averge 9593 47 5.359
Space Transport - Liquid Rocket
IRS-72 Engine - Lox/Rp 3 Very Low 340 65 0.097
Space Transport - Liquid Rocket
—10 Engine - Lox/Lh 14 Very Low 368 57 0.249
Space Transport - Liquid Rocket
IR-4D Engine - Lox/Lb 5 Very Low 8 1136 0.039



















Table 11-3. Delta Family Payload and Cost Data
 
  
Launch Vehicle Payload Capacity (kg) Cost (M)
Delta IV M 8,120 $70
Delta IV M+ (4,2) 10,430 $90
Delta IV M+ (5,2) 7,980 $80
Delta IV M+ (5,4) 11,475 $100
Delta IV H 23,040 $140  
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Table 11-4. ELV Percent Capacity of Trailblazer Spacecraft
 
 
             
 
Delta
Launch Atlas Delta Atlas Atlas Atlas Atlas Atlas IV M+ Atlas Delta
ELV Payload Mass fig) V H IV H 552 542 532 522 512 (4,2) 502 IV M
CM 17784 71% 77% 87% 94% 103% 118% 141% 171% 173% 219%
PMl 5725 23% 25% 28% 30% 33% 38% 45% 55% 56% 70%
PMl-S 7547 30% 33% 37% 40% 44% 50% 60% 72% 73% 93%
ADV 18110 72% 79% 88% 96% 105% 120% 144% 174% 176% 223%
AM 9025 36% 39% 44% 48% 52% 60% 72% 87% 88% 111%
AM-S 9025 36% 39% 44% 48% 52% 60% 72% 87% 88% 111%
FT-Ml 18110 72% 79% 88% 96% 105% 120% 144% 174% 176% 223%
FT-M2 10062 40% 44% 49% 53% 58% 67% 80% 96% 98% 124%
FT-M3 8347 33% 36% 41% 44% 48% 55% 66% 80% 81% 103%
FT-M4 8443 34% 37% 41% 45% 49% 56% 67% 81% 82% 104%
FT-MS 17936 72% 78% 87% 95% 104% 119% 142% 172% 174% 221%
PM2 (CM) 22253 89% 97% 108% 117% 129% 148% 177% 213% 216% 274%
PM2(PM1/AM) 19413 78% 84% 95% 102% 113% 129% 154% 186% 188% 239%
PM2
(PMl-S/AM-S) 21038 84% 91% 103% 111% 122% 140% 167% 202% 204% 259%
PM2 (ADV) 22885 92% 99% 112% 121% 133% 152% 182% 219% 222% 282%
PM2(FT-M1) 22885 92% 99% 112% 121% 133% 152% 182% 219% 222% 282%
PM2(FT-M3) 12796 51% 56% 62% 68% 74% 85% 102% 123% 124% 158%
PM2(FT-M4) 13053 52% 57% 64% 69% 76% 87% 104% 125% 127% 161%
PM2(FT-M5) 22405 90% 97% 109% 118% 130% 149% 178% 215% 218% 276%
Table 11-5. ELV Percent Capacity of Selected Combined Spacecraft
Delta
Launch Atlas Delta Atlas Atlas Atlas Atlas Atlas IV M+ Atlas Delta
ELV Payload Mass (kg) V H IV H 552 542 532 522 512 (4,2) 502 IV M
CM+PM1 23509 94% 102% 115% 124% 136% 156% 187% 225% 228% 290%
PMl-S+AM-S 16572 66% 72% 81% 87% 96% 110% 132% 159% 161% 204%
AM+FTM2 19087 76% 83% 93% 101% 111% 127% 152% 183% 185% 235%
FTM3+PM2
(FTM3) 21143 85% 92% 103% 112% 123% 140% 168% 203% 205% 260%
FTM4+PM2








     
Spacecraft
Launch Launch
LTV Spacecraft Mass (kg) Vehicle Cost (M)
ADV 18,110 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (ADV) 22,885 Delta IV H $140
PMl-S+AM-S 16,572 Atlas 532 $ 100
PM2 (PMl-S/AM-S) 21,038 Delta IV H $140
CM+PM1 23,509 Atlas V H $130
FT-Ml 18,110 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M1) . 22,885 Delta IV H $140
FT-Ml 18,110 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M1) 22,885 Delta IV H S 140
FT-MS 17,936 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M5) 22,405 Delta IV H $140
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 21,497 Atlas V H $130
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 21,143 Delta IV H $140
AM+FTM2 19,087 Atlas 552 $110
PM2 (PMl/AM) 19,413 Atlas 552 $110
Trailblazer Crew N/A Shuttle $500
PM2 (CM) 22,253 Delta IV H $140
Table 11-7. LTV Subsequent Even Numbered Expedition Launch Costs
 
 
    
Spacecraft
Launch Launch
LTV Spacecraft Mass (kg) Vehicle Cost (M)
FT-Ml 18,110 'Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-Ml) 22,885 Delta IV H $140
FT-M] 18,110 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M1) 22,885 Delta IV H $140
FT-M5 17,936 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M5) 22,405 Delta IV H $140
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 21,497 Atlas V H $130
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 21,143 Delta IV H $140
AM+FTM2 19,087 Atlas 552 $110
PM2 (PMl/AM) 19,413 Atlas 552 $110
Trailblazer Crew N/A Shuttle $500




Table 11-8. LTV Subsequent Odd Numbered Expedition Launch Costs
 
 
   
Spacecraft
Launch Launch
LTV Spacecraft Mass (kg) Vehicle Cost (M)
FT-Ml 18,110 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M1) 22,885 Delta IV H $140
FT-M5 17,936 Atlas 542 $105
PM2 (FT-M5) 22,405 Delta IV H $140
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 21,497 Atlas V H $130
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 21,143 Delta IV H $140
AM+FTM2 19,087 Atlas 552 $110
PM2 (PMl/AM) 19,413 Atlas 552 $110
Trailblazer Crew N/A Shuttle $500
PM2 (CM) 22,253 Delta IV H $140 





     
Fuel Mass (kg)
LTV Spacecraft N204 MMH L02 LH2
ADV 8414 4105 0 0
PM2 (ADV) 0 0 17719 2953
PM1-S+AM-S 3087 1506 0 0
PM2 (PM 1 -S/AM-S) 0 0 16136 2689
CM+PM1 3529 1722 0 0
FT-Ml 8570 5 194 0 0
PM2 (FT-M 1) O 0 17719 2953
FT-Ml 8570 5 194 0 0
PM2 (FT-M 1) 0 0 17719 2953
FT-M5 9134 4455 0 0
PM2 (FT-M5) 0 0 17307 2885
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 2753 1343 9291 1549
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 2688 1311 9071 1512
AM+FTM2 4797 2340 0 0
PM2 (PMl/AM) O 0 14742 2457
PM2 (CM) 0 0 17177 2863









     
Fuel Mass (kj)
LTV Spacecraft N201 MMH LO2 LH
FT-Ml 8570 5194 0 0
PM2 (FT-M1) 0 0 17719 2953
FT-Ml 8570 5 194 0 0
PM2 (FT-Ml) 0 0 17719 2953
FT-M5 9134 4455 0 0
PM2 (FT-M5) 0 0 17307 2885
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 2753 1343 9291 1549
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 2688 1311 9071 1512
AM+FTM2 4797 2340 0 0
PM2 (PM1/AM) 0 0 14742 2457
PM2 (CM) 0 0 17177 2863
Totals 3651] 19837 103025 17171





LTV Spacecraft N204 MMH LO2 LH2
FT-Ml 8570 5 194 0 0
PM2 (FT-M1) 0 0 17719 2953
FT-M5 9134 4455 0 0
PM2 (FT-M5) 0 0 17307 2885
FTM4+PM2 (FTM4) 2753 1343 9291 1549
FTM3+PM2 (FTM3) 2688 1311 9071 1512
AM+FTM2 4797 2340 0 O
PM2 (PMl/AM) O 0 14742 2457
PM2 (CM) 0 0 17177 2863




Table 11-12. Total LTV Fuel Costs
 
     
Fuel Mass (k ) Volume (gal) Cost
N204 281412 51270 $6,836,829
MMH 150448 45164 $20,111,500
LO2 804901 1 86520 $124,968
LH2 134150 506268 $496,142
Table ll-l3. X-38 V201 Ground Control Center Cost Data (Rader, 2002)
Rough Cost for X-38 V-201 Ground System Courtesy Steve Rader, NASA-JSC
 
  
Hardware and Software Costs Number Unit Cost Cost
Display Computers (standard Win2K High End PCS) 38 $2,000 $76,000
18" Flat Panel Monitors (Note prices have dropped significantly
since we bought these in FY00) 53 $2,500 $145,000
Data Servers 2 $5,000 $ 10,000
Telemetry Interface Servers (including $15K Avtec boards) 2 $18,000 $36,000
Telemetry Processing Servers (standard Win2K High End PC's) 4 $2,000 $3,000
Network Switching and Comm Equipment - $6,000 $6,000
Strip Chart Recorders (Everest) 4 $20,000 $80,000
Printers 3 $800 $2,400
Projector 2 $10,000 $20,000
COTS Messaging Software Lic (we used Tibco's Rendezvous
product.. But are looking at cheaper alternatives for the future.) 46 $350 $39,100
Satellite Took Kit (STK) (Modules: Connect for all seats + 2
VO lie. And a Communications coverage Lic.) 10 $2,300 $23,000
Misc. Software (O/S, Tools, Utilities) 46 $500 $23,000
Total Hardware Costs $468,500
Reoccurring Annual Costs Annual
Number Unit Cost Annual Cost
Software Maintenance (Rdvz + STK) $100,000 $ 100,000
Hardware maintenance (computers only) 46 $2,160 $99,360
Network Admin/Tech (personnel) 2 $100,000 $200,000
Total Reoccurring Annual Costs $399,360
Software Development Costs (for a 2.5 year development Annual Cost of 2.5
cycle) Number Unit Cost Year Dev.
Ground Software Design, Code, Test (personnel) 4 $150,000 $1,500,000
Development Software (licenses) 4 $12,500 $50,000
Total Development Costs for 2.5 Year Development Cycle $1,550,000
Note: Software development costs are highly dependent on your
deve10pment team, requirements, and project management. The
costs shown here reflect a very small, efficient team.




Table 11-14. Trailblazer LTV MCC Development Costs
 
Cost Estimates for LTV MCC
 
Hardware and Software Costs Number Unit Cost Cost
Computers (standard Win2K equivalent High End PC's) 162 $2,000 $324,000
18" Flat Panel Monitors 648 $2,500 $1,620,000
Data Servers 24 $5,000 $120,000
Telemetry Interface Servers (including $15K Avtec boards) 24 $18,000 $432,000
Telemetry Processing Servers (Win2K equivalent High End
PCs) 48 $2,000 $96,000
Network Switching and Comm Equipment 12 $6,000 $72,000
Strip Chart Recorders (Everest) - $20,000 _
Printers 10 $800 $8,000
Projector 8 $ 10,000 $80,000
COTS Messaging Software Lic. 258 $850 $219,300
Satellite Took Kit (STK) (Modules: Connect for all seats + 2
VO lic. And a Communications coverage Lic.) 54 32300 $124,200
Misc. Software (O/S, Tools, Utilities) 258 $500 $129,000
Total Hardware Costs $3,224,500
Reoccurring Annual Costs Annual
Number Unit Cost Annual Cost
Software Maintenance (Rdvz + STK) $100,000 $100,000
Hardware maintenance (computers only) 258 $2,160 $557,280
Network Admin/Tech (personnel) 2 $100,000 $200,000
Total Reoccurring Annual Costs $857,280
Software Development Costs (for a 2.5 year development Annual Cost of 2.5
cycle) Number Unit Cost Year Dev.
Ground Software Design, Code, Test (personnel) 12 $150,000 $22,500,000
Development Software (licenses) 12 $12,500 $375,000
Total Development Costs for 2.5 Year Development Cycle $22,875,000
Note: Software development costs include a 5x multiplier to








     
MPSR Days Group
FCR Console Positions Positions Staffed Size Salary
Flight 0 365 9 $778,068
CAPCOM 0 29 3 $259,356
MOD 0 N/A N/A N/A
Mew 0 29 3 $259,356
PAO 0 365 9 $778,068
GC 1 365 18 $1,556,136
EVA 1 29 6 $5 18,712
ELVIS l 365 6 $518,712
SABER 3 365 36 $3,112,272
LIFE 2 365 27 $2,334,204
TEMPER 3 365 36 $3,] 12,272
VADER 3 365 36 $3,] 12,272
VEHICON 3 365 36 $3,112,272
STAR 2 365 27 $2,334,204
PAC-MAN 3 365 36 $3,112,272
CANDIES 2 365 27 $2,334,204
EMCEE 2 365 9 $778,068
RAT 1 365 6 $518,712
AT-AT 2 365 27 $2,334,204
DART 2 206 18 $1,556,136
HYPER 2 55 9 $778,068
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Figure 4-3. Crew Accommodations Layout
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Figure 4-9. APAS docking mechanism (Schneider, et al, 1996).
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Figure 4-10. APAS with MDAS extendible boom (Schneider, et al, 1996).
 
Figure 4-11. MDAS Steel Plate
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MGS Steel Plates
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Figure 4-13. MGS Steel Plate Orientation
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Figure 7-3. LTV Preparing to Enter Aerocapture Module
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Figure 9-1. Centaur Upper Stage (Atlas Launch System Mission Planner’s Guide, 2001)































Figure 9-2. Delta 4-2 Upper Stage (Delta IV Payload Planners Guide, 2000)
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Figure 11-3. Trailblazer LTV Program Cost Distribution
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